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FM 30-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

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COMBAT

INTELLIGENCE

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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Field Manual }

No. 30-5 }

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1–1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual furnishes guidance to commanders, staff officers, military intelligence officers, and other personnel concerned with the collection, production, and use of combat intelligence in planning or conducting military operations at all levels of command. It deals primarily with the organization of an intelligence section; the functions of the intelligence officer; the intelligence sources and agencies; the intelligence aspects of terrain and weather; the planning, collection, processing, dissemination, and use of intelligence; and the intelligence aspects of special environmental conditions, special operational methods, and special purpose operations. Intelligence aspects of friendly employment of chemical and nuclear weapons and protection against enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks.

b. This manual is in consonance with the international agreements listed below. Applicable agreements are listed by type of agreement and number at the beginning of each chapter.

Title	NATO STANAG	CENTO STANAG	SEATO SEASTAG	ABCA SOLOG
Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports	2008	2008	2008	
Operation Orders, and Administrative/Logistic Orders	2014	2014	2014	17R
Operational Situation Reports	2020	2020	2020	
Intelligence Reports	2022	2022	2022	
Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas and Boundaries	2029	2029	2029	
Interrogation of Prisoners of War	2033	2033	____	69
NATO Intelligence Subject Code	2073			
Enemy Order of Battle Records for Combat Intelligence	2077	2077		
Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment	2084	____	2084	
Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment	2097	2097		
Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radioactive Fallout, and Biological and Chemical Attacks	2103	2103	____	123
Intelligence Estimate	2118	2118	2118	
Offensive Air Support Operations	2134			
Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms	3377	3377	3377	

1–2. Recommended Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the test in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219. Originators of proposed changes that would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060 to facilitate review and followup.

CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

Section I. INTELLIGENCE

2-1. General

To a degree, every profession has a language of its own, a language which is used in the particular environment of that profession. The military as a whole is no exception to this general rule. Therefore, when a soldier speaks of information or intelligence in general or combat intelligence, strategic intelligence, and counterintelligence in particular, he attaches to these words a specific meaning in a specific context. The reason for this special language is obvious—only in this manner will there be a common understanding of the communications involved. From this standpoint, a knowledge of the accepted usage of these words is important. There is also a value in knowing their context, their interrelationships, and the environment in which they are found.

2-2. Intelligence Versus Information

"Intelligence" is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas, and which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations. As such, it is to be distinguished from "information," because information is unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, communications, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources from which intelligence is produced. Information itself may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, pertinent or not pertinent, positive or negative. For definitions on specific types of intelligence, see AR 310-25.

2-3. Combat Intelligence

Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. It may be obtained from within his own command, or from higher or adjacent headquarters. Combat intelligence is derived from the evaluation of information on the enemy (both his capabilities and his vulnerabilities), the weather, and the terrain. The objective of combat intelligence is to minimize uncertainty concerning the effects of these factors on the accomplishment of the mission. The commander employs combat intelligence to determine how to best use available resources in accomplishing the mission and maintaining the security of his command. In noncombat commands, combat intelligence provides a basis for security measures, for decisions as to the best use of the area of operations in accomplishing the mission, and for determining or anticipating future support requirements. The term "tactical intelligence" has essentially the same meaning and the two terms are often used interchangeably.

2-4. Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence is that knowledge which is required to serve as a basis for the formulation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Oriented on national objectives, it assists in determining feasible national objectives and in furnishing a basis for planning methods of accomplishing them. Factors which influence the military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of nations are considered components of strategic intelligence.

2-5. Interrelationship of Combat and Strategic Intelligence

a. Distinctions. The distinction between strategic intelligence and combat intelligence is principally one of scope. Both types of intelligence are concerned with a knowledge of foreign nations and with areas of actual or possible military operations, and both are produced by the application of the same fundamental intelligence collection and processing techniques. The components

of strategic intelligence are geographic, transportation and telecommunication, sociological, political, economic, scientific and armed forces intelligence. Combat intelligence, focuses on the enemy, weather, and terrain and is obtained through such means as interrogation, ground and aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, area intelligence, counterintelligence, technical intelligence, imagery interpretation, and sensory data obtained from target acquisition and night observation devices (STANO).

b. *Derivation.* Although combat and strategic intelligence are treated as separate categories of military intelligence, there are several *functional* categories of intelligence from which both are derived. Some of these categories of intelligence are listed below, but a more comprehensive list may be found under "intelligence" in AR 310-25.

    (1) Order of battle.
    (2) Technical.
    (3) Target.
    (4) Terrain.
    (5) Weather.

c. *Overlapping Interests.* Many subjects of strategic intelligence interest are also of combat intelligence interest.

(1) Information gathered and intelligence produced for strategic purposes are frequently useful in the conduct of tactical operations. In this category are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, hamlets, and other terrain features; studies of transportation and communications systems; data on trafficability, cross-country movement, climate, and hydrography; political, sociological, and ec-

nomic studies; and order of battle studies on foreign armies, navies, and air forces. Field commanders, particularly of amphibious and airborne operations, may have to depend almost entirely upon strategic intelligence for their initial knowledge of the enemy and the area of operations. In this instance, the distinction between the two loses its effect.

(2) Information collected by combat units often assists in the production of strategic intelligence. Interrogation of prisoners of war and other individuals of intelligence interest (FM 30-15) may provide strategic information on political and economic conditions within the hostile denied area. Technical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon or other item of equipment, in addition to providing valuable combat intelligence, may be used in producing strategic intelligence to aid in determining the production of industrial or manufacturing centers (FM 30-16). On the other hand, much of what would be strategic intelligence in a conventional war becomes combat intelligence in an internal defense and development (IDAD) action. During IDAD operations, political, economic, sociological, geographic and insurgency intelligence is as important for day to day tactical operations as it is for strategic planning.

2-6. Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is the security phase of intelligence covering all activities devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage (FM 30-17 and FM 30-17A).

Section II. OPERATIONS

2-7. General

Intelligence operations concentrate on those essential elements of information (EEI) concerning the enemy and the area of operations, needed by the commander to accomplish his mission. The enemy situation and the area of operations are analyzed to determine the key elements which affect military operations. Key elements include such conditions as extremes of weather and terrain; enemy use of particular forms of combat power; implementation of an enemy capability previously held in restraint; or use of resources and characteristics of the area which affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

2-8. Geographical Areas of Intelligence Operations

a. *General.* Areas of intelligence operations are assigned to units on the basis of areas of influence and areas of interest. Such assignment provides for continuous surveillance of the entire area of operations.

b. *Area of Influence.* The area of influence is that portion of the assigned zone or area of operations in which the commander is capable of directly affecting the course of combat by the employment of his own available combat power. Normally, each commander will possess the

means for obtaining the information he needs from within his area of influence.

(1) Although the area of influence can extend in any direction from the forward disposition of the command, the significant direction and dimension is that which extends forward from the FEBA. For practical purposes the limit of the area of influence is set by the effective range of the available weapon systems since a commander will not normally maneuver the subordinate elements of his command beyond the range of the supporting fires available to him.

(2) A weapon system includes the means to acquire targets for the weapon; consequently, the range of the system is just as effectively limited by the inability to acquire targets as it is by a lack of weapon range. The area of influence, then, is sensitive to terrain and weather conditions which reduce the target acquisition capability for the weapon system involved.

c. *Area of Interest.* Intelligence operations are concerned not only with the area of influence but also extend further to the area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning for the extension of the area of influence or for the displacement of potential targets into the area of influence.

(1) The area of interest includes the area of influence plus that area outside the area of influence containing enemy forces which, if employed in the area of influence, could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. The commander relies on higher and adjacent commands to conduct intelligence operations in that portion of his area of interest which is outside his area of influence.

(2) The area of interest of a subordinate command is normally included in the area of influence of the next higher command. The next higher commander, therefore, has combat surveillance over it and provides the bulk of the surveillance required in that portion of the subordinate commander's area of interest which is outside the subordinate's area of influence. The relationship of the two areas is schematically depicted in figure 2-1.

2-9. Basic Principles of Intelligence Operations

Although the product of intelligence operations in the Army varies with the requirements posed by the operational environment, certain basic principles guide the conduct of all intelligence operations. These are as follows:

a. Intelligence operations and tactical operations are interdependent.

(1) Intelligence operations within the Army are an integral part of the operations of all units. The degree of success achieved by any unit in accomplishing its mission will be directly affected by the intelligence which it develops and uses.

(2) Staff agencies with responsibility and authority for preparing and issuing operational orders and those with responsibility for intelligence operations must work as one. Only in this manner can orders and plans reflect available intelligence and take full advantage of available knowledge of the situation and of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Responsibility for coordination rests jointly upon intelligence and other staff agencies.

b. Intelligence must be useful. Intelligence must increase knowledge and understanding of the particular problem under consideration in order that logical decisions can be reached.

c. Intelligence must be timely. The best intelligence is valueless unless it reaches the user in time to serve as a basis for appropriate action. Adherence to this principle may involve some sacrifice of completeness and accuracy in the intelligence product. Whenever this occurs, the user of the intelligence must be informed of the loss of completeness or accuracy. The complete intelligence is identified and forwarded when it becomes available.

d. Intelligence operations must permit flexibility in procedures. Standard procedures generally make intelligence operations more effective. However, intelligence operations are based upon reason and judgment; procedures must be flexible to meet unexpected requirements. Procedures which cannot be changed to meet the requirements of a given situation generally lead to failure.

e. Intelligence operations require imagination and foresight. Policies and procedures that limit the imagination or initiative of subordinate agencies are avoided. Intelligence personnel and agencies use resourcefulness so that all available information can be developed and exploited to produce intelligence for the user. Blind acceptance of the continuance of the current situation may be fatal.

f. The nature of intelligence requires employment of continuous security measures.

(1) Unauthorized personnel or individuals having no need to know must be denied information about operations of intelligence agencies,

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                    ENCOMPASSES AREA OF INFLUENCE
                ——— ENCOMPASSES AREA OF INTEREST.
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
Figure 2–1. Relationship of area of influence to area of interest.

sources of information, and the intelligence product.

(2) While the effects of compromise of complete intelligence studies and estimates are obvious, the cumulative effects of compromise of fragmentary information also are dangerous. The compromise of a source nearly always will result in loss or lessened value of that source to the intelligence element exploring it. Some sources are so peculiarly susceptible to this that elaborate security systems are required for protection.

g. Intelligence processing agencies must exchange information and intelligence freely and completely to permit production of a complete and timely product. Security measures must not hinder the timely dissemination of information or intelligence to those who need it.

2–10. Intelligence Cycle

a. The activities connected with intelligence operations generally follow a four step cycle oriented on the commander's mission. The four steps are:

(1) Directing the collection effort.

(2) Collecting the information.

(3) Processing the collected information.

(4) Disseminating the resulting intelligence.

b. The intelligence cycle is continuous (fig. 2–3). All four steps may take place concurrently. At the same time that new information is being collected by intelligence assets, other information previously collected, is analyzed, processed, and disseminated.

DIRECTING

- SELECTION
- INDICATIONS
- PRIORITIES
- REQUIREMENTS
- SUPERVISE

COLLECTING

- TROOPS
- INTEL SPECIALISTS
- SPECIAL UNITS
- OTHER SOURCES

DIRECTING

DISSEMINATING MISSION COLLECTING

PROCESSING

DISSEMINATING AND USE

- TIMELY
- PROPER FORM
- IMPORTANCE
- COMMANDERS
- STAFF
- OTHERS

PROCESSING

- RECORDING
- EVALUATION
- INTERPRETATION

Figure 2–2. The intelligence cycle.

Section III. INFLUENCE OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

2–11. General

FM 100–5 presents a detailed discussion of the operational environment. While all elements of the operational environment do not necessarily influence every operation, each operation is influenced by the commander's mission, the nature of the conflict, the scale of use of nuclear and other weapons, the method of troop transport, the nature of enemy forces, the locale, the civil population in the area of operations, and the friendly forces available.

2–12. The Mission

The mission of the command is a paramount consideration in conducting intelligence operations; hence, intelligence operations must be conducted to produce the intelligence necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of the mission. Requirements are, therefore, based on the mission, and the information obtained is processed for its significance in relation to the accomplishment of the mission. This consideration makes it imperative that intelligence personnel have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the assigned mission. In addition to the assigned mission, contingency missions will also generate requirements for intelligence.

2–13. Nature of Conflict

Intelligence requirements are similar for all types of conflict. However, in a given type of conflict, emphasis is often placed upon certain aspects of these intelligence requirements.

a. Cold War.

(1) The frequent noncombatant nature of military activities in cold war situations influences intelligence requirements. While military aspects of the area of operations are emphasized, the political, economic, technological, sociological, and psychological actions in the area are greatly emphasized. Requirements for information on covert and overt activities and potential capabilities of dissent and insurgent elements also are necessary to determine the nature of the activities of these elements. An analysis of these activities is necessary to determine a counteraction, to provide warning of an extension of the conflict to other types of conflict, and to provide for an immediate attack of targets if open conflict begins.

(2) Counterintelligence requirements are particularly significant. Since covert enemy activ-

ities such as espionage and sabotage; political, social, and economic subversion; guerrilla and insurgent activity; or any combination of these are normal operations, a continuous effort is necessary to counter them. This effort is a responsibility of the highest to the lowest individual from the highest headquarters to the lowest echelon.

(3) Intelligence collection procedures and techniques vary with the nature of the environment. Troop commitments will influence the scope of the operations; for example, in some cases regular military forces may be required to conduct what are essentially combat-preventive operations. In this cold war environment, which encompasses stages from simple political maneuvering between some countries to insurgent warfare in other countries, changes in conditions in turn demand a change in emphasis of procedures and techniques. As examples, the need to honor political boundaries often reduces the effective employment of airborne surveillance devices and requires a modified use of these means and a greater emphasis upon covert collection techniques. Or, the nature of phase I insurgency may limit the effectiveness of electronic collection devices and combat intelligence techniques and may also require greater emphasis on covert collection techniques. For each situation, collection techniques must be selected in terms of their capability and suitability within the nature of the situation. See chapter 11 for a discussion of intelligence aspects related to an insurgent warfare environment. FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A provide detailed intelligence guidance and procedures applicable to the conduct of intelligence activities in stability operations.

b. Limited War. In a limited war, intelligence operations are primarily of a combat intelligence nature. Although the immediate emphasis in intelligence operations is determined by the requirement to support the existing operational situation, the consequences of a sudden extension of the conflict, particularly to a general war, dictate that intelligence operations be conditioned to this possibility. Intelligence operations must produce information and intelligence which will provide warning of an impending extension of the conflict. The overall system, which includes organization, equipment, and operations, must be maintained in such a condition so as to permit ready transition from a limited to a general war.

c. General War. During the opening phases of a general war, the intelligence emphasis is on maintaining the security of the command; providing early warning of the start of major enemy tactical operations; protecting intelligence collection means; and providing such evaluated information concerning the nature of the enemy, the weather, and terrain, as may be available and is required. When tactical operations begin, intelligence operations are oriented toward securing the intelligence necessary for accomplishment of the assigned tactical mission.

2–14. Use of Nuclear, and Chemical Weapons-Munitions

a. General. The use of nuclear, weapons and chemical agents affects the nature of military operations which in turn changes the intelligence requirements. For example, the scale on which nuclear weapons and chemical agents are employed affects the relationship between fire and maneuver. This relationship influences intelligence operations concerned with target acquisition. Similarly, the scale on which nuclear weapons or chemical agents are used affects the degree of dispersion required to provide adequate security to units and installations. The degree of dispersion also influences intelligence operations concerned with combat surveillance and the physical area of operations. Greater dispersion of targets may demand the use of weapons with large areas of effect. These weapons, delivering nuclear surface bursts have weather-dependent effects. Prior to employment, detailed weather information is required. Also, in using weapons with smaller areas of effect, weather requirements are essential in determining which units or areas, other than the target, will be affected. The effects of chemical agents also influences the use of defensive and protective equipment.

b. Use of Nuclear Weapons on a Restricted Scale.

(1) A restricted scale of use of nuclear weapons dictates that combat forces adopt measures which permit speed, dispersion, and mobility—of a high degree, on air and ground—on the battlefield. Intelligence requirements emphasize the importance of knowledge of the terrain, particularly the air and ground routes that influence courses of action. Target acquisition for nuclear delivery means is a major function. Political, social, and economic information of the area of operations is relatively less important to the conduct of the military operation than terrain and

target acquisition data. The enemy, weather, and the terrain are the dominant intelligence factors that permit the commander to judge vulnerabilities, compare courses of action, and arrive at prudent decisions.

(2) Counterintelligence activities focus on measures to protect nuclear delivery means (and associated installations) and to reduce the effectiveness of enemy target acquisition.

(3) Techniques and procedures must make maximum use of advanced technological equipment to provide the responsive intelligence operation necessary in nuclear warfare.

c. Use of Nuclear Weapons on an Unrestricted Scale.

(1) Firepower generally becomes the dominant element of combat power when using nuclear weapons in the higher yields. In such situations, intelligence operations are concerned more with target acquisition and counterintelligence than with the influence of the area of operations on ground and air mobility.

(2) Emphasis in target acquisition is on locating enemy nuclear delivery means and other nuclear targets.

(3) Emphasis in counterintelligence operations is on preserving the security of the command and on protecting nuclear delivery systems.

d. Use of Chemical and Biological Agents.

(1) Enemy employment of chemical and biological agents introduces new factors into intelligence operations. The effectiveness of such agents, the difficulty of immediately detecting their employment, and the surprise with which they can be delivered present a formidable intelligence problem. They also create requirements not only for means of detecting chemical and biological agents but also for means of obtaining information on the enemy's capability and intention to employ these agents.

(2) The influence of weather, particularly micrometeorology, on the effectiveness of our chemical agents and on friendly troop safety distances requires detailed and reliable weather forecasts and observations (TM 3–240).

2–15. Enemy Forces

Enemy forces may vary from a well-trained, well-supported, highly mobile, and numerically superior force to one that is a loosely organized group of irregular forces operating with little or no support. These latter forces can be expected,

however, to exploit fully opportunities for guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage, and be capable of maintaining sustained operations under favorable conditions. The diversity of possible enemy capabilities correspondingly increases the scope of the intelligence requirements of the commander. Knowledge of enemy intelligence organizations and operational procedures is also a key factor in estimating enemy capabilities, adapting adequate security measures, and employing effective countermeasures.

2–16. The Area of Operations

An important intelligence task is to provide information about the area of operations. The magnitude of this task increases as the locale of military operations changes from a modern, well-developed, and well-documented area of the world to a more remote area on which little or no documentation is available. In such an area, greater effort must be expended on the collection of information about the area of operations (particularly terrain and populace).

2–17. The Civil Population

a. The attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the civil population significantly affect intelligence operations. A friendly populace that actively assists the military force is an important asset in collecting information and in countering the enemy's intelligence activities. Vigorous well-planned psychological civil affairs operations programs, including community relations and civic action, will contribute to development of a cooperative attitude on the part of the populace. A hostile population, on the other hand, makes the collection of information more difficult, increases the scope and magnitude of counterintelligence operations, and intensifies the requirements for information on the civil aspects of the area. In planning combat operations hostile civilian activities constituting a threat to the security of activities or installations must be taken into consideration.

b. In stability operations, the civil population is an important combat intelligence factor because the insurgent war revolves around the people. Both insurgent and government forces attempt to win the loyal support of the population. The insurgent has directly associated the people with the insurgency through promises or threats in order to gain their loyalty and continuing support. The insurgent depends on the support of the people to sustain his manpower requirements, his

logistical needs, and his intelligence collection effort. This then provides one of the most important distinctions between stability operations and conventional warfare. Almost every action taken must be carefully considered as to its possible effect on the people, weighing immediate effects versus long range effects, and effects on the enemy as opposed to effects on the people. In the traditional, large land mass type of warfare, the civil population will tend to have less relative importance than they will be in insurgent type conflicts in an undeveloped area. Insurgent forces are dependent to a large degree on the support of the populace, thus creating a struggle not only for control of the land area, but also for control of the populace. Consequently, people are an important intelligence target on the same level as enemy, weather, and terrain (FM 30–31).

2–18. Friendly Forces

All friendly units are involved in offensive and defensive security measures. Intelligence operations are oriented primarily on aspects of the operational environment external to the command. However, the conduct of intelligence operations is affected by the means available to the friendly forces and the organization of the friendly forces.

a. Means Available.

(1) The availability and capability of intelligence units and information collection devices of friendly forces are important influences in intelligence operations. For example, a limitation in the number of aerial platforms may result in a reduction in the tactical air reconnaissance/aerial battlefield surveillance capability. This in turn may require a greater dependence upon collection by ground reconnaissance/surveillance means.

(2) All military units are means for collecting information. The amount of effort devoted to this aspect of intelligence operations varies with the primary mission of the unit. Combat and combat support units normally devote a significant effort toward the collection of information, while other types of units may collect information of intelligence value only as a by-product of their normal activities.

(3) The availability of support from other services also affects Army intelligence operations. In this respect, tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance and meteorology are especially affected.

(4) Other governmental agencies may be represented in the area of operations. The agencies most frequently represented are the Department

of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

(5) Specific agencies which collect or process information are included in chapter 4.

b. *Organization of the Forces.*

(1) At times, the friendly force structure may indicate that a headquarters conduct intelligence operations which would normally be performed by a higher headquarters. In a small theater of operations, a field army headquarters may be required to perform the intelligence operations normally conducted by a theater army headquarters, or a reinforced division may be required to perform the intelligence operations of a field army.

(2) In combined operations, which involve the armed forces of allied nations, certain intelligence operations may be assigned to a combined effort of all the participating nations. Combined intelligence operations may be an essential characteristic of stability operations.

(3) In unified operations and joint actions, the basic intelligence function is unchanged. Intelligence functions, responsibilities, and procedures in unified operations and joint actions are conducted in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2.

c. *Composition of Forces.* The composition of a force determines some of its intelligence requirements. A predominantly armored force has somewhat different requirements for detailed terrain information than an infantry force. Weather information requirements of an airborne or airmobile force are different from those of mechanized, motorized, or conventional infantry forces. An enemy capability or vulnerability which is an important consideration to one force may not be equally important to others. These different intelligence requirements influence intelligence operations to include the determination of intelligence priorities and methods of collecting information.

Section IV. WEATHER AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

2-19. General

Combat intelligence, by definition, is that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and terrain required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Two of these, weather and terrain, are discussed in this section.

2-20. Weather

a. *General Military Aspects of Weather.* A proper assessment of the military aspects of weather must commence with an examination of weather conditions. These conditions include:

(1) *Visibility.* Fog, haze, and precipitation reduce visibility, and thereby provide varying degrees of concealment from ground and air observation, as well as lessen the effects of thermal radiation resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. These weather conditions normally favor the attacker. As a result, disrupting actions, feints, ruses, and other deceptive measures are particularly aided by poor visibility. Good visibility will, of course, be a detriment. On the whole, good visibility favors the defender by permitting him to observe the approach of the enemy and allowing him to bring fire upon the enemy. Other considerations being equal, good visibility tends to favor the side with superiority in air, artillery, and nuclear weapons.

(2) *Clouds.* Clouds affect not only air activi-

ties, but they also affect other weather elements such as temperature—retard the loss of heat from the earth's surface due to radiational cooling. They also affect natural illumination by day or by night.

(3) *Precipitation.* This is one of the most significant of the weather elements, because heavy snow or rain will affect mobility, as well as directly affect personnel and equipment.

(4) *Temperature.* Extremes of temperature are found in such terrain as deserts, jungles, arctic areas, and mountains and adversely affect tactical operations by seriously affecting both personnel and equipment.

(5) *Wind.* Wind speed materially affects the degree of cold in which an individual can survive. For example, with no wind, personnel can be fairly comfortable at temperatures below 0° F, but a 5 mph wind at 20° F, or a 20 mph wind 25° F, can cause exposed flesh to freeze. The wind can also indirectly affect air or ground observation by creating a dense screen of blowing sand, dust, or snow. Wind will also play an important part in airmobile operations since aircraft may be dependent on wind speed in the planning and execution of air operations.

b. *Effects of Weather on Personnel.* Weather has the following direct effects on the physical well-being and emotional state of personnel.

(1) Physical disabilities such as heat exhaustion, frostbite, and snow blindness, are caused directly by weather conditions.

(2) The resistance to many diseases is lowered by the effects of weather on metabolism, level of physical activity, and mental state of the person.

(3) Seasonal patterns also contribute to some types of diseases—common cold, influenza, and pneumonia.

(4) The physical and mental strain on personnel is increased by prolonged exposure to extremes of temperature and humidity, to heavy or prolonged precipitation, to high winds, and to other undesirable weather influences.

(5) The incidence of communicable diseases is also affected by the influence of weather on the distribution of disease-causing and disease-carrying agents.

c. Effects of Weather on Equipment and Supplies. Weather may cause damage to, or destruction of, supplies and equipment.

(1) Precipitation or high humidity may cause rotting or mildewing of rubber, leather, cloth, and rope.

(2) Humidity, combined with high temperatures, causes a rapid deterioration of some types of electrical insulating material and causes corrosion of exposed metal particularly in small arms and artillery pieces.

(3) Materials such as wood, paper, and leather are sensitive to extremes of humidity. Others, such as sugar, tobacco, and glue, have critical humidity levels beyond which they lose their desirable properties.

(4) Many products, such as food, medicine, film, and photographic chemicals, require special handling in areas where extremes of temperature and/or humidity are encountered.

(5) High winds may damage or destroy many types of unprotected equipment. Blowing sand and dust tend to damage painted surfaces and such things as engines and weapons.

(6) Communication-electronic equipment, and sensor devices, unless protected by adequate casings, are affected by weather, extreme temperature, and humidity.

d. Effects of Weather on Natural Features. Weather conditions affect natural features of the environment. Some of the most important of these are described below:

(1) Soil trafficability is, to a large degree, a

weather problem, for the effects of weather constitute the one critical variable needed to estimate the capacity of soils to support vehicles. Frozen ground, affording excellent track and wheel trafficability can, with a temperature rise of just a few degrees become a sea of mud that hinders or completely blocks all off-road traffic. Conversely, a single dry, clear day can change deep mud into passable terrain. Winds and humidity to a lesser degree, also affect the trafficability of the soils.

(2) The amount of precipitation, coupled with rain runoff factor and, in season, thawing ice and snow, affects the stream levels and may cause floods. Temperature variations result in freezing snow and ice in winter and thaw and breakup of ice in spring.

(3) Snow cover affects concealment and mobility characteristics of terrain for personnel and vehicles.

e. Effects of Weather on Manmade Features. Weather affects all modes of communication and physical structures.

(1) Lines of communication, such as railways and highways, may be seriously affected by heavy accumulations of snow, by heavy or prolonged precipitation, (monsoon rains), or by frost action in the soil.

(2) Wire communication may be affected by heavy accumulations of snow, formation of ice on wire lines, strong wind, and frost action in the soil.

(3) Buildings and other installations may be affected as follows:

(*a*) Heavy snow accumulations may collapse roofs.

(*b*) High winds, tornadoes, hurricanes, or severe thunderstorms may damage or destroy structures.

(*c*) Frost action may damage surfaced runways.

(*d*) Hail may break exposed glass, plexiglass, and similar materials.

(*e*) High temperatures may be injurious to paint.

(*f*) Heavy or prolonged rains may weaken foundations and may flood subterranean and other installations constructed in low-lying areas.

f. Influences of Weather on Tactical Activities. As discussed here, tactical activities are grouped into the categories of acquisition and exchange of information, movement, firing units, use of special equipment, consumption of supplies, and

modification of environment. Each of these categories of activity is influenced by weather.

(1) Acquisition and exchange of information involve reconnaissance and communication. Information concerning the enemy and the area is procured by means of visual ground or air observation, aerial imagery, listening posts, sound ranging, radar, infrared, radio intercept, airborne personnel detector and other means.

(a) Visual observation and photography are affected adversely by fog, smoke, dust, haze, and precipitation. Visual observation from the air is hindered or prevented by clouds between the observer and the object or area observed.

(b) In addition to the above factors, dense clouds may reduce illumination to a point where attempts at photography are made difficult or impossible. Reflection of sunlight from a snow surface may make it difficult to obtain clear imagery.

(c) The effectiveness of listening posts is decreased by weather conditions such as thunder, heavy precipitation, and high winds that reduce audibility.

(d) Sound ranging operations may be affected by changes in weather conditions, such as temperature, humidity, and wind.

(e) Radar is affected by vertical distribution of temperature and moisture in the atmosphere. Clouds and precipitation also influence radar by producing "clutter" that obscures echoes.

(f) Wire communication is affected by electrical discharges in the atmosphere. Excessive ground moisture reduces the range of field wire circuits using sound and battery-powered telephones.

(g) Radio transmissions are affected by weather conditions, such as humidity, precipitation and temperature. VHF and UHF radios capabilities are subject to change resulting from extremes in moisture and temperature.

(h) Messengers are affected by many weather factors, and their ability to move is also subject to weather effects.

(i) Visual communication is affected by obstructions to vision such as fog, clouds, dust, haze, and precipitation.

(j) Wind speed and direction, temperature gradient, and precipitation influence the effectiveness of airborne personnel detectors.

(k) Light data pertaining to moonrise, moonset, phases of the moon, and twilight periods are not weather information, however, this information is always needed by the commander and it is customary to consider the factors of weather and light data together. The amount of available illumination has a significant effect on night operations.

(l) In the planning of river crossings and amphibious oprations, tidal variations have a paramount effect on tactical operations.

(2) Movement involves air or surface transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(a) Movement by air is affected by clouds, visibility, temperature, and surface winds at terminals, and by clouds, visibility, temperature, wind turbulence, icing, and other hazards occurring over routes.

(b) Surface movement is affected by trafficability, conditions of line-of-communication features and visibility. Each is subject to the effects of weather conditions; however, the effect of weather on the various modes of travel (wheel, track and foot) will differ.

(3) Weather influences the use of weapons by affecting delivery capabilities and by influencing the terminal effects of the fires.

(a) Muzzle velocity is affected by temperature.

(b) Trajectory is affected by wind, air density, and air temperature.

(c) The range and flight path of rockets and guided missiles are affected by wind.

(d) The employment of smoke for screening purposes is influenced by weather factors which affect the density and persistency of smoke clouds. These factors include wind direction and speed, temperature gradient, precipitation, and humidity.

(e) Precipitation and wind influence the effectiveness of incendiaries and flame on flammable materials. Wind speed and direction affect the range and accuracy of flame weapons.

(f) The effectiveness of chemical agents is influenced in varying degrees by temperature, temperature gradient, precipitation, humidity, and strong winds.

(g) The effectiveness of visually-directed air defense weapons is adversely influenced by fog, clouds, haze, heavy precipitation, smoke, and dust.

(h) Wind speed and direction determines the distribution of propaganda leaflets disseminated by air.

(4) The effectiveness of certain types of special equipment is influenced by weather.

(a) Clouds and obstructions to vision affect searchlight activities. Low clouds provide a

reflecting surface that increases the effectiveness of searchlight illumination. Dense fog, precipitation, or other obstructions to vision decrease searchlight effectiveness by scattering and diffusing light.

(b) The use of loudspeakers in psychological operations is affected by any weather element that reduces audibility.

(5) The rate of consumption of most supplies is directly influenced by weather conditions.

(6) A great variety of activities related to strengthening defensive positions, facilitating movement, and obstructing enemy movement are performed by tactical forces. Included in these categories are such activities as construction of emplacements and fortifications, mine laying, and construction of roads, airfields, and other facilities. Weather affects the speed with which such tasks can be completed and may provide concealment for forces carrying out such tasks near the enemy.

(a) Emplacements must be designed to withstand the weather. Alternate freezing and thawing of the soil prevent using materials that peel, scale, or crack. Prolonged or heavy rainfall softens the ground so that special foundations, bracing, and drainage are necessary to prevent cave-ins and flooding. Heavy rains or severe freezes slow or completely negate excavation.

(b) Rains may make mine-laying operations easier by softening the ground. Severe freezes may make digging difficult, and thereby, increase the time required for laying minefields. Concealment of mines is difficult after a snowfall. However, falling snow quickly obliterates tracks and signs of digging.

(c) The amount of rainfall affects plans for foundations and drainage systems for roads, airfields, and similar facilities. In addition, the weather influences methods used and time required for completion of construction.

2-21. Terrain

a. General. As long as wars are fought on the ground, terrain will exercise a dominant influence on tactics. Terrain is analyzed in terms of its five military aspects (observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) to determine the effect of terrain on the general courses of action available to friendly and enemy forces. The engineer staff and special engineer units are responsible for special studies used in the analysis of the area of operations in support of the intelligence effort.

b. Observation and Fire.

(1) Observation relates to the influence of the terrain on the ability of a force to exercise surveillance over a given area either personally or through the use of sensors. The best observation generally is obtained from the highest terrain features in an area; characteristics of the terrain which restrict observation include hills, cliffs, vegetation, and manmade features. Although the net effect of visibility and observation is manifested in the ability of a force to see (or its vulnerability to being seen), they are analyzed independently because the former varies with weather conditions which are transitory, whereas the latter varies with terrain conditions which are relatively permanent. For example, a high hill may provide excellent observation (an aspect of terrain) even though visibility (an effect of weather) is restricted by fog surrounding the hill at a given time.

(2) Fire encompasses the influence of the terrain on the effectiveness of direct and indirect fire weapons. Indirect fire weapons such as mortars and howitzers are affected primarily by terrain conditions within the target area which may influence the terminal effect of the projectile. Fields of fire for direct fire weapons such as machineguns and automatic rifles are primarily affected by terrain conditions between the weapon and the target.

(3) The analyst identifies those terrain features within and adjacent to the area of operations which afford the friendly or enemy force favorable observation and fire. He considers them in his subsequent analysis of the area of operations.

c. Concealment and Cover. Concealment is protection from observation; cover is protection from the effects of fire. The analyst determines the concealment and cover available to both friendly and enemy forces.

(1) Concealment may be provided by darkness, by smoke screens and by terrain features such as woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation or by any other feature which denies observation. Concealment from ground observation does not necessarily provide concealment from air observation does not necessarily provide concealment from air observation or from electronic or infrared detection devices. Concealment does not necessarily provide cover.

(2) Cover may be provided by trees, rocks, ditches, quarries, caves, river banks, bunkers,

folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Areas that provide cover from direct fires may or may not protect against the effects of indirect fire; however, most terrain features that offer cover also afford concealment.

d. Obstacles.

(1) An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement.

(2) Consideration of obstacles is influenced by the mission. In the defense the intelligence officer identifies as obstacles those features of the terrain which stop or impede military movement within the battle area. In the attack he considers the obstacles within his unit's assigned or assumed zone of action.

(3) An obstacle may constitute an advantage or disadvantage. For example, obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing or canalizing the attacker. On the other hand obstacles parallel to the direction of attack may assist in protecting a flank of the attacking force.

e. Key Terrain. A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to either opposing force. As used in this definition, the term "seizure" clearly implies physical occupation of the terrain by a force, whereas the term "control" may or may not include physical occupation. Control can be exercised by the use of fire as well as by physical occupation. The critical element in determining whether or not a given terrain feature is key terrain rests in the judgment of the analyst as to what constitutes a "marked" advantage in a given situation. Recognizing that a terrain feature may afford a marked advantage in one set of circumstances but only a slight advantage or no advantage under other conditions, it becomes clear that the selection of key terrain varies with the level of command, the type of unit, and the mission of the unit.

(1) *Level of command and type of unit.*

(a) As an example of the influence of the level of command on the selection of key terrain, consider a circumstance in which a given city provides a common terminus for a network of highways, railways and canals; to the field army commander seizure or control of the city would afford him the marked advantage of gaining control of a vital link in his lines of communications; therefore, he might properly select the city as key terrain. On the other hand, an infantry battalion commander within that field army gains no advantage from seizing or controlling the city and therefore would not consider it key terrain. The structure of friendly and enemy units also influences the analyst in the selection of key terrain. An airborne battalion, for example, may under proper circumstances select cleared areas as key terrain, because seizure or control would permit their use as drop zones. To a tank battalion commander the same areas may be of little or no consequence.

(b) Types of terrain features which are frequently selected as key terrain for tactical units include high ground from which favorable observation and fire over a significant portion of the operation area may be obtained, bridges over unfordable rivers, assigned or assumed objectives and domination terrain within a defensive sector. Obstacles are rarely selected as key terrain by the analysts although a terrain feature may properly be analyzed as key terrain at one level of command and as an obstacle at another. An example of this is the city mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; to the army commander, the city is key terrain whereas to the battalion commander it is an obstacle, but it is not both key terrain and an obstacle to the same commander. To examine this further, consider a circumstance in which the use of an unfordable river as a defensive line is appropriate to a commander who has been directed to defend. Is the river key terrain because its seizure or control affords a marked advantage to the commander conducting the defense, or is it an obstacle because it stops or impedes military movement? At the tactical unit level, in normal terrain, the river is classified as an obstacle because of its primary effect of stopping or impeding military movement, and the adjacent high ground is key terrain because its seizure or control permits full utilization of the obstacle value of the river. It is this condition which constitutes the tactical advantage.

(2) *Mission of the unit.*

(a) In the attack, key terrain features usually lie forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. Terrain features in adjacent zones may be key terrain if their control facilitates the conduct of the attack or accomplishment of the mission. Terrain in an adjacent zone which gives the enemy effective observation along an avenue of approach which may be used by friendly forces may be key ter-

rain. Key terrain may be selected within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, if the enemy can seize the terrain feature which prevents or hinders the launching of the friendly attack, then the terrain feature affords either a marked advantage and is, therefore, key terrain.

(b) In the defense, key terrain is usually located within the battle area. Infrequently key terrain may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. A terrain feature forward of the battle area or in an adjacent defensive sector which gives the enemy a decided advantage of observation over defended localities, routes of communication, or enemy avenues of approach is key terrain. A terrain feature in an adjacent defensive sector which may give the same advantage may also be considered key terrain.

f. Avenue of Approach.

(1) An avenue of approach is a route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide enough width for the deployment of the size force for which the avenue of approach is being considered. Intelligence officers above corps level consider avenues of approach which are adequate for at least a division. The intelligence officer at corps and lower levels usually considers avenues of approach adequate for the deployment of the major maneuver element directly subordinate to his headquarters. Thus, the corps G2 considers avenues of approach which are adequate for a division, the division G2 considers those which are adequate for a brigade, the brigade S2 considers those which are adequate for a battalion, and the battalion S2 considers those which are adequate for a company.

(2) The analysis of an avenue of approach at any level of command is based on the following considerations:

(a) *Observation and fire.* Favorable observation and fire for the force moving on the avenue of approach.

(b) *Concealment and cover.* Provides favorable conditions of concealment and cover— this consideration is frequently in conflict with the preceding one.

(c) *Obstacles.* Avoids those which are perpendicular to the direction of advance and, whenever practical, takes advantage of those which are parallel to the direction of advance.

(d) *Utilization of key terrain.*

(e) *Adequate maneuver space.* Determina-

tion of required maneuver space is based, in part, on consideration of deployment patterns, means of mobility, and the area required for maneuver to preclude presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.

(f) *Ease of movement.* This consideration includes such factors as relative length of the avenue of approach, directness of approach to the objective, soil trafficability, steepness of slopes, obstacles, direction of terrain compartments with respect to the direction of movement and those aspects of the terrain which enhance or restrict command and control.

(3) It should be noted from the preceding paragraph that the analysis of an avenue of approach is based primarily on terrain considerations. The ability of an opposing force (existing or assumed) to interfere with the use of an avenue of approach does not influence the analysis of that avenue of approach whether this analysis is being made by the commander, intelligence officer, or any other staff officer at any level of command.

(4) In the attack, avenues of approach which lead from the line of departure to key terrain within the objective area are selected for analysis and the best avenue of approach available to the friendly force is identified (fig. 2-3).

(5) In the defense, avenues of approach, which lead from the enemy's position to key terrain within the battle area, are selected and analyzed and the best one(s) available to the enemy are identified. Avenues of approach available to the enemy are described as terminating within that key terrain in the battle area which, if seized by the attacker, will threaten the overall defense position. Such an avenue of approach begins a reasonable distance beyond the initial disposition of the forward friendly forces of the unit for whom the analysis is being made. This distance is usually equal to the forward extent of the defense sector (fig. 2-4).

2-22. Relationship of Weather and Terrain

The last two paragraphs discussed the elements of weather and terrain separately. In reality, these elements interact and affect the commanders mission and cannot be treated separately. Examples of such interaction follow:

a. Changes in weather tend to alter the surface condition of terrain, but the same weather conditions, for example, rain, may have decidedly differing effects depending upon the type of terrain

Figure 2–3. Avenue of approach in the attack.

NOTE:
IN THE ATTACK, AVENUES OF APPROACH WHICH LEAD FROM THE LINE OF DEPARTURE TO KEY TERRAIN ARE SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS. THE BEST AVENUES OF APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE ARE IDENTIFIED FOR THE FRIENDLY FORCES

NOTE:
IN THE DEFENSE, AVENUES OF APPROACH AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY ARE SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS AND THE BEST AVENUE OF APPROACH IS DETERMINED.

Figure 2–4. Avenue of approach in the defense.

—a clay road becomes impassable, while a road of sandy soil becomes more firm.

b. Terrain relief affects weather conditions; for example, moist air moving rapidly up the slopes of a mountain, hill, or ridge often causes fog, mist, or low-lying clouds over the elevated terrain, while the nearby valleys remain clear. Moisture at higher elevations may result in snow, while the same amount of moisture may fall as rain at lower elevations. The terrain also influences other aspects of the weather, such as wind velocity and humidity.

Section V. ORGANIZATION

2–23. Organization-of-the-Intelligence-Section

a. General.

(1) The commander relies primarily on the G2/S2 section of his own staff, the attached military intelligence and ASA elements, as well as subordinate combat units for the combat intelligence that he requires. Consequently, a knowledge of these organizations—their composition, capabilities, interrelationships and personnel—is a necessity. In an intelligence section, there are normally several factors which will affect the organization and duty assignments. One such factor is the requirement placed upon the intelligence officer to be responsible for the operations of the section. In order that he may best meet this responsibility, the detailed supervision of the section should generally be left to an assistant. Such a measure will assure the intelligence officer of the continued operation of the section in his absence. It will provide him the time necessary to properly analyze the intelligence produced by the section and to use this analysis as a basis for making sound recommendations to the commander. Furthermore, the intelligence officer is responsible for many broad tasks which do not permit adequate time for detailed supervision of the intelligence section. The intelligence officer conducts a considerable degree of liaison with other staff sections and must keep abreast of all operational plans for which he will eventually supply intelligence support. Based on these operational requirements he must be a planner himself, developing priorities for the tasks to be accomplished in consonance with command priorities and determine the most efficient manner in which to use his available assets.

(2) Another factor that must be considered is the need for continuous (24-hour) operation of the intelligence section. The intelligence section must retain sufficient flexibility to meet peak workloads without impairing the ability to continue operations during displacement. At division and above, the G2 maintains personnel in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and may be required to assist in the manning of an alternate command post.

(3) Finally, there are a number of issues that the G2/S2 will consider in actually organizing his section. He must form his own organization because the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) specifies only the number of personnel authorized for the intelligence section

and does not prescribe a functional organization. Under normal circumstances the "type" functional organization, a flexible one, discussed in this paragraph is modified to meet the needs of the command in terms of the mission assigned, the scope of the intelligence activities to be performed, and the number of qualified personnel available. Under certain conditions it may be necessary to augment unit intelligence sections with representatives of other agencies, units, or services. This will be especially true under conditions of independent, semi-independent, or relatively stationary operations in a given area.

b. Brigade and Battalion. The S2 and S3 personnel must work together as a team in order to discharge their joint responsibilities. Personnel from either section must be prepared to assume the duties and functions of the other when necessary. Organizational guidance required to accomplish the intelligence responsibilities at brigade and battalion levels is provided in FM of the appropriate branch and unit SOP. Intelligence guidance for units below battalion level, where no intelligence staff section exists, is provided in chapter 9.

c. Division. Normally a "type" G2 section at division level (fig. 2–5) will consist of four functional branches—operations, G2 Air, counterintelligence, and administration. These branches perform the functions described below:

(1) *Operations branch.* The operations branch accomplishes functions which encompass the entire spectrum of the intelligence cycle—planning, collecting, and processing the information, and disseminating the resulting intelligence. Along with these functions, the operations branch maintains the collection plan and publishes the commander's essential elements of information (EEI) in the form of orders and requests for information to units; maintains enemy situation maps; prepares daily summaries; plans reconnaissance and surveillance operations; develops target data; and prepares intelligence estimates, analyses of areas of operations, intelligence annexes, and intelligence reports. In addition to these functions, the branch engages in a variety of diverse but intelligence-related activities: conducting required research projects; arranging for liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters; disseminating weather information; supervising prediction of radioactive fallout from enemy-delivered weapons and super-

* When required by nature or scope of intelligence operations.

Figure 2–5. "Type" G2 section (all levels division, corps, field army).

vising the monitoring and surveying of radio-active contaminations from all weapons; supervising procurement and distribution of maps and map supplements; supervising the activities of the order of battle (OB) and interrogation (INTG) personnel of the attached military intelligence (MI) companies; coordinating and correlating SIGINT activities of supporting United States Army Security Agency (USASA) units; providing recommendations and advice for deception operations; supervising the operations of the long-range reconnaissance element (if formed through division assets) which provides a deep reconnaissance and target acquisition capability; and providing intelligence training for division personnel.

(2) *G2 air branch.* Personnel of this branch exercise staff supervision of all organic and supporting aerial reconnaissance and surveillance elements to include airborne SIGINT and intelligence related electronic warfare support measures organic to the supporting USASA division support units. G2 air personnel are responsible for establishing priorities of requests for missions received from all units and staff supervision for weather activities. Personnel of the G2 air branch are also responsible for maintaining aerial reconnaissance maps and other essential records. Once the imagery is obtained, the G2 air branch supervises the imagery interpreter's effort through the imagery interpretation section chief. The reproduction of the aerial imagery obtained from army and other services is accomplished by the reproduction laboratory organic to the MI company. The intelligence obtained is then distributed by the branch, in coordination with the aforementioned operations branch, to all

interested agencies. (For additional detail see FM 30-20.)

(3) *Counterintelligence (CI) branch.* Since there are no organic counterintelligence personnel assigned to the division G2 section, the chief of the CI section of the supporting MI company also serves as CI branch chief. His responsibilities include the recommending, planning, and supervising of counterintelligence measures (counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, signal security); maintaining counterintelligence records, supervising the interrogation of personnel of CI interest; maintaining records of known and suspected enemy agents and collaborators; maintaining records on enemy intelligence organization and procedures, and advising the command on methods to counter enemy collection efforts; providing assistance and advice for friendly countersurveillance and deception operations; supervising the activities of the counterintelligence personnel of the attached MI company; coordinating the signal security activities of supporting USASA units; preparing counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, SOP, and reports; and supervising security training within the command in conjunction with the G3.

(4) *Administration branch.* The administration branch performs all the administration, transportation, and housekeeping requirements of the G2 section. The branch administers to the needs of both assigned and attached personnel. The branch is responsible for maintaining the section journal, central files and records, and duty rosters. It establishes a G2 message center for the handling of outgoing and incoming correspondence and intelligence reports.

(5) *Supporting elements.*

(a) There are two major support elements available to the division G2 section. The first of these is the U.S. Army Security Agency Divisional Support Company, ASA Battalion (Corps). This element is capable of furnishing signal intelligence to the G2 section, through the special security detachment (SSD), which is attached to each division. During combat operations, certain categories of signal intelligence are provided directly to the supported unit commander, the G2, and other appropriate members of the staff. The USASA element also carries out certain aspects of electronic warfare.

(b) The MI company is the second major support element available to the division G2 section and is attached from the MI parent unit to the division. It has the mission of performing specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions to include order of battle, interrogation of prisoners of war, imagery interpretation, and counterintelligence which require the employment of foreign languages or special skills (fig. 2–6). The MI company commander advises the G2/S2 on the employment of the unit to insure that the company is responsive to the mission requirements.

d. Corps. The functions of the G2 section at corps (fig. 2–5) are basically the same as those at division, but the scope of corps responsibilities is larger and the volume of information at corps is greater, with a consequent increase in personnel (TOE 52–1). This increase in personnel requirements is necessary because the corps G2 section is concerned with the collection efforts in a larger area of operations than the divisions. Furthermore, the leadtime required for planning a future operation is greater at corps than it is at the division level. For example, at corps level the USASA support unit is now a battalion. Also the MI element is increased in strength by the addition of editorial and technical intelligence personnel who operate under the supervision of the operations branch. Other intelligence assets available to the G2 include the airborne infantry ranger company which provides a deep reconnaissance and target acquisition capability and the aerial surveillance company which provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support for the corps. The engineer terrain detachment performs terrain analysis and provides reports and studies required by the intelligence officer in preparing his analysis of the area of operations. The engineer staff and special engineer units have the responsibility and technical capability of performing detailed terrain analysis and evaluating the effects of weather on terrain. The G2 is also provided weather data and studies by the Air Weather Detachment (AWS) at corps. Psychological operations and civil affairs units have intelligence personnel specifically trained to perform detailed analysis of psychological, sociological, and economic factors and to evaluate the effects of their operations on the corps mission.

e. Field Army.

(1) The field army is supported by a Military Intelligence Battalion (Field Army), a Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (MIBARS) and the Army Security Agency Group. At field army there is a significant increase in the amount and scope of activities compared to that found at division and

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
* With Corps military intelligence company only.

Figure 2–6. Military intelligence company.

corps levels (fig. 2–5), and the MI element has an increased strength and capability. Therefore, personnel authorizations are again increased. (TOE 51–1G). Planning leadtime is greater, the area of interest has increased tremendously, and the intelligence requirements have expanded to include strategic intelligence. In the latter case, there is a need for target information from deep within the enemy territory so that suitable targets may be located for long-range weapons available at army level; correspondingly, the army must also counter enemy air and missile capabilities.

(2) The operations branch performs the same basic functions as at the lower levels plus strategic intelligence research and analysis (SIRA) and technical intelligence (TI) functions. Strategic intelligence research and analysis

personnel provide to interested agencies/studies in fields of strategic intelligence interests, process information relating to the areas of assigned interest, and disseminate the intelligence produced. Technical intelligence personnel plan and supervise the exploitation of captured materiel by technical intelligence specialists; coordinate activities of scientific and technical intelligence agencies in the field army area; assist special staff and technical service intelligence personnel in obtaining interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, photographs, and other available data on enemy technical and scientific materiel; prepare technical intelligence summaries and reports; and maintain collection directives and plans, items-wanted lists, and technical intelligence files.

(3) The field army G2 air branch is also responsible for the staff supervision of the imagery interpretation detachments operating with tactical air force reconnaissance squadrons.

(4) The counterintelligence branch supervises the activities of censorship teams and counterintelligence personnel teams of the MI unit.

(5) In addition to the functions performed by the G2 sections at lower levels, the administration branch of the field army G2 section supervises the activities of the editorial section.

(6) A plans branch is added to the G2 section at field army level and to lower echelons when required. In line with the increased scope of responsibilities, this branch prepares and/or coordinates action on intelligence plans, intelligence collection memoranda, specific requests for information, EEI, and other intelligence requirements.

(7) Under the staff supervision of the G2, the engineer staff officer at field army is responsible for providing engineer topographic and geographic intelligence products. To accomplish this intelligence function, an engineer topographic battalion is assigned the mission of producing, storing, and distributing maps, performing topographic surveys, and preparing engineer intelligence reports as required for the field army (FM 30–10 and FM 5–1).

(8) The Air Weather Service (AWS) of the U.S. Air Force provides weather forecasts, climatic studies, and weather and climatic summaries to the G2 based on his requirements.

2–24. Relationship of Intelligence Section with the Military Intelligence Units

a. General. The G2/S2 section (separate brigade, division, corps, and field army) is authorized by TOE. MI personnel from the attached MI unit will be employed at all echelons based on the recommendations made by the MI unit commander to the G2/S2. Close liaison between the intelligence officer and the MI unit commander is essential, and they should work together as a team to insure maximum and proper utilization of intelligence personnel.

b. Attachment. To maintain a harmonious and close working relationship with the supported units, military intelligence companies are activated and displaced concurrently with the supported unit of the field army. The units, minus linguist personnel and certain other intelligence specialists, are attached to the supported unit early in their joint training phases. As the MI unit displaces, administrative control over the unit is assigned or transferred from one MI parent unit to another, as required.

2–25. Relationship of Intelligence Section with the ASA Units and the Electronic Warfare Element (EWE) in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

The G2 section (division, corps and field army) has the staff responsibility for control and direction of the SIGINT and SIGSEC resources of the supporting ASA units. The G2 is assisted in executing this responsibility by the EW/cryptologic staff officer, who normally exercises for the G2, staff supervision over supporting SIGINT and SIGSEC operations. Tasking is accomplished by the use of EEI. The EEI are taken by the EWE in the TOC and translated into SIGINT EEI (FM 101–5).

CHAPTER 3

THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Section I. GENERAL

3-1. Terms

The term "intelligence officer" is used here and elsewhere to include the assistant chief of staff, G2, of headquarters provided with a general staff, and, as appropriate, the intelligence officer, or S2, of lower unit headquarters.

3-2. Scope

This chapter deals with a discussion of the relationships of the intelligence officer with the commander and other staff members. FM 101-5 discusses in detail the responsibilities of the intelligence officer to include coordination with other staff officers, collection and processing of information, counterintelligence activities, and the intelligence officer's responsibility for preparation of reports.

Section II. COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

3-3. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Commander

The commander is responsible for all intelligence activities of his command, to include gathering and reporting information on the enemy and the area of operations; converting information into intelligence; and disseminating intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent units. In connection with the security of his command, the commander is also responsible for taking appropriate counterintelligence measures.

3-4. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Intelligence Officer

a. The intelligence officer is the principal staff officer assigned to advise and assist the commander in carrying out his intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities. As such, the intelligence officer assists the commander (and staff) by furnishing intelligence which is needed to make decisions and to plan operations. Intelligence is provided by the intelligence officer through written reports, estimates, and oral briefings.

b. The intelligence officer must plan, making logical assumptions about probable missions which the command may expect to receive, and

collect all necessary information and intelligence. Advance planning can be facilitated by the intelligence officer if he maintains close contact with the other staff members of his own headquarters and with the G2/S2 of the next higher headquarters as well as subordinate and adjacent headquarters.

c. Once a mission has been received, the intelligence officer reevaluates the intelligence that he has on hand and determines what additional intelligence is needed by the commander for planning operations and making decisions. The needs are usually related to enemy capabilities, enemy vulnerabilities, and the area in which the operation will occur. These intelligence requirements are reported to and approved by the commander, and they form the bases for the collection effort.

d. The intelligence officer provides information, estimates, and intelligence plans during the planning phase of an operation. He also prepares, coordinates with the G3/S3, and recommends to the chief of staff pertinent fragmentary orders to initiate or modify intelligence and security operations.

e. During the execution phase of an operation, the intelligence officer supervises and coordinates intelligence operations to insure the successful

execution of the commander's collection orders and to develop information of the enemy situation as rapidly and completely as possible. As an application, intelligence derived from the enemy situation is of critical importance to the commander in deciding when and where to employ reserves of combat power in both offensive and defensive operations.

f. The intelligence officer (G2/S2) assists the operations officer (G3/S3) in planning cover and deception missions by furnishing an assessment of the enemy's intelligence collection capabilities; by increasing his counterintelligence activities to detect enemy plans, and, in coordination with the EW/cryptologic staff officer, coordinates appropriate aspects of electronic deception.

3–5. Relationship of the Intelligence Officer to the Staff

a. Primary general staff responsibility for any particular activity is assigned by the chief of staff to only one general staff officer. However, many activities are closely related and require close coordination and cooperation between several, and sometimes all, of the assistant chiefs of staff, G1 through G5.

b. The G2 prepares the analysis of the area of operations and the intelligence estimate; both are used by all staff officers in estimating the effect of weather, terrain, and possible enemy courses of action in their areas of interest. All general and special staff sections furnish, in turn, information to the G2. For example, the G2 furnishes information within the political, social, economic, and psychological fields for inclusion in the analysis of the area of operations and otherwise assists in intelligence activities involving civil affairs and psychological operations, such as civil censorship, identification and recommendation of potential sources and agencies, detection of enemy agents within the civilian population, and procurement of civilian equipment and supplies required for military intelligence operations.

c. Other specific intelligence data are furnished to meet the needs of various members of the staff. Staff members who need specific intelligence state these needs to the G2 so that he may include them in his collection plan. Specific intelligence needs include such items as target intelligence, technical intelligence, reconnaissance requirements, and maps.

d. All the assistant chiefs of staff recommend to the G2 essential elements of information

(EEI) on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and area characteristics which have a major effect on activities falling within their primary staff responsibilities. The G2 uses these recommendations and his own determination of intelligence requirements as a basis for the EEI to be recommended to the commander.

e. The G2 assists the G1 by providing information on which to base personnel loss estimates for the whole command. In turn, the G1 assists the G2 by insuring the availability of intelligence specialists and by maintaining the strength of reconnaissance units.

f. The G2 is closely associated with the G3 in combat operations. At division, corps, and field army, they normally operate a joint staff facility (G2–G3 operations) as part of the tactical operations center (TOC).

g. In stability operations, the G2 coordinates with the G5 because the population is a major source of information. Psychological operations conducted in both hostile and friendly areas will also provide valuable information. The G2 provides information to the G5 on which the civil military operations officer and units base their analysis and estimate of psychological, political, sociological, and economic factors affecting the command. In turn, the G5 assists the G2 by providing the results of these detailed analyses to the G2.

3–6. Relationship of the Intelligence Officer to Higher and Lower Units

a. The intelligence officer furnishes intelligence and information to subordinate units and to higher headquarters. The intelligence which is furnished may have been produced by the G2/S2 and his staff of it may have been received from higher, lower, or adjacent units. Intelligence or unprocessed information may be disseminated based on the urgency and needs of the user. The distinction between information and intelligence is frequently a matter of degree. The point at which processing of information produces intelligence is difficult to identify. As a general rule, intelligence received from subordinate headquarters is treated as information by the receiving echelon inasmuch as this information must now be integrated into present holdings, compared with other data, and reassessed based on all data available at the higher echelon.

b. The intelligence officer develops the plans and orders that govern the conduct of intelligence activities and collection efforts of the command.

Orders are issued in the name of the commander, and the intelligence officer sees to it that these orders are properly executed.

c. The intelligence officer assists subordinate commanders and other intelligence staff officers to anticipate and to resolve or to minimize problems arising in the intelligence field. Such assistance frequently requires continuous coordination with other members of the general staff.

d. The intelligence officer maintains very close liaison with the S2 or G2 of the next higher headquarters to obtain early information regarding planned future operations. In stability operations, the G2/S2 will also be required to maintain close and continuous liaison with both host country and allied forces, both to obtain intelligence data and reports, and to provide assistance in the form of intelligence studies, reports, estimates, etc., which may be needed by allied forces located within, or in some cases, outside of the area of operations. This liaison permits the intelligence officer to collect information and to prepare analyses and estimates needed by the commander, other members of the staff, and subordinate units to make their own estimates and plans. The intelligence officer at the next higher headquarters will be able to obtain and furnish needed intelligence not otherwise available; for example, to provide advice as to the availability of specialists and intelligence detachments. The intelligence officer of the lower headquarters may then contact the G1/S1 or the G3/S3 of his own unit and request action to obtain additional intelligence support for a given operation.

3-7. The Intelligence Officer as a Manager

a. The primary function of the intelligence officer (G2) at echelons of division or higher is to supervise and manage the overall intelligence effort in such a way as to provide effective intelligence support to the commander. Normally the G2 will not become directly involved in detailed intelligence production procedures, but will remain relatively unencumbered by the daily routine of operations. He will, instead, supervise the entire intelligence collection system and task appropriate collection assets based on the commander's EEI. The intelligence officer is responsible for staff supervision of organic and attached intelligence units and for coordinating the overall intelligence effort of the command. He recommends to the commander priorities for intelligence collection and production. He anticipates intelligence requirements and controls production and

dissemination of intelligence by reviewing, modifying, and approving intelligence documents and reports produced by intelligence resources of the command. In conjunction with other staff sections, the G2 also monitors intelligence aspects of training personnel and maintenance of intelligence related equipment.

b. The effective utilization of available personnel resources may be the key to a G2's success. As means to that end, the G2 must constantly evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and peculiarities of his personnel and relate these to their achievements. This evaluation will allow the G2 to better judge the intelligence produced by specific individuals and agencies and to better anticipate their future performance. The evaluation must be a deliberate and systematic one, and should not be limited to personnel. It should be extended to include sources and agencies as well. Normally such an evaluation should not be used as a basis for remedial action, unless such a step is clearly indicated. Another means of insuring effective utilization of personnel is to weigh the need and to establish a priority for each intelligence task, thereby precluding the eventuality of unnecessarily dissipating limited personnel resources. And, once a task is determined to be necessary, it must be accomplished only in the order and to the degree required. Thus, the G2 can assure the commander of the timely, clear, concise, and accurate intelligence that is a must to achieve success in combat.

c. In addition to supervising and coordinating intelligence operations, the G2 must also coordinate closely with other staff heads. To facilitate planning for these missions, he will keep in close touch with the chief of staff, the G3, and other staff officers of his own headquarters, as well as the G2 of the next higher headquarters.

d. In the furtherance of the overall intelligence effort, the G2 should carry out a number of periodic and scheduled, personal liaison visits to related intelligence organizations, including host country intelligence agencies in stability operations. Such a step should prove to be mutually beneficial—a closer working relationship can be established. The quality of intelligence should also be improved as each agency obtains an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the other and how each can provide support to others to resolve or minimize existing problems.

3-8. Intelligence Officer Functions in Intelligence Operations

a. The major G2/S2 functions in the field of in-

telligence (discussed in greater detail in later chapters) are:

(1) Directing the collection effort and preparing orders;

(2) Collecting the information;

(3) Processing information into intelligence;

(4) Disseminating the resulting intelligence to the user.

b. In directing the collection effort a collection plan keyed to the mission of the command and enemy situation must be developed. Based on this plan, orders and requests for the collection of specified information are sent to selected units and organizations (collection agencies). A typical collection plan is discussed in detail later to show how it is related to the mission through the EEI and other intelligence requirements, and to reveal the logical thought processes by which the intelligence officer produces the specific orders and requests to be sent to the collection agencies.

c. Collecting the information is the next step. After the agencies with a collection capability have been selected and sent specific orders and requests, the intelligence officer or his assistant supervises the collection efforts to verify that orders and instructions are executed effectively and timely. This supervision can be facilitated by maintaining close contact with the intelligence officer and/or commanders of the units and organizations concerned. Such contact provides the intelligence officer and his assistants with the latest information and permits a continuing review of the collection plan, which may need modification as the enemy situation changes or as the enemy situation becomes better known.

d. Processing is the third step. As the information is collected and received by the intelligence officer and his assistants, it is processed into intelligence. Processing consists of—

(1) Recording;

(2) Evaluating the information to determine its pertinence, reliability, and accuracy; and

(3) Interpreting the information to determine its meaning and significance.

e. Dissemination and use of resulting intelligence is the final step in the intelligence cycle. Once intelligence has been produced, it is disseminated to all potential users. The completed intelligence product is disseminated through means of analyses, summaries, reports, estimates, briefings, and situation overlays. The intelligence officer, in addition to disseminating intelligence, is also re-sponsible for combining all available data into a meaningful estimate which will assist both the commander and members of his staff. The intelligence estimate, therefore, is used as a guide in evaluating and interpreting new information, and in providing further direction to a new cycle of intelligence operations.

f. Although a single intelligence activity usually follows the sequence of the intelligence cycle as explained, it is not to be assumed that all activities in each phase of the cycle must be completed before passing to the next phase. Rather, there usually are concurrent activities occurring in all four phases—while the collection of new information is being planned and called for, other information is being processed and intelligence is being disseminated to users.

g. At higher echelons, the production of military intelligence is an operation which requires a more thorough, integrated, and systematic effort than is necessary at division and lower echelons. Sources are more numerous and varied, agencies acquire larger volumes of information to ultimately produce intelligence, and the intelligence picture is so complex that it may be misinterpreted unless the collected information and intelligence are properly integrated into a meaningful whole.

h. At lower echelons the intelligence officer (S2) places maximum effort in the production of intelligence on enemy capabilities and in determining the effects of those capabilities on the unit's mission as well as on the operation plans prepared for the mission. The commander at the lower echelon has the primary problem of ascertaining ways and means of countering the enemy's capabilities and accomplishing his mission successfully. To do this, he must have the answers to specific questions. The S2 must devote his time and effort to answering the commander's specific questions on such subjects as strength, disposition and identity of enemy units and the location of enemy weapons, mine fields and defensive installations. Concurrently, the S2 must determine the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action. The S2 must coordinate most closely with the S3. At these levels the S2/S3 relationship can best be described by the term "dual function." That is, it is imperative that the S2 and the S3 possess a firm, clear, and realistic understanding of each other's functions, and each must be prepared to assume for short periods of time the functions of the other concurrently with his own.

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

(STANAG 2014, 2029, 2033, 2084; SEASTAG 2014, 2084; SOLOG 17R, 34R, 69, 90, 94)

Section I. GENERAL

4–1. Introduction

a. In his capacity as a staff officer, the G2 directs his efforts toward the support of the planned or anticipated mission. This chapter provides the G2 with guidance in determining and understanding the intelligence requirements of the commander, sources of information, the various agencies which are available to obtain the information, and the coordination necessary for effective collection efforts.

b. The collection of information is made difficult by the fact that the enemy makes every practicable effort to defeat collection attempts. Accordingly, strengths, dispositions, and movements are concealed; censorship and communications security measures are enforced; false information is disseminated and tactical measures designed to deceive are adopted.

c. In order to penetrate the enemy's countermeasures, every conceivable source of pertinent information must be continuously exploited.

4–2. Planning and Executing the Collection Effort

a. The various steps in the planning and executing the collection effort are as follows:

(1) Determine the intelligence required for decisions and plans.

(2) Determine the priority of need for each of the different intelligence items.

(3) Determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which would indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement.

(4) Determine specific items of information, the presence or absence of which would affirm or refute pertinent indications.

(5) Collection agencies are then selected and appropriate orders are prepared and dispatched.

(6) The collection effort is supervised to insure that the required information is obtained in time to be of use.

b. To plan efficiently and to supervise the execution of the collection effort, the intelligence officer must thoroughly understand—

(1) The mission of the command.

(2) The area of operations.

(3) The nature of available sources of information and the capabilities and limitations of available agencies.

(4) The steps in planning and executing the collection effort.

(5) The tactics, organizations, and characteristics of the enemy, including the enemy intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

(6) Characteristics of the local populace, to clude loyalties, religions, etc.

Section II. REQUIREMENTS

4–3. General

The commander's intelligence requirements are those facts which he needs to know, concerning the weather, terrain, and enemy in order to successfully execute his assigned mission. The collection capabilities of a command are, however, seldom sufficient to satisfy concurrently all intelligence requirements. Therefore, collection resources of a command are directed toward definite intelligence objectives in the priority of their need. Such priorities should reflect the criticality of the need for a particular type of information.

Unfortunately no formula can be provided to automatically determine priorities. The determination is largely one of judgment, for an intelligence priority in one situation or for one command may not be a priority in another situation or for another command. These intelligence requirements generally can be divided, however, into two broad categories—essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR). In a tactical situation, EEI and OIR are normally developed by the G2 and G3 in the tactical operations center (TOC) or equivalent at every echelon, i.e., separate brigade, division (DTOC), corps (CTOC), and field army (FATOC) for approval by the commander. Intelligence contributions to the TOC are provided by the G2 and electronic warfare elements.

4-4. Essential Elements of Information

a. The term "essential elements of information" is defined as those critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision. The decision is of a type which involves the mission of the command and the choice of a course of action which can be taken to accomplish the mission. Any enemy capability or characteristic of the area which is a governing factor in the choice of a course of action will be an EEI. Enemy capabilities or area characteristics which may affect but which will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission, regardless of which course of action is chosen, will qualify as other intelligence requirements.

b. The relationship between an EEI and a command decision at a particular time dictates that the establishment, modification, or cancellation of an EEI must have the commander's approval.

c. Although EEI have a special relationship to the needs of the commander, at division and higher levels they may be originated by the staff in the form of recommendations. These recommendations are coordinated and presented by the intelligence officer for command approval.

d. An item of information or intelligence specified in the unit standing operating procedure (SOP) for collection or dissemination may become an EEI. For example, an SOP may require all units to report immediately such items as "known or suspected targets suitable for nuclear attack or indications of their existence or development." Whether or not such an item is in the unit SOP, it becomes an EEI if it is needed by the commander at a given time in order to make a decision.

e. The nature and number of EEI will vary with the type and phase of an operation and the extent and accuracy of the available information and intelligence. For example, in the planning phase of an airborne operation, there might be two EEI:

(1) "What drop or landing zones exist in our objective area? Special attention * * * *"

(2) "What are the enemy's air defense dispositions? Special attention to * * * * "

During the execution phase of the same operation, the EEI might be reduced to one, the nature of which would be directed toward the enemy's nuclear capability.

f. When the available information and intelligence are complete enough to satisfy the commander's needs, he may have no further outstanding priorities. However, seldom is the available information or intelligence so complete that additional requirements do not exist. For typical information needs in areas of influence at various echelons of command, see appendix Q.

4-5. Other Intelligence Requirements

a. Following the tasking of intelligence elements to collect information required to satisfy the EEI, consideration is given to tasking these and other intelligence assets to collect information on other capabilities, vulnerabilities, and characteristics of the area of operations which may affect, but which will not prevent, the accomplishment of the mission. Collection agencies may be able to collect information needed to satisfy "other" intelligence requirements concurrently with the collection of information needed to satisfy EEI. In such a case, the agencies may properly be assigned collection missions designed to satisfy multiple requirements. In addition, such information of the enemy and of the area of operations which is needed to aid in the interpretation of the results of the collection effort must be collected.

b. Other intelligence requirements are derived from command requirements which do not qualify as EEI, ind from staff requirements. The formulation and/or announcement of intelligence requirements and the allocation of collection means to meet these requirements are staff responsibilities of the intelligence officer.

4-6. Stating Intelligence Requirements

a. When announced to the command, EEI and other intelligence requirements should be stated in such a manner that they will provide guidance to the receiving agencies to allow formulation of orders and requests for specific information. They should be stated clearly and concisely as specific questions dealing with—

(1) Enemy capabilities, including time, place, strength, or details;

(2) Enemy vulnerabilities, including nature, extent, permanence, or other details;

(3) Enemy order of battle factors;

(4) Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles;

(5) Weather; and

(6) Information desired by higher, lower, or adjacent headquarters.

b. EEI are not announced in the foregoing manner to units which do not have an assigned intelligence officer. For example, the battalion S2 does not announce EEI to a company commander in the broad terms described above. He will, instead, present specific requirements for information based on the EEI.

4-7. Dissemination of Requirements

a. EEI and other intelligence requirements are disseminated to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commands to guide them in preparing collection plans and evaluating information by acquainting them with the commander's priority intelligence needs.

b. Because the subordinate unit receiving the EEI is a collection agency of the higher headquarters, due consideration is given to the EEI by the receiving subordinate unit even though the EEI are obviously outside the capabilities of that unit.

c. The intelligence requirements announced by another headquarters are analyzed by the receiving headquarters to determine whether or not that unit is physically capable of obtaining information pertinent to the requirements and whether or not the collection of that information is compatible with its mission. If not, the receiving headquarters does not repeat the requirements to its subordinate elements. The intelligence needs of higher headquarters are modified by a lower unit as required. For example, a corps

EEI may ask, "Where are possible crossing sites on the COTTONWOOD River in the corps zone? Special attention to area between CRATERVILLE and TRAIL CITY." Subordinate divisions upon receipt of the corps EEI, task their subordinate units to satisfy the requirement within the division zone. This special attention would be directed to specific portions of the river line within the division boundaries.

d. Intelligence requirements are disseminated by fragmentary orders or listed in paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to an operation order (app N), and they may be included in the coordination instructions of paragraph 3 of the operation order (FM 101-5).

4-8. Cancellation or Modification

EEI and other intelligence requirements are canceled or modified by fragmentary orders or by a new list published in an operation order. Those which are concerned with the enemy's adoption of a course of action prior to a specified time are automatically canceled when that time arrives.

4-9. Intelligence Requirements for Attack

a. *General.* Most of the commander's *initial* requirements must be satisfied during the planning phase so that plans may be properly formulated. *Subsequent* requirements, that is, information which is needed during the attack, must provide the basis upon which the commander can decide on movement of his reserves, employment of supporting weapons or units, and modification of his operation plan.

b. *Specific Requirements for the Planning Phase.*

(1) *Location, type, strength, and morale of enemy units on line and in reserve.* The locations of the enemy in contact should be established down to the lowest unit practicable. The type, strength, and morale of the enemy are indicative of the manner in which the area will be defended, the extent of enemy resistance, the force necessary to overcome the resistance, and the capability of the enemy to counter this force by employment of his reserves.

(2) *Location, type, nature, and extent of enemy defensive installations, to include supporting weapons, screening units, and obstacles.* The magnitude and the complexity of the enemy's installations will influence the choice of areas for the main attack, routes to the objective, areas for secondary attacks, and required destruction of

obstacles or installations necessary to accomplish the mission. The density of supporting weapons, their caliber or delivery capability, and resupply of ammunition help determine the preattack preparation fires necessary and the main area of attack. Screening units and obstacles must be taken into account in planning the phasing of an operation, the special units and/or equipment necessary to overcome obstacles, the timing of the attack, and the use of deception or countermeasures.

(3) *Location, type, and strength of enemy reserves.* The commander will be concerned with those enemy reserves which have the capability of reinforcing in time to affect the accomplishment of his mission. For this reason it is essential to locate, identify as to type, and determine the strength of enemy reserves in the area of operation. It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to determine the movement capabilities of these enemy reserves and to keep the commander informed as to these capabilities.

(4) *Location, number, and type of enemy automatic weapons.* Prior knowledge of the location, number, and type of enemy automatic weapons positions is of obvious advantage to the attacker. The density of automatic weapons in portions of the enemy's defensive area, together with the observation and fields of fire available, will influence the commander's choice of areas for his main attack, along with the planning of supporting fires to overcome this factor. The volume of fire power anticipated will also aid the commander in determining attachments of supporting elements to subordinate units to overcome enemy resistance.

(5) *Location, number and types of enemy supporting weapons.* The weapons in this category include mortars, direct fire weapons, field artillery, air defense artillery, missiles, tank guns employed in a fire support role, antitank guns, or weapons assisting or protecting units of which they are not an organic part, but which are within the range of weapons controlled by the commander. The amount of mortar and other fire support within the enemy defensive area must be considered in assessing his overall defensive strength. Knowledge of this aspect of enemy strength and the location of these weapons enables the commander to plan for reducing the effectiveness of these fires by the employment of his own fires, the choice of routes for his attacking force, the timing of the attack, and the use of other countermeasures such as smokescreens.

(6) *Location of enemy outposts.* An enemy may use outposts to prevent close ground observation of his main battle position, to indicate a false location as to his main battle position, or to mislead the opposing force as to the location of his main defensive position. The commander can apply the principle of surprise in his operations when he knows the location of the enemy's outposts by denying them observation, by cutting them off from the main body, by reducing them through fire, or bypassing them. When a commander possesses this knowledge, he has a wider choice of actions upon which to base his decision regarding the attack.

(7) *Location of enemy command posts.* Locating and neutralizing enemy command posts aids in the reduction or elimination of command control over enemy subordinate units. This action may be carried out through harassment, destruction, isolation, or a combination of these means. The commander may physically isolate enemy command elements from their units by tactical maneuver and/or by disrupting communications.

(8) *Location of enemy boundaries.* When the commander plans an attack, the intelligence officer's function is to analyze the significance of enemy boundaries. If the enemy has recently moved into an area, shifted boundaries, or replaced units, he may be vulnerable along boundary lines. Enemy boundaries reveal much concerning the enemy defense and may have a bearing on the time of attack, routes of advance, and the general employment of subordinate units.

(9) *Observation.* Determination of the enemy's observation capability, his aerial and ground surveillance, and his electronic surveillance means and capabilities helps the commander plan effective countermeasures, determine attack timing, and plan for destruction, screening, or neutralization of these capabilities.

(10) *Concealment and cover.* In planning for the attack, consideration will be given to those routes leading to the objective which offer concealment from the enemy's observation and cover from his fire. These factors must be viewed from the standpoint of the enemy's dispositions and his ability to counter the apparent advantage of concealment and cover along routes available.

(11) *Location of obstacles.* The presence and location of natural or artificial obstacles are usually determined by means of map, aerial, or ground reconnaissance, or a combination of the three. The intelligence officer analyzes the rela-

tionship between obstacles and the enemy's dispositions to determine the degree to which these factors will influence the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The commander applies this analysis in choosing routes to the objective and in planning a time schedule for the operation.

(12) *Weather and terrain.* Specific terrain features which, when held or controlled by friendly forces, will have an especially favorable effect on the outcome of the mission. Key terrain features and an analysis of the weather will be important factors in determining the scheme of maneuver.

(13) *Avenues of approach.* In planning an attack, the commander is concerned with the choice of direction of attack. The avenues of approach available will influence the choice of direction, when considered with available observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, maneuver space, ease of movement, utilization of key terrain, enemy disposition, and weather.

(14) *Location number and types of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the method of delivery.* In the planning of an operation, consideration must be given to the possibility of enemy use of chemical and biological agents and nuclear weapons. Plans must be made to insure a continuous collection of data on the enemy's capability to employ CB agents and nuclear weapons. Based upon the enemy's capability, appropriate plans for protective measures and countermeasures must be made.

(15) *Plans and capabilities.* To the extent information or estimates on enemy plans and probable courses of action can be derived from pattern analysis, signal intelligence, special intelligence units, or other means and agencies discussed in succeeding paragraphs, the friendly commander is provided with invaluable insights for developing his own plans for the attack. Such indications, however, must be considered in the light of previous enemy deception activities or other practices which may help uncover an attempt to deceive friendly forces.

(16) *Command, control, and communications.* Determination of the enemy's command, control, and communications helps the commander plan effective electronic countermeasures to assess the capabilities of the opponent for executing orders or for acquiring timely information on which to base decisions during the attack.

(17) *Electronic countermeasures.* Determination of the enemy's electronic countermeasures

capabilities enables the commander to plan effective counter countermeasures and to base his planning on the possibilities that his own command control may be disrupted during the attack.

c. *Requirements During the Attack.*

(1) *Movement of enemy units.* Units may be moved for deception, reinforcement, replacement, counterattack, blocking or withdrawal. The direction of movement, the location of the vacated area and the newly occupied area all provide important indications of the enemy's defensive plan.

(2) *Displacement of weapons.* The displacement of enemy weapons provides indications of the enemy's plan of action. For example, weapons displacing to the rear or deployed in depth may indicate a planned or deliberate defense. Other configurations may point to a counterattack.

(3) *Degree of resistance of units on contact.* The degree of resistance which the enemy offers and the manner in which he may withdraw give indications of the type of defense he will employ, whether he intends to hold at all costs or withdraw, whether he plans a counterattack, and the degree of disorganization of the enemy.

(4) *Expenditure of ammunition and resupply activities.* The amount and type of ammunition which the enemy expends provide indications of the area the enemy most strongly desires to defend, of his fire plan, of the degree of his resistance, and of his resupply capability. Other resupply activities may indicate the area to be most heavily defended, the type of defense action, and the possible shortages which may illuminate weak points in the defense.

(5) *Intelligence estimates.* A continuing assessment of the enemy's intelligence estimate of the situation can provide an important tool for the commander in the conduct of his own operations. Such insights into the enemy's estimate of the situation may be developed from analysis of his observation, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and activities, from signal intelligence, and from other special means and activities.

(6) *Command, control, and communications.* Continuing efforts are needed during the attack to assess the capabilities of the enemy for executing orders and acquiring information on which to base decisions.

4–10. Intelligence Requirements for Defense

a. *General.* In the defense, many of the factors (of weather, terrain, and enemy situation) in-

cluded in planning for attack are considered; however, most of the factors take on a new meaning, and they must be interpreted in a different light. Whereas heavy rain may impede an attack, the rain may be an aid in defense because of its adverse effect on the enemy's capability to attack.

b. *Specific Requirements for the Planning Phase.*

(1) *Location, strength and morale of enemy units in contact, in reserve, or in position to influence the action.* Just as in the attack, the strength and morale of the enemy has a critical bearing on planning the defense. Location and type of the enemy units serve as indications of an impending attack and help determine the planned location of the main attack. Especially important indications come from enemy unit movements. These tend to show the progress of plans for an attack and provide indications of weakened areas in the line of contact. The number, type, and location of reserve units help determine likely areas of attack and potential reinforcements. Such indications, however, must be considered in the light of previous enemy deception activities or other practices which may help uncover an attempt to deceive friendly forces.

(2) *Location of potential enemy assembly areas.* The location of enemy assembly areas is influenced by the terrain and by the distance from the line of contact. The primary terrain considerations are those of cover and concealment and routes into and out of the area. The distance between assembly areas and the line of contact tends to change as the attack plan progresses. Early in the planning phase the assembly areas are usually farther to the rear, but they may move successively nearer the line of contact as the time of attack nears. If such a pattern of movement is detected, it will further indicate an area selected for the attack. Determination of assembly areas is of prime importance in target acquisition for the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

(3) *Location of enemy boundaries.* The location of enemy boundaries is of significance due to its influence on the enemy plan of attack. A knowledge of boundaries provides indications as to the size of the force which may participate in the attack and, possibly, the depth of echelons. Consideration of boundaries, along with the locations of enemy units, both in contact and in rear areas, provides an overall picture of the enemy situation.

(4) *Number and routes of enemy reconnaissance and/or combat patrols.* To execute his attack most advantageously, the enemy must collect information on the location of our security elements, our line units, our fire support weapons, and our reserves. During his preparation for the attack, the enemy usually will stress reconnaissance. He will thus attempt to locate and to exploit gaps in our defensive positions. He may execute raids on our positions or installations, possibly even in our rear areas through successful infiltration. Destruction missions may be expected prior to the commencement of the enemy's main attack. Extensive patrolling, as a countermeasure, may be employed by the enemy to cover or misrepresent other enemy activity, as a show of strength to cover weaknesses, or as a measure to force our forward outposts and listening posts back. In any case, an analysis of the missions, routes, number, and probable objectives of the enemy patrols will provide valuable intelligence.

(5) *Location and type of supporting weapons.* The location and type of supporting weapons used by the enemy help the commander to determine the likely areas of attack and to estimate the degree of force which the enemy may use. Movements of weapons may also help to determine the enemy's scheme of maneuver and the timing of the action.

(6) *Observation and fire.* An accurate determination of the most advantageous observation sites and fields of fire available throughout a sector, with special emphasis on the avenues of approach, is important in defensive operations.

(7) *Location of natural and artificial obstacles.* The commander employs natural and artificial obstacles to strengthen his defensive position. Natural obstacles within the enemy area should be considered with reference to the limitations which they impose on enemy mobility and, consequently, on his choice of avenues of approach.

(8) *Weather and terrain.* As in the attack, the effects of weather and the features of the terrain play a highly important role in the defensive effort. Just as certain pieces of key terrain often must be secured in order to attack successfully, so must they be held in order to defend. Weather also plays a key part in the operation, and the same condition may have an entirely different effect depending upon whether an attack or a defense is planned.

(9) *Avenues of approach.* The avenue of approach of most concern to the defending com-

mander is the route most advantageous to the enemy in his main attack. Enemy reconnaissance activity may provide indications of consideration of avenues of approach. Coupled with this, the commander considers avenues of approach for use by friendly forces in a counterattack. He also considers natural obstacles in the area with reference to their limitation on enemy mobility and on friendly counterattack.

(10) *Plans and capabilities.* To the extent information or estimates on enemy plans and capabilities can be derived from enemy pattern analysis, signal intelligence, intelligence units, or other means and agencies discussed in succeeding paragraphs, the commander is provided with invaluable insights for developing his own plans for the defense. Such indications, however, must be considered in the light of previous enemy deception activities or other practices which may help uncover an attempt to deceive friendly forces.

(11) *Command, control, and communications.* Determination of the enemy's command, control, and communication capabilities assists the commander in planning effective electronic countermeasures.

(12) *Electronic countermeasure.* Determination of the enemy's electronic countermeasures capabilities enables the commander to plan effective counter-countermeasures, and to base his planning on the possibilities that his own command control may be disrupted during the defense.

c. *Requirements During the Defense.*

(1) *Areas of enemy's main attack and secondary attacks.* Movement of enemy units, displacement of weapons, routes of movement, type and size of units involved, movement of reserve units, and location of unidentified or enemy caused nuclear bursts serve as indications of the areas under main attack and secondary or diversionary attacks. These are also factors to be considerd in planning counterattacks, displacements, withdrawals, and the employment of reserves.

(2) *Enemy tactics.* Coupled closely with the foregoing factors are those indicators which disclose the enemy's scheme of operations. Unit movement, weapon disposition, formation, depth of echelon, and the type and size of units committed are significant considerations for early determination of enemy tactics.

(3) *Intelligence estimates.* Development of a continuing assessment of the enemy's intelligence estimate of the situation can provide an important tool for the commander in the conduct on his own operations.

(4) *Command, control, and communications.* Continuing efforts are needed, during the defense, to assess the capabilities of the enemy for executing orders and acquiring information on which to base decisions, as those capabilities may have been affected by destruction of means, electronic countermeasures, and other battle actions.

4-11. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Capabilities

a. *General.*

(1) Enemy capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining intelligence requirements and their priorities, because of the commander's concern with intelligence which confirms, alters or refutes the existing estimate of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. Enemy capabilities which appear improbable of implementation, are not considered in formulating EEI or other intelligence requirements. For example, when a delaying action is being conducted against advancing superior enemy forces, priorities concerning enemy defense, delay, and withdrawal are not stated.

(2) Each enemy capability listed in the current intelligence estimate (chap 6) is usually the subject of either an EEI or some other intelligence requirement. If knowledge of the implementation of the particular enemy capability or course of action is not available, and this knowledge is needed by the commander at the time in order to make a reasonable decision, then that enemy capability is an EEI rather than another intelligence requirement.

(3) EEI and other intelligence requirements pertaining to enemy capabilities are not answered completely until the enemy has committed himself to a course of action. Partial answers are produced continually and result in progressive changes to the intelligence estimate. For example, efforts to determine in what strength the enemy may reinforce troops in contact often produce changes in the strength estimate of available enemy reinforcements, and of the enemy's capability to reinforce. Similarly, evidence that the enemy has reinforced certain units, changes the estimate of the number of committed forces.

b. *Attack Capability.* An intelligence requirement concerning an enemy attack directs specific attention to definite areas and usually to specified

times. The areas to which attention is directed are usually avenues of approach determined by analysis of the area of operations and enemy dispositions. If the enemy can attack using several avenues of approach, only one requirement is stated. The different avenues of approach are indicated as areas to which special attention is directed. Specified times are most frequently stated when the command's course of action is to attack. Time may be given precisely or may be stated as "before our attack," depending upon whether the time of the attack has been determined.

c. Defense Capability. Requirements concerning enemy defense specifically state the line or area concerned.

d. Withdrawal Capability. Requirements concerning enemy withdrawal usually indicate the line or area beyond which the enemy's withdrawal is of particular interest and may direct attention to a line or area to which the enemy might withdraw and the withdrawal route.

e. Delay Capability. Requirements concerning enemy delaying actions also specify the lines or areas along which delaying positions may be formed.

f. Reinforcement Capability. Requirements concerning reinforcement ordinarily do not distinguish between reinforcement of an attack and a defense. They simply ask when and where available reserves may be employed. Other requirements ask specifically whether the enemy will attack or defend. Requirements concerning reinforcement direct specific attention to known reserves.

g. Nuclear Capabilities. When the enemy has a nuclear capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yield, and by what delivery means? Special attention to very heavy artillery units in the vicinity of GROTE and possible missile launchers in the vicinity of AVON."

h. Chemical and Biological Capabilities. When the enemy has a CB capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy use chemical or biological agents against us? If so, what agents, when, where, and by what delivery means? Special attention to artillery, mortar, and rocket units."

i. Air Capabilities. Requirements as to enemy air capabilities are rarely listed at division, corps, or units in the communications zone. Normally

intelligence on enemy air capabilities is disseminated by the field army, and by headquarters at levels above field army, because units subordinate to these headquarters do not have the means to obtain the desired information. In airborne, airmobile, and amphibious operations, where enemy air activity is a significant factor, a corps or division commander may appropriately designate an air EEI, especially during the planning phases of the operation. However, heavy reliance will be placed on higher headquarters to provide answers to such an EEI.

j. Miscellaneous Capabilities. Stated requirements concerning other enemy capabilities might be—

(1) "Will the enemy employ guerrilla forces in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the heavily wooded area north of MASLEM."

(2) "Will the enemy infiltrate our lines? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the swampy area east of HAYS."

(3) "Will the enemy employ airborne or airmobile forces in our sector? If so, when, where, and in what strength? What will be the direction and altitude of approach? What drop or landing zones will be used? Special attention to the area south of YORK."

(4) "Will the enemy employ amphibious forces on our south flank? If so, when, where, and in what strength? How many landing vehicles of what type will be employed? Special attention to the beaches at SAVANAH and GEORGETOWN."

(5) "Will the enemy employ electronic warfare in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where, and to what extent? Special attention to EW units."

(6) "Does the enemy possess the capability to employ cover and deception operations? If so, at what level, with what type equipment, etc.

4–12. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. Requirements may be designed for developing knowledge of enemy vulnerability; that is, any conditions or circumstances which make the enemy vulnerable to neutralization, deception, or defeat. Such requirements are to develop intelligence as to the nature, extent, permanence, or other details of the conditions or circumstances which produce the vulnerability.

b. The details desired may be listed in the stated requirement or may be omitted if they are numerous and routine. For example, for analyses of nuclear of chemical targets, information is desired as to size, shape, composition, concentration, vulnerability, recuperability, and permanence. Since these requirements are both numerous and normal, details pertaining to them are properly omitted. The statement may simply ask what nuclear or chemical targets exist in our zone and direct attention to a specific area of activities. When enemy vulnerabilities result from faulty dispositions, logistical inadequacies, or administrative deficiencies, the degree of permanence of the condition may have to be established before tactical plans to exploit the vulnerability can be prepared. Hence, intelligence requirements may ask "if" and "when."

c. Psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy force must be known in order to plan cover and deception and other propaganda and nonpropaganda psychological operations. Such questions as "Is the enemy commander predisposed to expect a given friendly course of action?" and "Will a particular theme appeal to potential enemy defectors?" would be appropriate.

4–13. Weather and Terrain Information Requirements

a. General.

(1) The military commander must consider the effects of weather and terrain on his mission when he plans for and executes an operation; as a result, he strives for a thorough and accurate knowledge of these factors. This knowledge, considered together with the enemy capabilities, is required to insure the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

(2) An analysis of the effect of all of the conditions of weather and terrain upon our own forces and the enemy constitutes the basis for estimates which may be made by the commander and his staff. The answer sought is the best utilization of the weather and terrain based on the mission and enemy capabilities.

(3) Terrain and weather influence the application of the principles of war, such as the ability to mass and maneuver. Properly exploited, terrain and weather may allow a numerically inferior force to achieve relative superiority of combat power. For example, a mechanized, well-equipped, heavily-armored force drawn into marshy or rugged terrain may well be defeated by a smaller, lightly-equipped force, because the smaller force is enabled, through mass, maneuver and surprise, to apply superior combat power at the point of decision.

b. Weather.

(1) There are two types of weather information requirements—those established by the Army and passed to the USAF Air Weather Service (AWS) for action (weather forecasts, studies, and summaries) and those established by the USAF AWS and passed to the Army for action (local weather, temperature, and wind). The establishment, coordination, and consolidation of Army requirements are intelligence responsibilities. Figure 4–1 lists the usual requirements for weather information required at all echelons within the field army.

(2) At brigade or battalion level, the intelligence officer coordinates the requirements of his command for weather information and interprets weather information received from higher headquarters in terms of its application to the local terrain and situation. When weather information is required but has not been made available, the intelligence officer should request such information from the intelligence section of the next higher echelon. When regularly distributed forecasts are inadequate to satisfy particular requirements such as a planned chemical operation, special weather forecasts may be requested.

(3) There are three types of weather forecasts: Short, Extended, and Long Period. For further detail as to type and duration of forecasts, see paragraph 6–15b.

(4) At higher headquarters, climate and weather information is included in the Analysis of the Area of Operations and in the Intelligence Estimate (app B and J).

c. Terrain.

(1) Normally the smaller the unit, the greater the interest in details of the terrain. The higher headquarters may think in terms of mountain ranges, a lower headquarters in terms of hill complexes, and a small unit in terms of small ridges and draws on a single hill. Detailed terrain data become particularly valuable during stability operations when the area of operations includes areas particularly suited for location of insurgent base camps, headquarters, hospitals, etc.

(2) Terrain is normally evaluated in terms of the following factors to determine their effect on military operations:

	Command and Staff	Air Defense Artillery	Armor	Aviation	CBR	Engineer	Field Artillery	G2 Intelligence	Infantry	Medical	Military Police	Ordnance	Psychological Operations	Quartermaster	Signal	Transportation	Unconventional Warfare
I-WEATHER OBSERVATIONS																	
A. Surface																	
1. Current observations	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Selected data*	----	-----	e_{12}	acd_1	acd_1	acd	cd_1	-----	d_{13}	acd_4	acd	-----	acdf	-----	-----	acd_1	f
3. Forward area Observations	-----	-----	-----	e_1	-----	ac	-----	-----	e	-----	-----	-----	f	-----	-----	-----	f_1
B. Low Level - Selected Data*	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	cde_1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acdf	-----	-----	-----	f
C. Upper Air																	
1. Current Observations	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	cd_1	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	---	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Selected Data*	-----	a	-----	-----	acd	a	cd_1	-----	d_3	-----	-----	-----	f	-----	-----	-----	f
II-WEATHER FORECASTS/BRIEFINGS/CLIMATOLOGY																	
A. General Forecasts																	
1. 12 Hour	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd
2. 24 Hour	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd
3. 48 Hour	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	avd	acd	acd	acdf	acd	acd	acd	acd
4. 72 Hour	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acdf	acd	acd	acd	acd
5. 3-5 Day	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acdf	acd	acd	acd	acd
B. Special Forecasts of Selected Parameters																	
1. Fallout Winds	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Aviation Route and Terminal	-----	-----	d_4	acd	-----	-----	cde_4	----	d_4	acd_4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd_4	f_4
3. 12 Hour Aviation	-----	-----	d_4	acd	-----	-----	cde_4	-----	d_4	acd_4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd_4	f
4. 24 Hour Aviation	-----	-----	d_4	acd	-----	----	cde_4	-----	d_4	acd_4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd_4	f
5. Stability to 2 meters and Surface Winds	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
6. Winds - Surface to 2,000 feet	-----	-----	-----	acd	cd	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd_4	acd	-----	acdef	-----	-----	-----	f
7. Precipitation Type and Amount	-----	-----	-----	acd	cd	acdf	-----	-----	-----	acd_4	acd	-----	acdef	-----	-----	-----	-----
8. Special Mission Forecasts	acd	-----	-----	-----	acd	----	cd	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	f	-----	-----	-----	f
9. Upper Air for Ballistic Corrections	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	cd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
10. Refractive Index	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	f
11. Dropzone	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	acd	acd_3	-----	-----	-----	acdef	-----	-----	-----	f
12. Sea Swell and Surf	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	a	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	a	f
13. Severe Weather Warnings	acde	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acdef	acd	acd	acd	f
C. Weather Briefings and Display	acd	-----	-----	acd	acd	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
D. Climatology/Summaries																	
1. Climatic Summaries	ac	-----	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	-----	-----	acf	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Climatic Studies	ac	-----	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	-----	-----	acf	-----	-----	-----	f
3. Engineer Climate Information	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
4. Weather Summaries	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

LEGEND:
- a - Army area of interest
- c - Corps area of interest
- d - Division area of interest
- e - Interest area of units below division
- f - Interest area for operations deep in enemy held territory

* "Selected Data" are observations of selected weather elements taken at locations and times, as required, by the user.

FOOTNOTES:
1 - Provided by organization requiring information
2 - Armored Cavalry Regiments only
3 - Airborne Infantry only
4 - Required only by organic aviation

Figure 4–1. Requirements for weather information within the field army.

(a) Observation and fire.

(b) Concealment and cover.

(c) Obstacles.

(d) Key terrain.

(e) Avenues of approach.

(f) Trafficability, and its effects on (c), (d), and (e) above.

(3) At higher headquarters, information on terrain is included in the Analysis of the Area of Operations (app B). Terrain intelligence is pro-

vided by the engineer staff officer, engineer terrain teams, and other engineer units; however, surveillance and reconnaissance reports, interrogation reports, imagery interpretation reports, maps, together with other intelligence sources as-sist the intelligence officer in the overall analysis of the area of operations. At lower echelons, information may be provided by higher headquarters, adjacent units, local civilian inhabitants, and aerial surveillance.

Section III. DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS

4-14. General

a. Although EEI and other intelligence requirements announce the intelligence missions of the command, collection agencies normally are assigned specific tasks in the collection of information of enemy activity or of characteristics of the area of operation.

b. Particular enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations indicate various courses of action open to the enemy. A determination must be made as to which of these enemy activities or area characteristics should comprise a part of the mission of intelligence collection agencies. This determination is based upon the theory that probable enemy courses of action can be deduced from the knowledge that certain enemy activities such as movement of units, increase in sapper activities, construction of roads, stockpiling of weapons, etc., do or do not exist. Such knowledge of enemy activities forms the basis for deducing the relative probability of various enemy courses of action. This theory is extended to include enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, units, and installations.

c. A necessary step in planning the collection effort is, therefore, to determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which will indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement. This procedure is called "determination of indications" and is a function of the intelligence officer. The ability or inability of the intelligence officer to "read indicators" (including recognition of deception measures) may to a degree, contribute to the success of friendly forces since an analysis of all available enemy indications will be the basis for recommendations to the commander for specific courses of action.

4-15. Indications

a. An indication is any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the area of operation which points toward enemy vulnerabilities or the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a particular capability, or which may influence the commander's selection of a course of action.

b. Indications include conditions and circumstances which result from previous actions or from enemy failure to take action. For example, current enemy dispositions may indicate the adoption of a particular enemy capability or the existence of an enemy vulnerability. Similarly, the enemy's logistical situation may favor the adoption of a particular capability or may influence friendly selection of a course of action by indicating an enemy vulnerability. The destruction of large enemy forces by nuclear attack may result in a vulnerability which favors friendly resumption of the offensive. Destruction of river-crossing means in one area by friendly forces may lead to forcing the enemy to cross elsewhere. The presence of obstacles such as areas of poor trafficability may influence the adoption or rejection of a course of action by either force.

c. Indications provide the basis for orders and requests. The specific information which collection agencies are directed or requested to supply is the information which will confirm or deny the indication.

4-16. Analysis of EEI and Other Intelligence Requirements

a. EEI and other intelligence requirements are analyzed to determine the indications which by their existence or nonexistence provide an answer to an intelligence requirement. Normally, these are indications which are likely to exist when the enemy prepares to adopt or does adopt any particular course of action. Thus, a requirement which asks in part, "will the enemy attack" is analyzed by determining the indications of attack which may exist during the preparation or launching of offensive actions. These indications frequently include forward movement of hostile units, forward displacement of artillery, and strengthening of counter reconnaissance screens.

b. The analysis requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and of the characteristics of the area

of operations which can affect military operations. Particularly valuable is detailed knowledge of the enemy organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods; the probable enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control; the personalities of the opposing enemy commanders; and the past performance of the opposing enemy units.

c. At every headquarters, lists of enemy activities peculiar to each indication are complied. The lists are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. For training exercises, FM 30–102 lists activities pertaining to operations of the maneuver enemy-aggressor.

d. Having identified those indications which will reveal the answers to the intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer next determines those specific enemy activities which by their very nature and location, will, if present, establish each of the pertinent indications. These specific items of information constitute a basis for orders and requests to agencies.

Section IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

4–17. General

a. A source is defined as a person, thing, or system from which information is originally obtained. Sources may or may not be under friendly control.

b. The source of information to be selected to fulfill a given intelligence requirement is an important consideration. For this reason, a knowledge of what sources of information are available is essential to the planning of a collection effort.

c. The most common sources of information for intelligence purposes are enemy activities, prisoners of war, local residents, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, civilian agencies, recovered military personnel, captured enemy documents and materiel, enemy electromagnetic emissions and sounds, odors, duds, shell and missile fragments, craters, areas contaminated by CB agents, nuclear bursts, imagery, maps, weather forecasts, studies, and reports.

d. Other sources of information include informants; intelligence reports and studies prepared by higher, lower, and adjacent units; and reference materials prepared by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), Department of the Army, and the other military services and governmental agencies.

4–18. Enemy Activity

a. Enemy activity such as movements of troops, the presence of armor, weapons displacement, movement or stockpiling of supplies and materiel construction, and the amount and types of weapons fire, all provide valuable combat intelligence information. Enemy intelligence collection activities and surveillance methods also provide valuable information. Enemy intelligence organization, doctrine, procedures, strengths and weak-

nesses, communications, and relations with the local civilian population provide vital information for planning the deception, counterintelligence, and security measures of the command.

b. Conversely, the lack of enemy activity or the fact that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities is often of great value. For example, the information that the enemy has not moved his reserves or that he has not displaced certain support units may influence the commander's course of action.

c. The volume and type of information available from enemy activities are limited by the capabilities of the means to detect and observe them and the measures taken by the enemy to mask his activities. As examples, since radar is limited to line-of-sight observation, the enemy may use hills to cover troop movement and may use the noises of artillery fire to cover the sounds of vehicular movement.

d. The location of concealed enemy personnel may be detected by use of airborne personnel detectors which detect minute combustion particles that result from enemy activity such as oven and camp fires and operation of trucks and other internal combustion engines.

4–19. Prisoners of War

a. Prisoners of war (pw) are valuable sources of information, particularly of the immediate battle area and of the effects of our psychological operations. Maximum information is obtained through skillful handling of prisoners of war from the time of capture until the interrogation is completed. Interrogation personnel are carefully briefed on the information desired and are provided with aids, such as maps and aerial photos to assist them in the conduct of the interroga-

tion. Deserters, as sources of information, are interrogated in the same manner as prisoners of war.

b. Since qualified interrogation personnel are not normally assigned or attached below brigade level except for specified operations, prisoners of war are not formally interrogated at echelons below brigade; however, brief initial tactical interrogation may occur at the lowest echelon in order to determine information of immediate tactical value. Tactical interrogation of selected prisoners of war takes place at brigade and division and a detailed interrogation at field army. However, in stability operations, interrogations probably will be conducted at lower echelons, with qualified interrogation personnel being attached for specified periods of time. Normally corps is bypassed in the chain of PW evacuations. A PW cage, however, may be established at crops for the temporary retention of selected PW for special interrogation or for interrogation of those who may be captured by corps troops. (See FM 30–15 for guidance in PW interrogation.)

c. When sick or wounded prisoners of war are detained at a medical treatment facility suitable arrangements for interrogation will be made.

d. Procedures for interrogation and handling of prisoners of war are standardized and are fully discussed in FM 30–15 and FM 19–40.

4–20. Civilians

a. Civilians who have been within enemy controlled areas may be valuable sources of information. Civilians in recently seized areas often give information readily. However, they must be screened carefully to detect line crossers and stay-behind agents. The term "civilian" includes local inhabitants, line crossers, tourists, missionaries, partisans, displaced persons and repatriates. Generally, the longer the delay in questioning, the less valid is the information obtained.

b. Civilian sources can provide information on terrain in enemy-controlled areas and may be able to provide information of enemy installations and activities. They may provide data on climate; economic, sociological and psychological factors; and local resources. Civilians are particularly valuable sources of information in cold war operations and of information on immediate areas of operations for division and smaller units.

c. The civilian population is a most lucrative source of intelligence information in stability op-

erations. Some of the population, although appearing as innocent civilians, will in reality be the insurgent, the terrorist, and the political organizer. The insurgent directs his efforts to gaining the support and the control of the people, with the majority of his operations conducted to achieving this goal. Therefore, in stability operations the civilian population's knowledge of the insurgent and his activities is broader than in conventional warfare. The amount of intelligence information which may be derived from the population will largely depend on their existing loyalties which normally are accorded to the force which provides the greatest promise of security and economic well-being.

4–21. Recovered Military Personnel

Recovered military personnel are sources of information on the area of operations and enemy dispositions and activities. Escapees and evaders are also sources of information on successful evasion techniques. Interrogation of recovered military personnel is conducted in accordance with FM 21–77A, AR 190–25 and regulations prescribed by the theater headquarters. Within the limits prescribed, interrogation of such personnel at division and lower levels is usually limited to obtaining information of immediate tactical value.

4–22. Captured Enemy Documents

a. General. Maximum collection of enemy documents is insured by appropriate training and supervision of small units and individual training. Captured documents furnish information that is generally reliable. However, enemy plans may be based on false assumption or may have been changed. Documents also may contain enemy propaganda or may have been changed. Documents also may contain enemy propaganda or may have been prepared and planted by the enemy to be captured in an effort to confuse and deceive. Enemy dead must be searched for documents and marks of identification; observation of those killed in action (KIA) for appearance, condition of clothing, and equipment will provide additional information of value.

b. Handling, Reporting, and Evacuation of Captured Enemy Documents (CED).

(1) Captured enemy documents include any piece of recorded information which has been in the possession of the enemy and subsequently comes into U.S. possession.

(2) Captured documents, excluding those found on PW, will be processed through the various echelons, with each echelon extracting that data of immediate tactical significance. Documents found on PW will be delivered to the next higher headquarters by the guard(s) escorting the PW.

(3) At division level, the document will be assigned a category dependent on the type of information contained in the document. These include:

(a) Category "A"—Document(s) contains information of immediate tactical or strategic value.

(b) Category "B"—Document(s) contains cryptographic items and information relative to enemy radio systems.

(c) Category "C"—Document(s) contain information of lesser value to intelligence staffs.

(d) Category "D"—Document(s) contains no information of apparent value to intelligence staffs. (See FM 30-15 for further detail on categories assigned captured enemy documents.)

4-23. Enemy Materiel

Captured enemy materiel may provide technical intelligence information of immediate value to target intelligence, order of battle intelligence, or to the determination of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The production of technical intelligence is facilitated by a continuous collection and exploitation effort by both combat troops and support troops. (See FM 30-16 for detailed information on the handling and disposal of enemy materiel.)

4-24. Enemy Signal Communications and Other Electromagnetic Emissions

Enemy signal communications and electromagnetic emissions are valuable sources of information of enemy plans and orders, unit identification and locations, locations of fire control and surveillance devices, and similar data. Exploitation of these sources extends the depth of intelligence and contributes significantly to intelligence production (to include that used for target acquisition). Normally the means utilized to exploit these sources are capable of all-weather, day-and-night operations and often may provide unique insight into enemy plans or actions (FM 32-10).

4-25. Duds; Shell and Missile Fragments; Craters; Areas Contaminated by CBR Agents and Residual Radiation; and Nuclear Bursts

a. Duds and missile and shell fragments are sources of information on the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. This information is an aid to determining order of battle intelligence and to ascertaining enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Duds and crater analyses are used in target acquisition by providing direction to firing positions.

b. Examination of areas contaminated by chemical and biological agents and analyses and identification of the agents used assist in developing countermeasures and in evaluating enemy capabilities. Information of areas contaminated by residual nuclear radiation or chemical agents is required in determining terrain use and troop safety factors.

c. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack information is essential to commanders and their staffs at all echelons for estimates of the situation. The initial NBC-1 message will contain as a minimum the location of the observer and the azimuth from his location to the attack, and the date/time of the attack. Additional information will be transmitted as it becomes available (FM 21-40 and app H).

d. The existence of an enemy biological attack may not be known for days or weeks depending on the agent used. The first indication of a biological attack may be an apparent epidemic among troops of the attacked unit and/or civilians in the surrounding areas.

4-26. Imagery and Ground Surveillance Radar Reports

a. Imagery obtained by ground and airborne sensors is an excellent source of graphic information for terrain evaluation, damage assessment, and enemy activities such as fortifications, weapon positions, organization or tactical locations, movements, and relative size and location of assembly areas. Current types of image-producing sensors include photographic equipment, airborne infrared detectors, airborne radars, ground surveillance radars, thermal imaging devices, and night vision devices. Each of these types of image-producing sensors operates in a different portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and each will detect and record different data.

b. Imagery obtained by ground-based sensors, for intelligence purposes, includes panoramic views of areas, large-scale coverage of specific objects and terrain features, flash recordings, and repetitive imagery of specific areas for comparative purposes. A special type of coverage, for example, is that provided by comparative motion pictures with the capability of using selected frames as still pictures rather than in a motion picture sequence. Another type of coverage is panoramic imagery taken from a dominant terrain feature. It provides terrain information which may be used to supplement maps and aerial imagery for coodinating observation plans, ground reconnaissance activities, artillery fires, and orientation of personnel of subordinate echelons.

c. Imagery obtained by sensors operating from airborne platforms, manned or unmanned, is particularly useful to combat elements in operational planning. Properly exploited, it is an excellent means for collecting information to assist in—

(1) Locating enemy offensive and defensive installations; supply installations and lines of communications; and armored, motorized, and personnel concentrations.

(2) Analyzing terrain.

(3) Confirming or denying intelligence data obtained from other sources or agencies.

(4) Preparing target folders.

(5) Assessing damage.

(6) Preparing mosaics and panoramas for planning purposes.

(7) Correcting maps and making map supplements.

(8) Recognizing deception measures.

d. Ground surveillance radar teams organic to infantry, mechanized, airborne, armored, and airmobile battalions, the armored cavalry squadron and division artillery are a source of valuable information concerning the movement of enemy personnel and equipment within the detection ranges of the radars used. These radars are especially valuable during periods of poor visibility. The G2/S2 exercises staff supervision over planning the employment of the ground surveillance radars organic to, or in direct support of his organization and receives reports concerning moving targets detected by these radars. Moving targets detected by radars are normally reported to the battalion S2. An exception is that artillery target acquisition radar teams are controlled by artillery elements and report to the division fire support element (FSE), or to their battalion fire direction center (FDC), or to their supported unit. Information originating in these radar reports is processed through normal channels.

e. Night vision devices are classified as either passive or active, depending upon whether they make use of available light or require the use of artificial illumination.

(1) Passive night vision devices make use of available light, however limited it may be, and electronically intensify and/or convert optical or electronic images so that they may be seen in an eyepiece or on a screen. Passive devices include so-called "starlight scopes," which intensify low-light-level optical images so that they may be seen by the naked eye, systems employing low-light-level television, and passive infrared viewers, such as metascopes, which convert images produced by infrared light into visible images.

(2) Active night vision devices require the use of artificial illumination. Such systems usually consist of an infrared light source, which emits invisible infrared light, and an infrared viewer, which converts images produced by reflected infrared light into visible images. Active devices require more caution in employment since the infrared rays emitted can be detected by the enemy.

f. Thermal imaging devices are passive sensors which detect and display emitted and reflected thermal radiation coming from the terrain and objects on the terrain. The total emitted radiation is a function of an object's temperature and its emissivity. Emitted radiation differs between objects and the resultant differences are sensed and displayed by the system. The sensor can detect minute differences and, therefore, differentiate between objects close to each other. Both a real time pictorial display of the thermal images and the recording of the sensor acquired images on film are possible. This type of sensor is passive in that it does not depend upon detecting the reflection of artificial illumination or transmitted energy. Thermal imaging devices should not be confused with simple infrared viewing devices.

g. The G2/S2 is responsible for insuring that all surveillance means are coordinated and integrated to preclude undesired duplication or gaps in the surveillance effort. The G2/S2 considers the mission of the unit or organization and the capabilities of each of the surveillance means available, and then prepares an integrated battlefield surveillance plan. A new surveillance plan is prepared whenever necessary, and each new

plan is continually revised as the tactical situation or the mission changes.

4–27. Unattended Sensors

a. Unattended ground sensors (intrusion detectors) can be used in a wide variety of military operations, to include both offensive and defensive situations as well as special surveillance missions. In each application, sensors are used to collect data concerning activity and/or movement in the area under surveillance. Sensor data is definitive and must therefore be integrated with the information obtained by the other collection means available to the commander.

b. Unattended ground sensors use the principles or sensitivity to phenomena peculiar to discrete portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, the acoustic spectrum, and seismic disturbances. For example seismic sensors detect earth vibrations as very low frequencies which may be caused by the impact on the earth's surface of human footsteps, vehicle tires or tracks, or any of a number of other phenomena. Acoustic sensors are sensitive to engine noises, human voices, or any other sounds throughout the acoustic spectrum. Upon sensing the appropriate types of physical stimuli, a sensor transmits an identification code, and in some cases additional data or signals, to a remotely located annunicator/monitoring device. The annunciator/monitoring device, in turn, indicates to the operator that a specific sensor has been stimulated, and relays to the operator any additional signals or data which the sensor may be capable of transmitting. Sensors may be used in many configurations to assist the operator in detecting, locating, and monitoring enemy presence, activity, or movement in the area under surveillance.

c. The G2/S2 exercises staff supervision over planning for the employment of unattended ground sensors, selection of locations for their emplacement, display and processing of the data collected through their use, immediate dissemination of target data acquired, integration of sensor data with information collected by other means, analysis of the integrated information, and dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

d. Unattended ground sensors are an additional major resource available for use by commanders as part of their total information gathering assets. Sensor data, correlated with information obtained from other intelligence

sources, can materially assist the G2/S2 in providing timely and factual intelligence for use by the commander and his staff (FM 31–2 (Test)).

e. In addition to the attended ground sensors, the commander has an additional resource at his disposal in the form of airborne personnel detectors (APD) often referred to as the "people sniffer."

4–28. Maps

Maps are a principal source of terrain information. Map accuracy is determined by the data used in the preparation of the map. Maps are supplemented by aerial or ground photographs, side looking airborne radar (SLAR), sketches, visual observation, trig lists, gazetteers, and other information. Trig lists are publications containing the exact location and elevation of benchmarks and other survey points, together with a complete description of their characteristics. Trig lists are of particular value to artillery and engineer units and are required for locating and orienting certain surveillance devices. Engineer topographic units are responsible for providing these data.

4–29. Weather Forecasts, Studies, and Reports

a. The mission of providing direct weather service for the field army is vested in a single U.S. Air Force Air Weather Service (AWS) organization functionally alined with, and under the operational control of the field army units that are supported. AWS Staff Weather Officers are special staff officers to army, corps and division commanders. They also normally command the attached AWS weather units. Within the army, these weather units are provided with army transportation and logistic support and are linked together by special sole user army communications. These dedicated communications circuits are vital to army weather support operations. It is an intelligence responsibility to assure that the attached weather units receive their authorized support. See FM 31–3 for details of AWS operations.

b. The Army is responsible for satisfying certain requirements of its own such as ballistic-meteorological data and fallout wind data. The responsibility for ballistic meteorological data is carried out by field artillery target acquisition units, meteorological sections, and army aviation. Artillery meteorological sections can measure or

determine current surface and upper air winds, pressure, temperature, and humidity. Army aviators report weather conditions within their areas of flight operations. All units can provide weather data obtained by visual observation and, if required, they may be equipped with instruments for collecting additional weather data. The responsibility for fallout wind data is carried out by personnel of the tactical operations center (TOC) or rear area operations center (RAOC). Air Weather Service units operate tactical weather stations with weather observing and forecasting capability at each army, corps, and division TOC. They also operate airfield weather observation units at major airfields from army to brigade. Air Weather Service units:

(1) Maintain continuous surveillance over weather conditions in the operational areas of the units served, and advise commanders and staff officers of significant changes and developments in the weather situation. This surveillance may include operating tactial weather radar and meteorological satellite tactical ground readout equip-

ment as well as acquiring conventional surface and upper air observation.

(2) Provide weather observations, detailed operational and planning forecasts, weather briefings for combat missions, reports of current weather, weather summaries, and climatological information as required to meet the needs of the organizations served.

(3) Provide experienced weather personnel as required for consultation on special weather problems.

(4) Collect, evaluate, and further disseminate weather data generated within the area.

d. AWS detachments send out tactical observer teams to make weather observations required to refine large area forecasts. Tactical units may be required to assist by supplying local weather data.

e. The Navy Oceanographic Service will provide necessary charts and tidal data in areas where this information is important to tactical operations.

Section V. AGENCIES

4-30. Agency

a. An agency is any individual or organization which exploits a source to collect or process information. An agency may collect, process, or do both. No distinction is made between those agencies which collect information and those which produce intelligence; all are regarded as agencies. All subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters, as well as certain intelligence personnel, are considered to be agencies (app C). Individual soldiers of the command afford the lower echelon intelligence officer his most direct and basic means of collecting information.

b. Collection agencies use varying methods to collect information. The more common methods are interrogation; examination of documents; use of observation and listening posts, ground and airborne surveillance devices, airborne personnel detectors, and air and ground reconnaissance; reconnaissance in force and by fire; chemical agent detection and radiological monitoring and survey; and interception of enemy communications and noncommunications electromagnetic emissions.

4-31. Selection of Agencies for Collection Tasks

a. General. After determination of the specific

information required, available agencies are selected to obtain the information. In making this selection, the factors of capability, suitability, multiplicity, and balance are considered.

b. Capability. An agency must be physically capable of providing the desired information. An armor unit in reserve is not asked for identifications of units in contact, nor is artillery asked for information which can be obtained only from prisoners of war.

c. Suitability. The collection task assigned to a unit must be compatible with its primary mission. Only the agencies best suited to furnish the desired information are used. For example, information most readily secured by dismounted patrols should be obtained by infantry units rather than armor units. Economy of personnel and materiel also is considered. Dismounted patrols are not used to collect information that can be obtained equally as well by available aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

d. Multiplicity. Evaluation of information requires that it be compared with information received from other sources and agencies. Consequently, subject to considerations of capability and suitability, more than one agency is used to obtain each item of required information.

e. Balance. Within the limits imposed by other considerations, the collection workload is balanced among agencies. Balance is a minor consideration, however, when compared with the importance of other factors.

4-32. Troops

All units have capabilities which can be exploited for collecting information. Combat and combat support units are especially useful for collecting information of the enemy and of the area of operations forward of the FEBA. Some units, such as armored cavalry units, are specifically organized to collect information by conducting combat operations. Other units, such as certain Army aviation units, air defense units, and field artillery target acquisition units are organized to collect information by observation. Some combat service support units are capable of collecting significant amounts of information during the conduct of their normal operations. Virtually every military unit—combat, combat support and combat service support—has intelligence collection capabilities in the stability operations environment since the enemy can be presumed to be everywhere.

4-33. Military Police Units

Due to their characteristic employment and nature of activities throughout the field army area of operations, military police units are valuable collectors of information. Military police units will have intimate knowledge of information of of interest to intelligence and counterintelligence agencies in the following military police areas of responsibility.

a. Physical characteristics of the friendly territory.

b. Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees.

c. Crimes and offenses in the area of operation.

d. Operations of patrols, checkpoints, and information posts.

e. Operations of confinement facilities and rehabilitation centers.

f. Liaison with other civil and military law enforcement agencies in the area.

g. Physical security of key facilities and installations, including special ammunition escort and security.

h. Assistance in rear area security operations.

i. Circulation control to include traffic control.

4-34. Civil Affairs Units

Civil affairs units acquire much information of both the physical and nonphysical characteristics of the area through contact with the civilian population, the government, the economy, and the institutions of the area. If possible information of intelligence interest acquired by civil affairs units through day-to-day operations should be collected discreetly so as not to jeopardize the primary mission of the civil affairs units in that area. See FM 41-10 for guidance on civil affairs intelligence activities.

4-35. Psychological Operations Units

Psychological operations units acquire information of use to supported commands. This information is generally in the area of psychological, political, sociological, and economic intelligence, dealing with enemy, neutral and friendly groups. When authorized by the appropriate command, PSYOP intelligence personnel participate in detailed prisoner of war interrogations. Analysis of enemy propaganda is a supplementary source of intelligence information. Opinion analysis based on carefully prepared and executed interviews with prisoners of war, civilian internees, refugees and similar groups is used to determine the attitudes of these groups, especially in stability operations. The results of these analyses may be used as an index of the effectiveness of friendly operations. Psychological operations units conduct radio monitoring of enemy propaganda broadcasts. Analysis of enemy propaganda assists the supported command's G2 in determining the effectiveness of friendly operations.

4-36. Military Intelligence Personnel

Some military intelligence personnel are also collection agencies. Typical of these are interrogators, imagery interpreters, document analysts, counterintelligence personnel, area intelligence specialists, and strategic intelligence research and analysis personnel. (See FM 30-9 for organization and employment of intelligence units and personnel.)

4-37. Army Security Agency Units

Army Security Agency (ASA) units support field armies, corps, divisions, and independent brigades by providing information in the fields of signal intelligence (SIGINT), signal security (SIGSEC), and electronic warfare (EW). Integration of SIGINT at the earliest practical mo-

ment into the intelligence collection effort is a requirement for the most effective target acquisition, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the tactical commander. SIGINT information can complement, confirm, or refute and, in many instances, provide leads to other intelligence collection elements. SIGSEC support denies the enemy information/intelligence from the commanders' communications network and electronic equipment. USASA is also tasked with the mission and responsibility of exploiting, on a timely basis, all known or suspected sources possessing possible target exploit ation (TAREX) or other information of USASA interest (AR 10–122 and FM 32–10).

4–38. Special Security Detachments

Special security detachments (SSD) are attached to field army, corps, and division headquarters from the U.S. Army Special Security Group, a class II activity of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. The detachments operate the secure area for the receipt, storage, distribution, limited processing of certain signal intelligence material within the supported command, and are responsible for security, dissemination, and use of this material (AR 380–28 and AR 380–35). Each detachment is commanded by a Special Security Officer (SSO) who provides information, advice, and represents a direct link between the command, higher headquarters, and the Department of the Army on signal intelligence and other high-level, sensitive intelligence matters.

4–39. Special Army Intelligence Collection Units

Special Army Intelligence collection units, usually controlled at field army, furnish information on activities in enemy areas of operations. These units furnish a liaison team to accomplish coordination with the command in whose area they are operating (FM 30–31A).

4–40. Technical Intelligence Units

a. Technical intelligence elements operate in the field army to perform the following functions:

(1) Collect, identify, and examine captured enemy materiel.

(2) Make preliminary tests and reports on capabilities, limitations, use, and effectiveness of enemy materiel.

(3) Arrange for evacuation of selected enemy materiel and recommend disposition of enemy materiel of no intelligence value.

(4) Prepare questionnaires for interrogation.

(5) Instruct on recognition characteristics, use, maintenance of enemy materiel, countermeasures, and interchangeability of our own and Allied materiel.

(6) Evaluate effectiveness of our own and Allied weapons and ammunition against enemy materiel.

(7) Investigate intelligence targets to evaluate enemy scientific and technical achievements in research, development, production, and storage so that further detailed analyses may be made by appropriate personnel.

(8) Collect, evaluate, and interpret information affecting the health and welfare of man and animals in actual or possible areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for military planning.

b. Capture of special-interest equipment including ammunitions such as chemical or biological agents or protective equipment, as well as communications-electronics and cryptographic material is reported to an appropriate technical intelligence team as standardized in STANAG 2084. The team either arranges for the item to be evacuated for examination, examines the item at the location where it was captured, or directs other dispositions of it. Capture of explosive-type ammunition or munitions which contain chemical or biological agents is reported to an appropriate explosive ordance detachment for safe-rendering of the munitions prior to evacuation or technical intelligence examination.

c. Technical intelligence elements at army level receive information and actual items from army units as indicated. They evaluate and report on these items, as appropriate, within their capabilities and assigned missions. They also arrange for evacuation of appropriate items to the communications zone or the United States, as necessary. Details of the operations of technical intelligence personnel are contained in FM 30–16.

4–41. Engineer Topographic Units

Engineer topographic units collect, evaluate, and disseminate terrain data, produce terrain studies, and provide consultant service in military geology and hydrology in support of programs of the intelligence officer of the appropriate command.

4–42. Special and Other Staff Officers

Special staff officers or elements having troops under their control can obtain information of intelligence value in the conduct of their normal duties and furnish the intelligence officer with such information and intelligence. All special staff officers are capable of advising on enemy activities which are similar to those within their own areas of interest. The following special staff officers can furnish information of the types indicated:

a. *EW/Cryptologic Staff Officer.* Information and advice pertaining to signal intelligence (SIGINT), signal security (SIGSEC), and electronic warfare (EW) may be obtained from the EW/Cryptologic Staff Officer (FM 101–5).

b. *Chemical Officer.*

(1) Information and intelligence are provided on location, time, number, and extent of reported enemy or unidentified nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attacks; on location, size, duration, and effects of chemical and biological contamination; and on location, extent, and degree of radiological contamination caused by or expected from nuclear weapons (FM 21–40 and FM 3–12).

(2) Information obtained from airborne personnel detector operations is provided by the chemical officer who supervises these operations.

c. *Engineer Officer.* Information and intelligence are provided on terrain, enemy fortifications, enginer troops, tactics, materiel, and capabilities. Terrain information includes stream data (width, depth, condition of banks and bottom, and rate of flow); landing beach data; trafficability studies; traffic and road conditions within the area of operations; port, railroad, canal, pipeline, airfield, and bridge data; and data concerning target acquisition and site selection for atomic demolition munition (FM 30–10). Special engineer units, including engineer terrain detachments, prepare terrain studies, topographic maps, terrain models, and map supplements. Engineers also provide flood warning service (FM 5–30).

d. *Surgeon.* Information is provided on medical and public health aspects to include health hazards due to weather or disease, and on capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy medical materiel and methods. Medical data from documents pertaining to enemy personnel under medical treatment also furnish valuable information.

e. *Provost Marshal.* Information is provided on incidents involving enemy agents, saboteurs, guerrillas, bypassed units, enemy raiding parties, and other security threats.

f. *Communications Electronics Staff Officer.* Information is furnished on the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy communications equipment and personnel. In addition information is also provided concerning the use and technical characteristics of enemy electronics equipment such as radar, optical, infrared, laser systems, and other peculiar type sensory devices. The status of enemy commercial communications systems found in the area of operations is also analyzed to provide additional information to be used in the development of a more detailed intelligence data base.

g. *Aviation Officer.* Information is provided on enemy aircraft and helicopter flight characteristics, load capacity, speed, endurance and armament; enemy airmobile tactics; normal and special aviation uses with particular attention to airborne surveillance devices; and enemy state of training.

h. *Staff Weather Officer.* Climatic information, to include weather observations and weather summaries, are provided by the staff weather officer (provided by the Air Force Air Weather Service).

i. *Other.* Other staff officers who may provide information of value to the intelligence officer include: civil military operations officer (G5), psychological operations officer, EOD officer, information officer, civil affairs officer, fire support coordinator or artillery officer, and air defense officer.

4–43. Stay-Behind Units

Stay-behind units are combat elements deliberately positioned in the enemy controlled area for the purpose of collecting information of enemy activities or for target acquisition. To be most effective, units preselected for deliberate stay-behind missions should be given special training and equipment.

4–44. Agencies for Operations Behind Enemy Lines

a. Target acquisition and the collection of information concerning enemy activities deep in enemy territory are highly suitable missions for the airborne infantry ranger company, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance units.

b. The airborne infantry ranger company (LRRP) is normally controlled by field army or corps. U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) and guerrilla elements are usually controlled by the theater headquarters. In requesting the use of an agency, the requesting headquarters must consider the time required to process the request to the controlling headquarters and the time required for the desired information to be collected and reported back to the requesting agency.

c. The principal factors that limit the operations of LRRP and SF are limited mobility and the necessity to escape detection. Generally, these agencies depend upon foot mobility; thus, they cannot move rapidly from one area to another in search of information. Furthermore their movement is limited by the threat of detection and by logistical problems. The threat of detection also limits their communications capabilities.

d. Although USASA units do not normally operate in or over enemy-held territory, they do have the capability of intercepting enemy communications links that eliminate or terminate deep in enemy territory, thereby providing target acquisition and intelligence information of enemy activity in that area.

4–45. Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units

a. The aerial surveillance company assigned to corps and separate task forces, as required, is capable of performing near all-weather, day and night aerial surveillance and reconnaissance in support of the corps (FM 30–20).

b. A military intelligence battalion, air reconnaissance support (MIBARS), normally is assigned to each field army or independent corps. The MIBARS produces and disseminates intelligence information obtained from tactical Air Force reconnaissance elements operating in support of the field army and provides liaison between the field army and the reconnaissance elements of the supporting tactical Air Force (FM 30–20).

c. Air Force and Navy collection means and facilities are capable of providing much information useful in producing intelligence to meet Army requirements.

Section VI. COMBAT SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION

4–46. Combat Surveillance

a. General.

(1) Combat surveillance is a principal means by which enemy objects and activities are detected. It encompasses all techniques of accomplishing a continuous (all-weather, day and night) systematic watch over the battle area to provide timely information for tactical ground operations.

(2) Ground surveillance is characterized by line-of-sight limitations, and dependence upon terrain for movement routes and site locations, and a generally inadequate capability of surface transport to displace surveillance means in time to be responsive to immediate requirements in new areas. These limitations notwithstanding, ground surveillance is essential to all-weather, day-and-night surveillance of the battle area.

(3) Aerial surveillance is characterized by a capability to extend line-of-sight to become independent from terrain for movement routes and site locations, and to adjust to new requirements rapidly. The mobility of aerial surveillance platforms and their ability to operate at high altitudes provide a capability to conduct surveillance over large areas or to adjust to new situations rapidly. Generally, visibility restrictions and inclement weather will reduce the effectiveness of aerial surveillance. Problems of coordination and control of the use of the airspace may impose further limitations on the use of aerial surveillance.

b. Combat Surveillance Requirements Within Field Army.

(1) *Division and lower echelon requirements.* At division level, and especially at the lower levels, surveillance requirements are characterized by the immediacy of operations. Continuous surveillance is required to detect or obtain information of movements into or within the area of interest, enemy dispositions, employment of supporting weapons, electromagnetic emissions, nuclear detonations, NBC or air threats, weather, and topographical features. Periodic area surveillance is required for general information of the enemy and terrain to supplement current general intelligence. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required. During static situations, periodic coverage of the area may suffice.

(2) *Corps requirements.* At corps level, surveillance requirements are generated by both immediate and future operations. They are characterized by deep penetration of the enemy territory and a general reliance upon aerial surveillance means. Continuous surveillance is required to detect and obtain information of movements of enemy reserves into or within the corps area of interest, general location of enemy reserves and fire support weapons in the corps area of interest, missile attack, CBR and air attack, nuclear detonations, electromagnetic emissions, and weather. Periodic area surveillance is required for supplemental information on the enemy and terrain required for planning the next operation. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required to assist in determining the enemy's course of action and the location of his main efforts. In static situations, periodic area coverage may suffice.

(3) *Field army requirements.* At field army level, surveillance requirements are characterized by the depth of penetration required and a lesser need for continuous surveillance coverage. Enemy objects and activities subject to surveillance include movement and general location of major reserves, long-range missile sites, command posts and combat service support complexes, and electromagnetic emissions. Other surveillance requirements include information of the terrain, weather, nuclear detonations, and contaminated areas. Normally, periodic surveillance will suffice. The length of time between missions will vary with the situation. In fluid situations, continuous surveillance of given activities or objects for short periods may be required.

c. *Combat Surveillance Means.* Combat surveillance means available to the commander consist of personnel such as patrols, specially trained units, and devices such as aircraft, drones, cameras, certain radars, and infrared, airborne personnel detectors, magnetic and radiac instruments, signal intelligence and electronic warfare support measures (ESM), unattended ground sensors and chemical agent detector kits. Target acquisition means also contribute timely information for tactical ground operations, and in addition other surveillance support provided by other services. In addition, the foregoing means and devices are a primary source or means of target acquisition.

d. *Combat Surveillance Planning.*

(1) Combat surveillance is under the staff supervision of the intelligence officer at all echelons. The G2, in coordination with G3, assigns mission priorities similar to that for processing reconnaissance requests.

(2) The G2 has the primary general staff responsibility for—

(a) Planning the systematic watch of the battle area.

(b) Assigning mission priorities in coordination with the G3.

(c) Coordinating and integrating all surveillance activities.

(d) Developing intelligence from the information that is acquired.

(e) Furnishing to users the resultant intelligence data.

(f) Procuring information required for damage assessment.

(3) The G3 has the primary general staff responsibility for—

(a) Designating units for conduct of surveillance in accordance with the mission priorities established by G2.

(b) Furnishing information on friendly forces, to include their location, activities, and plans.

(c) Specifying target characteristics that are compatible with the mission.

(4) All surveillance means are integrated to provide for their effective application and coordinated use in covering the commander's area of interest. This is particularly necessary in view of the ever-increasing enemy capabilities to deny use of the airspace and to impair or to deny use of electronic detection and communications devices.

(5) In assigning orders and requests for specific information, the capabilities and current and projected tactical mission requirements of the respective units are considered.

(6) Detailed control, coordination, and supervision are necessary to guard against gaps or similar deficiencies in the combat surveillance coverage of the area of interest. Provisions are made for inspections, reports, maintenance of patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance plans, and surveillance capability overlays.

4-47. Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance

a. *General.*

(1) Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken

to obtain information, by visual observation or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

(2) Counterreconnaissance includes all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place. One method is to seek out and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements; another is to deny the enemy access to certain areas. in both cases, counterreconnaissance becomes more difficult as the dispersion of units increases.

(3) All units have reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance capabilities and responsibilities. These responsibilities may be limited to short patrols or defensive counterreconnaissance measures during the conduct of normal mission activities, or they may extend to offensive operations involving specific reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance tasks. Certain units are specifically organized for such operations.

(4) Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance cannot be completely separated. This is so because effective reconnaissance helps security, and counterreconnaissance activities also provide reconnaissance information. Forces executing reconnaissance missions may be employed simultaneously on both types of missions. Orders given to the unit should, however, state which one of the two missions is to receive priority (FM 17–36).

b. Planning and Coordinating Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) The intelligence officer plans and coordinates reconnaissance activities with the operations officer and consults with the entire staff to insure coordination of reconnaissance with other activities. Also, adjacent and supporting units are informed of reconnaissance plans to preclude duplication of reconnaissance efforts. Coordination is especially important to the success of night reconnaissance missions. Several factors should be taken into consideration in the planning stage. These include the formulation of the plan itself, the selection of a unit, and coordination. In preparing the plan, broad generalizations such as "report strength and disposition of the enemy" are to be avoided. The specific time that the information is desired, or the latest time that the information will be of value, should be included in the order or request. When more than one mission is assigned to a unit, definite priorities

should be stated. Where appropriate, plans should include provisions for debriefing of participating personnel after the reconnaissance has been completed.

(2) Once a unit is selected, in coordination with the operations officer, the unit should be allowed sufficient time to prepare its own plans, to conduct the mission, and to report the results. The assigned mission should be within the capability of the reconnaissance agency.

c. Principles of Conducting Reconnaissance. The reconnaissance techniques used by the combat arms are described in branch field manuals. The principles for reconnaissance patrolling are—

(1) *To gain surveillance contact as soon as possible and maintain it continuously.* Ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain observation of the enemy; and by working continuously to the front, flanks, and to the rear, attempt to determine the location, identification, disposition, and strength of the enemy force and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Army aviation may be used to assist ground reconnaissance.

(2) *To maneuver freely in conformity with operations.* Patrols and reconnaissance units maneuver freely and keep pace with the activity of the enemy. Reconnaissance units orient on the enemy and not on other friendly elements. Reconnaissance of other portions of the assigned area, in addition to canalized routes such as roads, valleys, and ridge lines, will result in procurement of maximum information.

(3) *To fight only when necessary to gain information.* Reconnaissance is conducted preferably by stealth and observation of the enemy without his knowledge. Combat is resorted to only when necessary to prevent friendly casualties or capture, when prisoners are desired, or when the mission requires combat to obtain the desired information. Reconnaissance forces are provided the means to accomplish their mission by close combat, if necessary.

(4) *To report all items of information as soon as possible.* Much information has importance that is not obvious at the time of its collection. Negative information shows where the enemy is not going, or where he is not located, at a given time.

d. Principles of Counterreconnaissance. The principles of counterreconnaissance operations are as follows:

(1) Operations are adjusted to and oriented on the friendly forces being screened.

(2) Enemy reconnaissance elements are destroyed or neutralized by combat.

(3) Screening forces are echeloned in depth to provide mutual support and to limit penetrations by enemy reconnaissance elements. The counterreconnaissance screen prevents enemy reconnaissance forces from entering certain areas or places. It may be a moving or a stationary one depending upon the activities of the force being screened.

e. Agencies.

(1) Ground reconnaissance agencies consist of personnel manning ground observation posts or surveillance devices, elements of all arms, and units especially organized or designated to perform air and ground reconnaissance. Infantry, armor, and engineer elements are suited for patrolling. Armored cavalry reconnaissance units are suited for reconnaissance in enemy areas. The depth at which reconnaissance patrols may operate in enemy-held areas is increased by the use of air cavalry, helicopters, and other transportation means to deliver and retrieve patrols. The ability of ground patrols to produce timely information depends in part upon their mobility and upon their communication means for transmitting information and receiving new instructions.

(2) Ground units specifically organized for reconnaissance include the—

(*a*) Ground surveillance section in each battalion headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), except in airborne division where it is part of the reconnaissance platoon.

(*b*) Scout platoon in each tank and mechanized infantry battalion.

(*c*) Reconnaissance platoon in each battalion, to include airborne and airmobile.

(*d*) Armored cavalry squadron in each division.

(*e*) Cavalry squadron in each airmobile division.

(*f*) Armored cavalry regiment in the type corps and type field army.

(*g*) Airborne Infantry Ranger Company of the corps and field army.

(3) Air reconnaissance agencies are discussed in later paragraphs.

4-48. Reconnaissance in Force and by Fire

a. Reconnaissance in Force. A reconnaissance in force is a limited objective operation by a unit to discover and to test the enemy's disposition and strength, or to develop other intelligence. If the enemy situation must be developed along a broad front, a reconnaissance in force may be conducted using strong probing actions to determine the enemy situation at selected points. The size of the force used is of such strength as to cause the enemy to react sufficiently to disclose his location, disposition, and strength. Reconnaissance in force operations may result in unacceptable losses, may disclose the commander's ultimate intentions, or may provoke an unwanted general engagement. When the enemy possesses appropriate nuclear weapons, the risk of presenting a profitable target may outweigh the value of the information desired.

b. Reconnaissance by Fire. Reconnaissance by fire is a reconnaissance method in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to destroy camouflage or to cause the enemy to react either by movement or by return of the fire. The enemy reaction permits observation of his locations, dispositions, and strength. This method has been frequently found productive in stability operations where rough terrain and heavy foliage degraded other reconnaissance methods. The use of riot control agents in lieu of high explosives (HE) is also considered feasible when the situation warrants.

4-49. Tactical Air Reconnaissance/Aerial Battlefield Surveillance

a. Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Tactical air reconnaissance missions are undertaken in direct support of tactical operations. Through the use of aerial platforms or vehicles equipped with visual, optical, electronic and/or other sensory devices, specific information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, is obtained. In addition, data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic characteristics of a particular area are secured.

b. Aerial Battlefield Surveillance. Aerial battlefield surveillance missions utilize aerial platforms or vehicles equipped with visual, optical, electronic and/or other sensory devices to—

(1) Maintain a continuous all-weather, day and night systematic watch over the battle area to provide timely intelligence information for tactical ground operations. Aerial surveillance in its broadest sense encompasses day/night observation over the entire area as contrasted to air reconnaissance which is a mission in time and

place to obtain information of the enemy, terrain, or weather.

(2) Perform target acquisition to identify targets by precise and timely location in three dimensions with respect to Army weapons which are able to engage those targets.

c. Visual Aerial Observation. Visual aerial observation by aircraft crews is limited by the speed and vibration of the aircraft, the availability of visual aids such as binoculars, and night observation devices, etc., the distance from which observation must be made, the enemy's air defenses and concealment measures, and the existing visibility. Many of these limitations may be overcome by use of sensors to verify and to supplement visual sightings. The value of visual aerial observation lies in the speed with which information of fleeting targets can be relayed to friendly units capable of attacking such targets. There are six general types of visual aerial observation—area search, spot search, specific search, route reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and contact reconnaissance. The use of crews intimately familiar with the terrain will greatly increase the effectiveness of visual aerial surveillance.

d. Permanent Record Imagery. Permanent record imagery is highly desirable before, during, and after most operations. All commanders require information concerning the location and disposition of the enemy. Aerial imagery can normally meet this requirement by providing recorded images which are studied, analyzed, and interpreted by trained imagery interpreters. Such analysis is more detailed and more accurate than that derived from visual observations. The use of permanent record imagery requires sensor recording equipment of various degrees of complexity. The time lag between acquisition and interpretation of permanent imagery may reduce or negate the value of information collected concerning transient and fleeting targets. Permanent imagery may be obtained through use of—

(1) Photographic Coverage—the general, categories of coverage are shown in figure 4–2.

(2) Emission detectors (light and heat in the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum).

(3) Radar.

(4) Electromagnetic intercept devices.

(5) Airborne personnel detectors.

e. Weather Reconnaissance. Weather reconnaissance by the tactical air force is the action

taken to obtain weather data over areas of operations. Weather reconnaissance is accomplished to obtain—

(1) Weather data for use in preparing weather analysis and forecasts. These missions fall into two general classes as follows:

(*a*) Scheduled missions which make weather observations, to include atmospheric soundings at predetermined locations and at scheduled times.

(*b*) Unscheduled missions to investigate doubtful weather conditions that will affect the battle area.

(2) Special reports of weather conditions along the route to, and in, the vicinity of targets for proposed air operations. These reports are required to permit immediate operational decisions such as diversion, change of flight track, or cancellation of mission.

f. Use of Radar and Infrared Devices.

(1) Portrayal methods used by radar and infrared devices include scope presentation for instantaneous viewing, inflight processing and viewing for near real-time intelligence, imagery recording for retention and detailed study, and transmission to a ground station. Airborne radar can produce acceptable imagery during most conditions of visibility, and is particularly valuable during periods of degraded visibility. Infrared sensory devices also produce acceptable imagery during most conditions of visibility, but are somewhat degraded during bad weather conditions.

(2) Airborne radar can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze, fog, mist, and dust. It is valuable as a moving target indicator (MTI), particularly in a controlled environment with the organic Army side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) capability of inflight processing, interpretation and reporting. Information obtained can be supplemented by use of other means, such as infrared (especially at night), visual observation, and photography to aid in the exact determination of the cause of the activity or other returns detected by the MTI radar. Airborne radar can quickly cover large areas. Side-looking airborne radars can operate from behind the forward edge of friendly dispositions. Airborne radar is dependent upon line-of-sight and may be detected and jammed or spoofed.

(3) Airborne pasive infrared and thermal detection devices are valuable in detecting heat emissions or differentials penetrating some types

PHOTO COVERAGE (1)	INITIAL RECORD	GENERAL INTELLIGENCE RECORD	DETAILED INTELLIGENCE RECORD	MAPPING RECORD
MAJOR USES (2)	General intelligence requirements, such as basic information on terrain, routes of communication, and enemy activities. Planning operations. Mapping.	Conduct of current tactical operations. Target acquisition.	Study of specific targets or objectives for information for immediate requirements and for specific planning.	Preparation and revision of maps.
TYPES OF PHOTOS (3)	Usually vertical stereo pairs	Usually vertical stereo pairs.	As required.	Usually small scale vertical stereo pairs*
AREA OF COVERAGE (4)	Projected areas of operations.	Unit area of influence and specified portions of the unit area of interest.	As required.	As required.
FREQUENCY (5)	As necessary to show seasonal changes.	As required by the tactical situation, terrain characteristics, and other variables. At times, daily coverage of only portions of the battle area is required. In moving situations, only coverage of specified areas and immediate objectives may be required.	As required.	As required.
DISTRIBUTION (6)	Normally requested by field army which makes automatic initial distribution to subordinate units according to areas of interest. Supplementary issues are made as the campaign progresses. See FM 101-10-1 for typical allowances.	Normally requested by divisions and higher headquarters. See FM-101-10-1 for typical allowances.	As required.	Normally requested by corps and higher headquarters and distributed to topographic units.

* Often supplemented with large scale photos of culturally developed areas.

Figure 4–2. Categories of aerial photographic coverage.

of camouflage, and collecting information at night. As with airborne radar, the information obtained by these devices is normally corroborated by other means, such as photography, which can better determine the nature of the detected activity. Airborne passive infrared and thermal detection devices are not designed for coverage of large areas and provide imagery only of that area beneath the flight path of the aircraft. The infrared (IR) devices are suitable for linear targets such as coastlines and communications nets. The aircraft must penetrate enemy airspace to accomplish its mission, with subsequent vulnerability to enemy aircraft or ground fire. Passive infrared and thermal detection devices are invulnerable to countermeasures but are susceptible to enemy deception measures. The effectiveness of these devices is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation (FM 30-20).

4-50. Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Agencies

a. *Army Aviation.* Within the field army, corps, or separate task force, where required, is an aviation aerial surveillance company which provides through use of visual observation and sensors (IR, SLAR, and photo) sustained near all-weather, day and night, surveillance of that portion of the area of interest for which the Army has primary aerial surveillance responsibility. Additional visual observation is available to combat battalions, brigades, task forces, and to divisions or corps through use of aerial observers in organic or supporting observation aircraft. Additional capabilities are provided by airborne COMINT, ELINT, and ESM resources of supporting USASA units at field army.

b. *Supporting Services.*

(1) Tactical reconnaissance wings of the tactical air force (TAF) normally support Army operations. A minimum of one air reconnaissance wing supports the field army with squadrons operating from dispersed airfields. The reconnaissance wings may include both reconnaissance/fighter and reconnaissance bomber aircraft. These aircraft provide night and day sensor and visual reconnaissance information. Reports of significant sightings made during any reconnaissance mission is transmitted inflight over the TAF Tactical Air Control System (TACS) net which are monitored by appropriate Air Force agencies. TAF high performance reconnaissance aircraft, with fighter cover when required, can perform air reconnaissance missions over the forward

areas as well as at great distances beyond the forward edge of the battle area.

(2) Naval and Marine carrier-based air reconnaissance may provide support for all types of Army units.

(a) Navy and Marine Corps carrier-based air reconnaissance is normal in amphibious operations. The Navy/Marine Corps system for requesting and coordinating air reconnaissance requests is used.

(b) In all other types of operations, Navy and Marine air reconnaissance support may be used when aircraft carriers or other air facilities are within range. Usually, Marine and Navy air reconnaissance activities are coordinated by the Tactical Air Force; normal Army-Air Force requests and coordinating procedures are used. In some cases, Navy and Marine air units may provide direct support to Army units in accordance with specially established procedures.

(c) Imagery may be delivered to Army units by Navy, Marine, or Army couriers. Army imagery interpreters and liaison officers are normally located with supporting Navy or Marine air reconnaissance units.

(3) Cryptologic service elements of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy, to include the U.S. Marine Corps, may provide support in the form of signal intelligence and electronic warfare services depending on geographical proximity and specially established procedures as developed by a joint or unified command.

4-51. Target Acquisition

a. *General.*

(1) Target acquisition is that part of combat intelligence specifically concerned with the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail for the effective employment of weapons.

(a) Detection determines the existence or presence of a target.

(b) Identification determines the nature, composition, and size of the target.

(c) Location consists of determining the position of the target with respect to known points or weapons, i.e., with respect to a common grid.

(d) The amount of detail required to acquire a target is dependent upon many variables, e.g., type of target, effect desired (neutralization, destruction, harassment, break-off of attack), means to be used to attack, or if the target is to

be preplanned or one of opportunity. In any case, the sufficiency of the detail is determined in the process of target analysis, whether this be an immediate analysis accomplished by a fire direction officer or a fire support element (FSE) in response to a target acquired by a forward observer, or a deliberate analysis accomplished by an intelligence target analyst or intelligence officer in response to future operational planning.

(e) The weapons to be employed are often construed to mean field artillery, but must be considered to mean all weapons, e.g., machine gun, mortar, antitank, armed helicopter, tactical aircraft, smoke generators, or even maneuver elements. The weapons to be used and the effect desired will be determined through analysis by FSE personnel.

(2) Target acquisition is accomplished either through the application of direct target acquisition means or through indirect target acquisition, that is, through the process of target development. These two methods supplement and complement each other, each at times satisfying the requirements implicit in the function of the other.

b. Direct Target Acquisition.

(1) Traditionally, direct target acquisition has been thought to be accomplished only by the application of means designed for that purpose, e.g., forward observers, observation posts, aerial observers, countermortar, counterbattery and surveillance radars, and flash and sound ranging devices. These means are part of the field artillery fire support system and are designed to be employed specifically to acquire targets for the field artillery and other fire support means. Implicit in the application of these means is the requirement for a great degree of accuracy, sufficient information for target analysis (i.e., if and when to engage target, by what method or means and by whom) and immediate response when required (FM 6-121).

(2) Direct target acquisition can be, and is, accomplished by other means, i.e., by units in contact, ground surveillance radars, SIGINT, ESM (to include direction finding), patrols of all types, survey parties, imagery acquired by aerial means, ground and air reconnaissance elements and virtually anyone who sees a target and has the capability to communicate the required information to a reaction means. All target information developed should be immediately passed to the FSE for rapid exploitation. At times many of

these means will be given the specific mission to acquire targets, e.g., long-range reconnaissance patrols, aerial imagery, or surveillance radars which have been surveyed into the common grid. Although all of these various means are not formally organized into a recognizable target acquisition system, they play an extremely important part in target acquisition.

c. Indirect Target Acquisition.

(1) Indirect target acquisition, sometimes termed target development, is the detection, location, and identification of suspect, probable and/or confirmed targets through the process of analyzing and correlating information from all intelligence collection means. The development process is accomplished over a period of time and is one of continuous refinement of detail; i.e., it may progress from a suspect target located only generally, through successive stages until a confirmed target is located accurately and identified exactly. This process is accomplished by the intelligence analyst who closely coordinates with the FSE in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The intelligence analyst normally logs all incoming information into a target workbook by specific target, and as targets are confirmed, he passes his analysis to the FSE. The FSE then performs the target analysis function according to priority as cited in paragraph 4-49b(1).

(2) Target development differs from direct target acquisition, not in the end results attained or sought, but in the manner of achieving the end result. It is a unique aspect of normal intelligence production with the specific purpose to develop targets. The force intelligence officer must not only accept staff responsibility for this function, but he must actively participate and coordinate the effort to insure its efficient and meaningful operation.

(3) Force commanders must provide resources to accomplish this important function. Intelligence personnel and fire support personnel charged with this function should be collocated and their efforts and capabilities integrated. This will facilitate the free flow and rapid exchange of information. Consolidation of intelligence and fire support personnel effort will also insure that pertinent targeting information is not delayed or derogated from by other intelligence data which may be of equal importance but not as perishable.

d. Target Acquisition Planning.

(1) Early in the planning stage of an operation, a list of potential targets is developed. Such

factors as mission, information on the enemy, characteristics of the area of operations, and enemy tactics and practices are studied to select areas in which targets are probable.

(2) The collection effort includes systematic battlefield surveillance to locate targets. Areas of particular importance to operational plans are subject to more intensive surveillance than other areas. Target folders are developed and maintained by inclusion of target intelligence and other material related to planning and executing action against a specific target.

(3) The target acquisition effort is then directed toward securing information to verify, identify, accurately locate, or disprove the presence of suspected targets. This is accomplished by assigning suitable collection tasks to collection agencies.

(4) The collection plan, observation plans, air reconnaissance plans, and patrol plans are used to assist in coordinating the target acquisition effort.

e. Requirements for Detail and Accuracy.

(1) Requirements for detail and accuracy will vary with the weapon to be employed (e.g., air, field artillery, maneuver force, ADM), the type ammunition (e.g., HE, chemical, or nuclear), the type fire (e.g., indirect or direct, unobserved or observed) and the effect desired (e.g., neutralization, destruction, harassment). Conversely, the detail and accuracy furnished by target acquisition means will, in turn, have an influence on each of these variables.

(2) For the above reason, it must be stressed that target information/intelligence must be reported as completely and accurately as possible in consonance with the capabilities of the acquisition source, timeliness of the information/intelligence requirements, and the existing situation. This is not to imply that incom-plete information should not be reported. All pertinent information is important to target acquisition and should be reported. For example, the field artillery continually stresses the requirement for the location of a target to be given in three dimensional coordinates (x-easting, y-northing, z-altitude). However, the altitude (z) is, more often than not, provided by the fire direction agency from the map rather than by the target acquisition means. Further, the report of vehicles entering and leaving a wooded area may be sufficient information to confirm the location of a previously suspected target.

f. Requirements for Timeliness.

(1) Requirements for timeliness vary. Several factors to be considered include the weapons to be employed, operational plans and the nature of the target, i.e., whether it is permanent, semipermanent or mobile; whether it is building up or dispersing; and whether it is an immediate or future threat to the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) To insure timeliness in target acquisition, all commands and target acquisition agencies must be authorized to report information directly to whatever agency has the capability to react rapidly and properly. Every effort should be made to prevent any unnecessary delay in reporting target information/intelligence.

(3) Highly accurate target information/intelligence is particularly valuable for general intelligence purposes. Thus, information acquired by target acquisition, though obtained primarily for use in the attack of targets, should receive thorough consideration for dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent commands.

(4) The general considerations discussed under the formulation of orders and requests (para 4-60) are particularly important to a successful target acquisition effort.

Section VII. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

4-52. General

Like any other staff section, the intelligence section plans all activities for which it is responsible. Intelligence planning is a continuing process, but planning for a specific operation is initiated on receipt of the mission or when a contingency mission is developed. Intelligence planning begins before the planning of other staff sections. Until an intelligence estimate is available, detailed op-erational planning cannot be completed. The intelligence officer must be ready to provide an estimate for the next operation and to revise the current estimate to meet changed operational conditions.

4-53. Coordination in Planning

a. Only rarely can the intelligence officer conclude his actions without coordination with one

or more general or special staff sections. No intelligence action that affects the commander's decision can be concluded without coordination with one or more staff agencies. An intelligence officer who fails to recognize where coordination is necessary may cause confusion and delay.

b. The following list exemplifies some of the staff coordination necessary in planning by the division intelligence officer:

(1) Interrogation of prisoners of war: G1, G4, G5, staff judge advocate, provost marshal, aviation officer, EW/Cryptologic staff officer, and surgeon.

(2) Censorship: G1, G5, AG, and public information officer.

(3) Operations: A11.

(4) Use of combat troops for intelligence missions: G3 and EW/Cryptologic staff officer.

(5) Escort, supervision, and briefing of visitors: G1, G3, provost marshal, public information officer, and headquarters commandant.

(6) Location and construction of observation posts: G3, engineer, communications electronics, and field artillery officers.

(7) Examination of captured equipment: G4, EW/Cryptologic staff officer, division surgeon, chemical officer, and elements of division support commands as appropriate.

(8) Needs for maps, imagery, and studies: All.

(9) Map procurement, storage, and distribution: G3, engineer and support commander.

(10) Aerial reconnaissance, photographic and visual: G3, air liaison officer, and field artillery officer.

(11) Civilian internees: G1, G5, EW/Cryptologic staff officer, staff judge advocate, and provost marshal.

(12) Intelligence training: G3 and EW/Cryptologic staff officer.

(13) Procurement and replacement of intelligence specialist: G1 and MI unit commander.

(14) Signal intelligence: EW/Cryptologic Staff Officer, communications electronics officer, special security officer (SSO), and USASA unit commander.

(15) Engineer intelligence: Engineer staff officer.

(16) Electronic warfare intelligence: EW/Cryptologic staff officer.

(17) Procurement, replacement and maintenance of intelligence related equipment: G4.

(18) Chemical intelligence: Chemical officer.

(19) Cover and deception: G3, engineer, communications electronics, USASA, and psychological operations officer.

4-54. Intelligence Planning Phases

a. General. Intelligence planning is a continuing process. Based on an analysis of planning tasks, periods are established for the completion of certain tasks before the plan is further developed. Further division of each planning period into phases facilitates coordination between staff sections. The sequence of intelligence planning phases, like that of the other staff sections, is generally outlined in the following paragraphs.

b. Preliminary Phase. Before the completion of a current operation and before the commander receives any directives or orders for further action, his staff considers what this further action is likely to be. This applies particularly to the intelligence officer, for when the commander receives a directive or warning for further action, the intelligence officer must have sufficient information immediately available for the commander to analyze the probable mission and to issue preliminary planning guidance. A similar situation may exist when a headquarters is activated or at the beginning of any war, campaign, or operation.

c. Initial Phase. When a unit receives a new mission, information of the enemy and the area of operations is furnished to the commander and the staff in the form of an intelligence estimate (app J) so that definite operational, administrative, and logistical planning may be initiated. In addition, a counterintelligence estimate (app M) may be prepared to determine and evaluate the enemy's intelligence capabilities and their possible effect on friendly operations. An analysis of the enemy's intelligence capabilities must not only include any and all methods by which the enemy is capable of gaining information but also how this would disrupt the effectiveness of friendly operations. The security measures contained in the unit SOP are reviewed to determine whether they are adequate for the security of the planning and the operation. Additional information is presented at the initial staff conference to assist the commander in analyzing the mission and providing definite planning guidance.

d. Subsequent Phases. These phases consist of

preparation, approval, publication, and *execution.* Preparation, approval, and publication refer to the operation plan and its various annexes; and execution is a final, preoperational stage during which subordinate units complete their planning and conduct rehearsals. These phases, which start the definite planning period, feature the concurrent preparation of various plans and studies, based on the current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates. The most important of these, from the intelligence viewpoint, follow:

(1) Preparation of a counterintelligence plan which contains an enumeration of appropriate intelligence countermeasures required for the security of the operation and which may include appropriate aspects of cover and deception.

(2) Completion of plans to obtain all necessary information not immediately available.

(3) Preparation of a plan for securing and distributing intelligence aids. These aids include materials such as charts and models of the area of operations, maps, photos and mosaics, imagery interpretation reports, sketches and diagrams, hydrographic charts, and intelligence reports.

(4) Revision of the intelligence estimate after evaluation and interpretation of all available information. The estimate, which is based on initial and subsequent assumptions and changes in the known enemy and friendly situation, is constantly revised throughout the planning phase.

(5) Revision and recommendation of EEI and other intelligence requirements, including those prepared earlier which are still applicable and those that concern the operational phase.

(6) Preparation of a collection plan, based on the EEI that were approved by the commander, and on other intelligence requirements (OIR). This plan is used by the intelliegnce section to develop collection missions.

(7) Preparation of an intelligence plan as an annex to the operation plan. (The operation plan becomes the operation order; thus, the intelligence plan becomes the intelligence annex to the operation order.)

e. Intelligence Planning is Continuous. Existing intelligence is revised as new intelligence is developed. The collection plan is altered as the situation develops so as to reflect current intelligence needs. Finally preliminary planning again commences in anticipation of future actions.

4-55. The Intelligence Annex to an Operation Order or Plan

a. General. The intelligence annex (app N and FM 101-5) is one of the several annexes to an operation order. The intelligence annex is standardized and has a more rigid format than other annexes.

b. Purpose. The purpose of the intelligence annex is to:

(1) Disseminate information/intelligence about enemy forces essential to the conduct of the operation.

(2) Serve as a medium for instructing subordinate commanders to acquire information necessary to the conduct of the operation but which can be obtained immediately before or when the operation itself has begun.

(3) Give certain other miscellaneous intelligence orders or guidance for the operation question.

(4) Confirm the orders and requests for information that have been made in fragmentary form and that are still current at the time the annex is issued.

(5) Preserve brevity, clarity, and simplicity in the body of the order.

(6) Amplify an order when information is of limited application to the entire command or is primarily technical in nature.

c. Preparation. General instructions for the preparation of the intelligence annex are the same as for the operation order. The following factors are further guidance to preparation of the intelligence annex:

(1) The annex is not intended to serve as a substitute for the intelligence collection plan.

(2) It may be issued before distribution of the operation order.

(3) An intelligence annex is normally prepared for each operation.

(4) It must be kept as brief as is consistent with clarity.

(5) Matters adequately covered in unit or command standing operating procedures (SOP) should not be repeated.

(6) Reference may be made to appropriate intelligence reports, provided addressees have the reports.

(7) Material of limited interest, or which involves considerable detail, may be included in

appendixes to the annex. The most likely appendixes are enemy situation maps or overlays, reconnaissance and observation and map distribution tables.

4-56. Field Army Intelligence Planning

a. The field army G2 is concerned with strategic and combat intelligence, and his planning reflects this concern. Moreover, the scope and projection of field army operations and the simultaneous planning for a number of operations interject into army intelligence planning a number of factors that warrant consideration.

b. The scope and the long range of field army operations affect intelligence planning in preparation for combat as follows:

(1) Preliminary and initial intelligence planning is based largely on assumptions. As planning progresses, particularly as operational details are made firm, the assumptions can either be substantiated as fact or, if erroneous, discarded.

(2) Intelligence planning is flexible, although with respect to gathering information of weather and terrain in the probable area of operations, it is not so flexible as in the cases of personnel and operational or logistical planning. The further an operation is projected into the future, the more likely are the changes in the situation that may radically alter the plans. Provisions are therefore made for all foreseeable contingencies.

(3) Concurrent planning by subordinate echelons is not ordinarily feasible in the early stages of planning for an operation scheduled far into the future due to the involvement in the operation in progress and the planning for the next operation. Sufficient data usually are not available from field army to provide to corps.

c. The conduct or current operations and the simultaneous planning of two or more future operations taxes the ability of the G2 section to operate on a 24-hour basis. Therefore, for more efficient operation during peak workload periods, consideration must be given to reorganization for planning future operations. One method of reorganizing the G2 section is to provide intelligence representation from each branch to a headquarters planning group. Another is to organize within the G2 section an intelligence planning group representing each branch. A third solution is to continue under the normal organization and concurrently plan and operate. The intelligence officer must decide which system to use based on requirements and the personnel available.

4-57. Corps Intelligence Planning

Intelligence planning at corps is based on Army plans and is primarily a matter of determining how, by whom, and when the intelligence functions of the corps will be performed and setting forth the details in a logical, understandable fashion. Each of the phases is generally the same as it is for the field army, but the time available to corps will be less than that available to the field army. During the execution phase of an operation, the corps G2 section is primarily concerned with the fulfillment of those functions which pertain directly to the operation. It will also be engaged in planning for future operations. Generally corps planning does not require the establishment of a separate planning staff or a separate planning group within the G2 section.

4-58. Division Intelligence Planning

The intelligence planning at division in preparation for combat is based on plans of the next higher headquarters. The same planning phases are applicable, although the preliminary phase will be considerably shortened. In addition to absorbing and disseminating the intelligence made available as a result of intelligence activities at higher headquarters, the division G2 develops intelligence requirements, levies requests for information and exploits any other sources available to him. In view of the reduced time available to prepare for combat, the division G2 must keep himself currently informed as to planning being undertaken at the next higher echelon.

4-59. Lower Unit Intelligence Planning

As at the higher levels, essentially the same planning is carried out. Because of the sizes of the units involved and their areas of interest, there will be a reduction in the number of operational plans and planning leadtime. Normally, operational planning at the lower levels is relatively informal.

Section VIII. ORDERS AND REQUESTS

4-60. Formulation of Orders and Requests

a. Orders and requests for specific information are based on indications. Collection agencies are directed or requested to supply the information which will confirm or deny the indications, but they are not given the responsibility for determining whether or not the information obtained does confirm or deny an indication. If the location of hostile artillery in depth is a defense indication, collection agencies are not ordered to "report whether or not hostile artillery is located on depth." Instead, they are ordered to "report locations of hostile artillery in your sector/zone." Determination of whether the indication has been substantiated is then based on the information collected. Orders and requests for information deal with a specific enemy activity, location, or characteristics, or a specific terrain feature or weather condition. These orders and requests are specific as to what information is desired and where it may be found. For example, the forward movement of hostile troops has been determined to be an indication of reinforcement. An analysis of the road nets, communications centers, and locations of enemy forces—integrated with a knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine—indicates what routes the enemy will most probably use and where the effort of available collection agencies should be concentrated. A proper order to collecting agencies is "report volume, type, and direction of traffic on the following roads:* * * *."

b. Orders and requests based on indications of enemy vulnerabilities are formulated in the same manner. For example, a battalion-sized troop unit disposed within a given area may have been determined to be the minimum target suitable for nuclear attack. Collection agencies are not ordered to report locations of battalions vulnerable to nuclear attack; instead, they are ordered to report location, composition, disposition, size, shape, and nuclear defense measures of battalion-sized troop units.

c. Orders and requests for specific information frequently deal with specific characteristics of the area of operations. For example, an intelligence requirement may ask, "What obstacles exist in our zone?" A map study reveals that streams cross the axis of advance. This is an indication that natural obstacles may exist. The extent to which a located stream is actually an obstacle becomes the subject for orders and requests for spe-

cific information. Accordingly, the order or request to a collection agency may state, "Report width, depth, velocity, and condition of banks and bottom of JOH River between WALIS and HERMANN."

d. Collection agencies do not restrict their efforts to items specifically mentioned in orders and reports from higher headquarters. All pertinent information, even if not specifically requested, is reported.

4-61. Dissemination of Orders and Requests

Orders and requests for specific information are normally transmitted either as fragmentary orders or by means of the intelligence annex of the operations order (para 4-7*d*). Security must be provided in the transmission of orders and requests, because enemy knowledge of our requirements would furnish him with a basis for countering our collection efforts.

a. Fragmentary orders are used most frequently because information requirements continually change. Operations orders have a prescribed format; however, a fragmentary (operation) order has no prescribed format. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when they have not changed, are not essential, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue.

b. Intelligence and intelligence instructions, to include orders and requests for the collection of information, are disseminated by means of the intelligence annex. This annex normally accompanies each complete operation order issued by division and higher commands. An example of an intelligence annex is shown in appendix N.

(1) Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex, "Intelligence Acquisition Tasks," implements the collection plan. It contains a complete list of current orders and requests for information. Except for collection orders which are a part of the unit SOP, previously issued collection orders and requests not repeated in the intelligence annex are automatically canceled. When orders and requests are lengthy, they may be placed in an appendix to the intelligence annex.

(2) Paragraph 4 of the intelligence annex, "Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel," lists under a separate subparagraph the items which require action different from those prescribed in the unit SOP. In preparing paragraph 4, the intelligence officer consults supporting intelligence agencies, as appropriate.

Section IX. THE COLLECTION PLAN

4–62. General

a. The collection plan is a means whereby an intelligence officer takes the intelligence requirements, as announced by the commander, and by following a logical, orderly process, analyzes the intelligence requirements for indications and translates the indications into specific missions or requests directed to collection agencies, together with the designation of the time and place the information is to be reported. It is supplemented, as required, by workbooks and other plans such as aerial and ground reconnaissance plans and observation plans.

b. The collection plan assists the intelligence officer in the coordination and integration of the collection efforts of the collecting agencies and in keeping all elements of the intelligence section informed of collection activities directed by the headquarters.

c. The collection plan covers an entire operation. Since the collection effort involves continuous planning, an entirely new collection plan is seldom prepared except when a unit first enters combat. The collection plan is continually revised, as required. In effect, it is a slate on which new entries are written, as necessary, and obsolete entries are removed.

d. Because information requirements are more complex at higher levels of command, the collection plan is normally more extensive at such levels. At any level, however, collection planning is essentially a mental process and the collection plan—regardless of the format being used—is merely an aid to assist the intelligence officer. It is not a substitute for thinking, and is maintained only to the extent that it assists the intelligence officer in planning and supervising the collection efforts.

e. An invaluable aid in directing the collection effort and in preparing the collection plan is the coverage map. Plotted on the coverage map are the extent and frequency of coverage of all collection sources and agencies, including aerial and ground reconnaissance, and any other activities which provide information coverage to portions of the battlefield. By use of a coverage map, the intelligence officer can quickly determine existing gaps in coverage as well as coverage that is already in effect against areas or targets of high interest. At lower levels, the coverage map may simply be an overlay to the situation map (para 5–6).

4–63. Format

a. The collection plan is not made up in any prescribed form. It can range from a fragmentary worksheet to a long, detailed plan, or it may be a mental plan alone. Although an experienced intelligence officer can formulate his collection plan mentally, the planning of the collection effort is facilitated and is less subject to error when a formal, written collection plan is used.

b. The type and makeup of the collection plan will depend upon the size of the unit, the mission, the situation, and the personalities concerned. At brigade and battalion levels, because of time and operational limitations, the collection plan must take the simplest form possible, consistent with operational necessity. For example, the format of the plan recommended for use at division and higher levels (fig 4–3), may be modified by eliminating columns 1, 2, and 5. Greater flexibility and mobility in future operations, together with the need for increased speed in the flow of information, may well preclude a formal written collection plan. Regardless of what form of plan is chosen, it must be patterned to meet the intelligence officer's needs at any given time.

4–64. Contents of the Collection Plan

a. A collection plan includes the following items (fig 4–3):

(1) The EEI and other intelligence requirements—usually stated in question form.

(2) The indications pertinent to the EEI and to other intelligence requirements.

(3) The specific information sought in connection with each indication. This information is the basis for orders and requests to collection agencies.

(4) The agencies to be used to obtain the required information.

(5) The place and time the information is to be reported if not specified in the unit SOP.

(6) A column to indicate the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action.

b. Appendix E is an example of a partially completed collection plan.

4–65. Basis for Specific Orders and Requests

The wording of an order or request is not necessarily the same as that used in column 3 of the

UNIT:

Period covered: From: _____ To: _____

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					(5)	(6)
			List all available agencies						
Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items	Indications (analysis of items in column (1))	Basis for specific orders or requests	List all available	agencies to be	used in the	collection of	required information	Place and time at which information is to be reported	Remarks
List the EEI announced for the operation or period and other required intelligence items, spaced sufficiently to permit entry in column (2) of all indications pertinent to each item.	List opposite each item in column (1) those indications that best provide an answer to the question asked or implied by each item.	List the specific information sought in connection with each indication.	Place a cross (X) under each agency that has or can get the information bearing on each indication. The agency (or agencies) finally selected to obtain the information is indicated by circling Ⓧ except for SOP items for agencies under the control of the unit.					Place: Headquarters or staff section to which information is to be reported if other than the insuing headquarters. Time may be a specific time, periodically, or as the information is obtained.	Notes for future actions and to indicate progress of the collection effort.

Figure 4–3. A collection plan.

plan. Several entries may be combined into a single order or request, because the same specific information may be sought in connection with several different indications. For example, indications of attack may include "location of artillery well forward"; indications of defense may include a requirement to determine the "location of artillery laterally and in depth." In both of these cases, the specific information desired from collection agencies is location of artillery by type and caliber.

4-66. Available Agencies

a. All available collection agencies usually are listed at the top of column 4. Military intelligence units should be listed specifically. Material from the MI unit would include Interrogation, Imagery Interpretation, Counterintelligence and Order of Battle Information. Supporting intelligence collection agencies also are listed.

b. Opposite each basis for specific orders or requests, an X is entered in the column of each collection agency capable of furnishing the required information. The factors of suitability, multiplicity, and balance are applied, and circles are drawn around the X's of the agencies to be ordered or requested to furnish the information. An exception to this technique is the handling of SPO items for agencies under the control of the headquarters.

c. The intelligence officer specifically selects those agencies with which he has direct communication. When information is desired from an agency of a higher or lower headquarters, normally the headquarters itself should be listed.

4-67 Place and Time of Reporting Information

a. Information may be required by or at a specified time or times, at specified intervals, or upon the occurrence of specific events. A one-time report, for example, the condition of a river bottom, may be required by a specified time. Reports on certain enemy activities may be desired at specified times. Such reports may be required daily at the beginning of morning nautical twilight and at the end of evening nautical twilight. Reports of other enemy activities, such as movement along particular roads, may be required periodically, that is, "every 4 hours beginning at 0800." Reports of identification of new units, enemy aerial activity, artillery bombardment, nuclear activity, and similar items, are usually

required as obtained. Periodic negative reports pertaining to specified activities may also be required.

b. Entries in column 5 are determined in consultation with the operations officer. Information which arrives too late is of no value. Information received too soon may be inaccurate by the time it is used.

c. When the collection agency requires time for preparation, allowance is made for the time needed by the collection agency to issue orders, prepare personnel for the mission, execute the mission, and report the results.

4-68. Remarks

a. Miscellaneous notes on the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action are recorded in column 6, "Remarks." A code consisting of plus and minus signs, checkmarks, and crosses may be used for designating whether positive or negative reports were received, whether the information received was adequate, or whether the indication concerned has been substantiated.

b. Notes on future cancellation or implementation of orders and requests, modifications of EEI and other intelligence requirements upon the occurrence of specific events, or other actions to be taken as the collection effort progresses are also entered in column 6.

4-69. SOP Items

a. As the collection plan is a means of facilitating analysis of the EEI and other intelligence requirements, and insuring that pertinent orders and requests have been issued, entries are also made concerning information items specified by unit SOP (FM 61-100 and FM 101-5). For example, ordinarily the SOP direct subordinate units to report newly obtained identifications immediately. Nevertheless, the collection plan is completed with respect to new unit identifications exactly as it would be if the SOP did not require such reporting. For such items, however, the X's under agencies to be used need not be circled and the abbreviation "SOP" may be entered in the "Remarks" column to indicate that an order is not necessary.

b. If the basis for specific orders or requests directs attention to a specific area, the item is treated as if it were not an SOP item even though it may be information of a type covered in the

unit SOP. For example, the unit SOP may prescribe reporting the location of hostile minefields, demolitions, and other defensive works. However, a requirement for reporting the location of minefields in the vicinity of a specific area is not treated as an SOP item.

Section X. SUPERVISION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

4-70. General

Active supervision of the collection effort by the intelligence officer is necessary to insure the success of the collection effort. This is particularly true of the collection agencies organic to or attached to brigade and lower units. Supervision can be best achieved by personal staff visits—by the intelligence officer himself or by members of his staff. For example, an S2 may brief members of a patrol before departure and debrief them, as a group, upon their return.

4-71. Significance

Because his primary function is to keep the commander and others informed of the enemy situation and capabilities in the area of operations, the intelligence officer is faced with the problem of efficiently employing all available collection agencies to gather information. The commander requires on a continuing basis, reliable information on the disposition, strength, composition, and movement of hostile forces as well as information on the area of operations. All means are employed to gain information of the enemy forces in his sector/zone and in other areas which may affect the preparation of plans and the accomplishment of the mission. Failure to exploit properly each source of information may deny important information of hostile dispositions, movements, and operations and prevent the exploitation of enemy peculiarities and weaknesses. Supervision of the collection effort must, therefore, be an integral part of the intelligence officer's responsibilities in the collection of information.

CHAPTER 5

PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
(STANAG 2022, 2073; SEASTAG 2022; SOLOG 2R2)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5-1. General

Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. Processing consists of three operations—

a. *Recording.* The reduction of information to writing or some other form of graphical representation and the arranging of this information into groups of related items.

b. *Evaluation.* The determination of the pertinence, reliability, and accuracy of the information.

c. *Interpretation.* The determination of the significance of the information in relationship to information and intelligence already known and the drawing of deductions as to the probable meaning of the evaluated information.

5-2. Processing Procedure

a. Information is processed as received without waiting to collect additional information. The intelligence derived from incomplete information may be particularly essential for nuclear targets or fast moving stability operations. Normally, there is a time lag between the buildup of a target and the time that the information becomes available; in fact, complete information on the target may not become available until after the target has begun to vanish. If time permits, a search is directed for additional information to complete, confirm, or refute the intelligence developed from incomplete information.

b. The sequence in processing depends upon the nature and urgency of the information. Usually, recording is the first step; however, on urgent items, recording may occur simultaneously with evaluation and interpretation or even later. Irrelevant information is not processed. Information needed immediately by higher, lower, or adjacent units is disseminated before it is com-

pletely processed. Information not of immediate concern, but of possible future value, is normally completely processed before being disseminated.

c. Evaluation and interpretation may be instantaneous and may be followed by immediate dissemination. For example, information from a reliable source and believed to be true may state that the enemy is about to launch a major attack. In this case, recording is of secondary importance and the intelligence report that an attack is imminent is disseminated as soon after receipt as possible.

d. Information is sometimes relayed to a higher echelon before any processing takes place. For example, to decrease the production time of intelligence related to nuclear targets, a commander may order that all information concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities is to be reported without processing at any lower headquarters.

e. Figure 5-1 illustrates the flow of processing at a division, corps, or field army headquarters having a tactical operations center (TOC). The upper portion of the figure reflects processing which occurs when the message is first received at the TOC; the lower portion reflects the processing which takes place when the message is first received at the G2 section. The latter portion may also apply equally as well to processing at brigade level except that those references to the G2 and TOC are not appropriate at this level.

f. A sound collection program and proper utilization of the various collection agencies and sources of information will result in a very heavy volume of information which flows into the respective intelligence staffs' processing element. Many of the intelligence requirements can only be met by reporting minute details on a great variety of subject areas. Each one of these details may appear unrelated to others and insignificant

54 PICAS

Figure 5–1. Flow of processing.

by itself, but when painstakingly mapped and otherwise chronologically reported over long periods of time and analyzed in the light of other details reported, they may lead to definitive and predictable patterns of enemy activity. This technique is known as pattern analysis. In developing a pattern analysis, the intelligence officer must decide what data he wants to compile by subject category. The types of overlays and categories of subjects plotted thereon will, therefore, vary extensively according to the needs. The use of a graphic keying system and color schemes in conjunction with large scale maps will greatly facilitate data analysis.

5-3. Processing of Information at Corps and Field Army

As the scope of intelligence activities and the volume of information increase, a more elaborate and intricate system of processing is required.

a. Recording. Above division, the wealth of information requires thorough and painstaking recording to prevent loss of items and obscuration by irrelevant details. For example, intelligence information and reports submitted by U.S. Army elements at the Army group level and above, assigned to NATO commands, are identified by the use of a standardized NATO intelligence code (STANAG 2073).

b. Evaluation. Evaluation of information is more complex at higher echelons because of the amount and variety of information received. This is partly compensated for by the greater number of sources and agencies that permit more specific determination of the accuracy of a given item, the reliability of the source, and the reliability of the agency obtaining the item.

(1) *Pertinence.* The pertinence of information is more than just a matter of determining who needs it and when. There must be a sifting of the valuable information from that of little importance or relevance.

(2) *Reliability.* Determination of the reliability of the source and agency is relatively easy because of the more frequent exploitation of a given source or use of a particular agency. Over a period much data accumulates on the accuracy and reliability of sources and on the ability, training, and experience of the collecting agency.

(3) *Accuracy.* The accuracy of information is readily determined because of the comparative wealth of corroborating evidence. An additional check on accuracy is available to the corps or field army G2. Frequently, however, a lower headquarters may use the same information to produce intelligence that agrees with the intelligence separately produced by a higher headquarters. This additional check on accuracy may become dangerous if the larger unit allows itself to become unduly reliant on intelligence produced by its subordinate units. Each echelon must have some independent capability for producing intelligence.

c. Interpretation. Interpretation of information at higher headquarters is a progressively more complex task. The same abundance of information and intelligence that makes determination of the significance of an item relatively simple makes the task of selecting the appropriate information and intelligence for comparison more difficult. Moreover, the higher the headquarters, the less comparative significance an individual item has; and the linking of the item with those which in the aggregate have a major significance is more difficult. When there are large volumes of both new information and accumulated information and intelligence, efficient interpretation depends on systematic recording and precise analysis.

(1) The evaluated information and previously produced intelligence used in determining the significance of new information are carefully recorded so that items required for reference are available to the intelligence officer when he interprets a new item of information.

(2) Analysis of each new item of information is made to relate it to information already available. Every component part is judged in relation to known facts; and the significance of the parts, as well as the whole, is determined. Once this has been accomplished, the effect of the information on the current intelligence picture is established. The information has been converted into intelligence.

d. Advent of Automatic Data Processing System (ADPS). With the advent and application of an intelligence data processing system in the field army, it is envisioned that the present-day problems of recording, storing, sorting, transmitting, retrieving, and displaying intelligence data will be somewhat alleviated. Intelligence data would be stored electronically and recalled and displayed either in graphic or hard-copy form. Access to data within the system may be provided through the use of area communications, with storage of data at a central point, perhaps division level. Developments in the ADPS area would therefore

reduce the large amount of time spent by intelligence personnel in procedural actions and allow

additional time for analysis of intelligence trends and studies.

Section II. RECORDING

5-4. General

a. Recording makes subsequent interpretation easier and more accurate and facilitates preparation of intelligence reports by conveniently drawing together all available information on a specific subject. The recording means used must be adequate to handle the volume of information and intelligence received and to serve the needs of those who must have access to it. Means and techniques of recording must permit timely dissemination of information and intelligence.

b. At headquarters above division, recording is of increased importance and complexity. Maximum use should be made of mechanical equipment and, when available, automatic data processing (ADP) systems.

c. Common aids currently used in recording are the—

(1) Journal.

(2) Situation map.

(3) Intelligence workbook.

(4) Intelligence files.

5-5. Journal

a. The journal is a permanent chronological record of reports and messages that have been received and transmitted, of important events that have occurred, and of actions taken in response, covering a stated period, usually 24 hours. Figure 5-2 is an example of a page from an intelligence journal, illustrating the types of entries normally made. The administration branch of the G2 section normally maintains the section journal. The journal is of great significance at division level and below.

b. The commander of a brigade may prescribe the maintenance of one journal for the unit or require the maintenance of separate journals by each staff section. It is felt desirable, in view of the trend toward a dual function capability on the part of the S2-S3, to maintain a combined journal for the S2-S3 section. In this event, separate workbooks and message files should be maintained. Unless specifically prohibited by the commander, the S2 section should maintain a separate intelligence journal file to provide a working file for the S2 section.

c. Journal entries should reflect—

(1) An accurate and concise statement of the message, report, or event.

(2) A notation as to the sender or individual making the report, to include unit duty position or section, such as S3, 1/60 Inf.

(3) The time of receipt or dispatch and method of transmission.

(4) Action actually taken (not intended) as a result, to include dissemination given to reports or information received.

5-6. Situation Map

a. The enemy situation map is a temporary graphic display of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy. Information of friendly forces on this map is usually limited to boundaries; locations of command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; reconnaissance units; and the forward edge of the battle area. Separate overlays are often used to display separate categories of information. A typical overlay shows fortifications; another shows potential nuclear targets; and still another presents details of order of battle. The latest time at which the activity was observed or the disposition confirmed should be indicated when plotting enemy activities and dispositions. The intelligence officer keeps the situation map or overlay as simple as possible. He uses authorized conventional signs, military symbols, and abbreviations.

b. Other information and intelligence aspects of the situation may be recorded on situation maps. Chemical officers at respective headquarters, for example, record reported nuclear bursts and CB data on situation maps; and engineer officers similarly record mine and obstacle data.

c. Permanent recordings of the information on a situation map is achieved by overlay tracing or periodically photographing the map.

d. Maintenance of the situation map at brigade and battalion levels is usually a joint S2/S3 action while at higher levels a separate situation map is maintained by each section. The friendly

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG					PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.					1		16	

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED				
		FROM		TO		
G2, 20th Inf Division	BURGEN (LA 567 275) GERMANY	HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE	
		0001	07 Dec 70	2400	07 Dec 70	

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
1			Journal opened 0001		RBW
2	0030		1st BDE: 2/20 Inf at 0005 during night recon patrol vic LA 888 912 discovered en supply dump. Search continues	M, WB, G3, F, C	RBW
3		0055	ALL UNITS: Aug alt chal/passw. Prim comp'd at 070045	S.F.C.	RBW
4	0200		1st BDE: Follow-up msg to J-2: Search results 12xAT mines, 30,000 rds NATO 7.62 ammo, 6 rls barbed wire. Equip dest'd inplace	M, WB, G3, F, C	RBW
5			G2 & OB OFF departed HQ for Corps Brief. at 0630. ETR approx 0930	DO	RBW
6		0700	DIST A: Wx forecast for 24 hrs: Prec: None; Ceiling: Unl; Wind: S&SW at 6 KTS; Temp: 62-85; Humidity: 15%	F	ABW
7			Div HQ red'd en arty fire at 0900. Fires lifted 0910. HQ rec'd approx 30 rds, unk cal. Damage unk at present.	T, F, WB, M, C	RBW
81			Journal closed 2400		GD
			SUMMARY		
			There was no en contact during period,		
			but Div HQ rec'd 32 rds 8in arty fires		
			with no major damage. One en ammo dump dest'd		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
ROLAND B. WYNOT, MAJ, MI	Roland B Wynot

DA FORM 1594
1 NOV 62

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.   ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 O—664154

Figure 5-2. Sample intelligence journal.

situation is basically the responsibility of the S3 while the enemy situation is basically the responsibility of the S2. In combined operations, personnel from either section may plot friendly or enemy entries on the situation map and perform other processing functions.

e. The situation map provides a basis for comparison of the enemy situation against the friendly situation. From the intelligence officer's standpoint, pertinent information of the enemy is recorded graphically on the situation map for reference and study. Whenever possible, both the situation map and the S2 workbook will be maintained. However, in a fast moving situation when the volume of messages is such that both cannot be maintained effectively, priority should be given to keeping the situation map current. In addition to recording the date time group of a report, the following types of entries pertaining to the enemy should be posted on the situation map:

(1) Unit identification (down to the lowest level practicable).

(2) Unit dispositions (down to the lowest determinable level).

(3) Boundaries (down to the lowest determinable echelon).

(4) Location of weapons, to include—

   (*a*) Machine gun positions.

   (*b*) Supporting mortars (all calibers).

   (*c*) Antitank gun positions.

   (*d*) Artillery positions.

   (*e*) Armored vehicles.

   (*f*) Antiaircraft positions.

   (*g*) Air defense artillery positions.

(5) Minefields.

(6) Roadblocks.

(7) Entrenchments.

(8) Other obstacles or defensive installations.

(9) Logistics and command facilities.

(10) Activities.

(11) Terrain data.

(12) Aircraft or helicopter staging areas.

(13) CBR contaminated areas.

(14) Enemy radars.

f. The primary intelligence uses of the situation map are—

(1) To display the enemy disposition and situation.

(2) To provide a basis for comparison in order to determine the significance of newly received data pertaining to the enemy forces.

(3) To provide a background and basis for briefings and other required intelligence reports.

(4) To provide the basis for overlays which graphically portray the enemy situation.

(5) To assist in the determination of patterns of movement of guerrilla or insurgent forces.

g. The secondary intelligence uses of the situation map are to post—directly on it or in its margins—the following information:

(1) Computations of enemy personnel and weapons strengths.

(2) Organization charts of specified enemy units.

(3) Summarizations of weather and terrain data.

(4) A listing of priority intelligence requirements.

(5) Notations pertaining to current patrol plans.

(6) Closing time computations.

(7) A listing of friendly attachments.

h. The intelligence officer may consider the use of the following means of maintaining the situation map:

(1) Rather than attempting to plot all entries on a map by means of conventional or improvised military symbols, a number or letter may be plotted in the area where the activity was observed. A corresponding letter or number can then be entered into a space alongside the map and a notation entered as to the activity observed.

(2) A variation of the above would be to draw a line from the descriptive passage or statement to the exact location on the map where the activity was observed.

(3) Care must be taken to prevent overcrowding of the map. One method of doing this is to group entries by categories on a series of acetate overlays.

(4) An enlarged sketch map can be also prepared to cover overcrowded areas. This will allow the posting of additional details.

5–7. The Intelligence Workbook

a. The intelligence workbook is a systematic arrangement by subject heading which aids in the

CLASSIFICATION

INTELLIGENCE (G2) WORKBOOK

(PERINTREP)

FROM: _____
(HOUR AND DATE)

TO: _____
(HOUR AND DATE)

HEADQUARTERS: _____

PLACE: _____

2A INFANTRY

2A ARMOR

2A ARTILLERY &
AIR DEFENSE

2B AIR

2C & D OTHER
(AIRBORNE
IRREGULAR)

2E NBC

2F
ELECTRONIC
WARFARE

2G
OTHER NEW TACTICS,
WEAPONS, ETC)

3A
ORDER OF BATTLE
NEW UNITS

3A
NEW
PERSONALITIES

3A
ENEMY MOVEMENTS

3B
ENENY STRENGTH
(WIA, KIA)

3B ENEMY
EQUIP, DESTROYED,
CAPTURED

3B
PRISONER OF WAR

4
COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE

5
WEATHER

6
TERRAIN

7A
ENEMY CAPABILITIES

7B
ENEMY
VULNERABILITIES

7C
CONCLUSIONS

CLASSIFICATION

NOTES: 1. NUMBERS ON TABS REFER TO PARAGRAPHS IN PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT.
2. THE CLASSIFICATION IS STAMPED AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE.

Figure 5–3. Type intelligence workbook.

sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. It is not a permanent record and it is not distributed to an outside agency. The workbook is kept current and obsolete entries are deleted. Specialized workbooks are usually maintained by each branch of the intelligence section at field army and higher headquarters.

b. There is no prescribed form for the workbook. At division and lower headquarters index tabs are labeled to assist in the preparation of paragraphs of the intelligence summary (IN-TSUM). At corps and higher levels, index tabs are utilized to assist in the preparation of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 5-3 shows a type workbook generally used at corps and higher levels. A type workbook for stability operations is contained in appendix O.

c. Information from incoming messages and reports is entered in the workbook under appropriate headings. For example, information on a newly identified infantry unit would be recorded under item 3A as well as item 2A "Infantry." A message that furnishes information on different subjects results in several entries, none of which usually quotes the entire message. For example, a message containing information on the locations of a reserve armor unit and an artillery unit results in extracts under item 2A "Armor" and under "Artillery." Each entry in the workbook based on an incoming message includes a reference to the journal serial number of that message. For example: "J2, 091200 April, from 20th Engr Cbt Bn: Bridge at LINDEN (91246) destroyed by bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." "J2" refers to the journal serial number, and the date-time group entered refers to the time of occurrence of the event. When appropriate, the intelligence officer should make written comments on his evaluation and the possible significance of the information following the appropriate entry.

5-8. Intelligence Files

Files are necessary to permit ready access to all available information. The files most commonly maintained are the—

a. Journal File. The journal file contains a record copy of each message or document noted in the journal. It supports the journal and is also a permanent and official record.

b. Information or Reference File. All information of possible future value is cross-indexed in this file. Much information is collected which has no immediate interest but which may be of future value. Because of the large volume of information filed at field army and higher headquarters, devices such as punch cards and electronic sorting machines are used where possible.

c. Order of Battle Files. These files are discussed in detail in chapter 7.

5-9. Coordinates Register

The coordinates register is a recording device primarily designed to provide the brigade and lower echelon intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the extensive intelligence files and workbooks maintained at higher echelons. Intelligence data should be organized by some means into related groupings or into systematized forms, in order that interpretation of them can be accomplished readily and without time loss. The coordinates register affords such a means; and it can also be compact enough to facilitate carrying the document on the person with the advantage of ready access.

a. Form of Coordinates Register.

(1) The register most commonly consists of a looseleaf notebook. Each page of the notebook pertains to a single grid square on the operational map, covering the geographical area of operations or area of interest. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly area, and areas of concern on both flanks.

(2) The pages of the coordinates register are of two types. One type of page is designed for written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and similar items. These entries are preceded by a date-time group and map coordinates. The S2 may, if desired, add his personal comments or notations to any entry. Figure 5-4 illustrates the composition of this type of page for the coordinates register.

(3) The second type of page is designed to represent a single grid square schematically. Entries are plotted on the square in a manner comparable to that used in plotting the enemy situation map. This page of the register shows graphically any data applicable to a single grid square. An enlarged grid square is drawn on the page and entries are made as shown in figure 5-5.

b. Uses of Coordinates Register. Some of the most important uses of the coordinates register are as follows:

(1) *Interpretation.* To develop patterns of

GRID SQUARE 2815

ITEM	TIME	COORD	STATEMENT	NOTES
1.	092235	28381539	MG Fired on Recon Ptl from A Co	Have next Ptl check this area
2.	092318	?	Veh noise - Tk? - Heard direct N. of A Co OP #2 28321507	Ask Air OP to look
3.	100600		Special OB report on Wpns & Fortifications	Div OB wants more dope on wpns strength
		28021523 to 28141527	Trenches & Bunkers	
		28141527 to 28221529	Wire	
		28611545 to 28781551	Platoon on line - has 2 MG's	Same MG as Yesterday? Check this!
		28811551 to 29001599	Extensive trenches and firing Psns	
4.	102335	28391530 to 28691541	B Co Ptl Rpts wire and AP Mines	New since 081800
5.	110600	28431588	Res Unit (Co?) in Gen'l Area	(From Div PIR)
6.	110630	28381557	Med Tank spotted by L Plane	How many more???
7.	111320	28731584 and 28151564	Active mortars	
8.	120010	28611564	Flash from small Cal. Arty not over 75	At? AA? Gun? RR or Bazooka ? Ask higher H Q

Figure 5-4. First type of page for the coordinates register.

GRID SQUARE 2815

NOTATIONS:
1. Elms Of 1st & 3rd Bns
66 Rifle Regt

LEGEND
X - Incomming Arty
☐ - En Patrol Contact
B- Bunker

Figure 5–5. Second type of page for the coordinates register.

enemy activity and to follow the progress of construction, laying of minefields, and other activities.

(2) *Planning.*

(a) *Operational.* To determine routes of movement, areas of main and secondary attacks.

(b) *Patrol.* To provide guidance in selecting missions which should be assigned to patrols and to brief patrol personnel.

(c) *Fire.* To assist in formulating the friendly fire plan in either defensive or offensive situations.

(3) *Reference.* Answers the questions of the S2 and his immediate commander and the questions of higher headquarters.

c. *Maintenance of Coordinates Register.*

(1) The coordinates register should be reviewed periodically when unit movement to a new area necessitates addition of new data and deletion of obsolete data.

(2) The register should be maintained, whenever possible, on strong semitransparent paper such as bond paper. The transparency of bond paper is sufficient to allow the use of a grid

scale underneath the schematic page, thereby allowing a more accurate and rapid plotting of or reference to the entries.

(3) The scale of the schematic page normally may be made a matter of SOP. Such standardization assists in dissemination of intelligence data from higher to lower echelons.

(4) For security reasons the friendly situation normally will not be plotted in the coordinates register.

Section III. EVALUATION

5–10. General

Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source and agency through which the information was derived, and its accuracy. Evaluation of information at the lower echelon is a simple step compared to the procedures employed at higher echelons. From the viewpoint of the brigade or battalion S2, information which relates to the unit's area of interest is pertinent; information relating to areas outside the area of interest may or may not be pertinent. The brigade of battalion S2 may not be able to judge the reliability of a source because he may have repetitive contact with a given source. This difference between higher and lower echelons is largely due to the fact that information received from higher headquarters normally has been processed, evaluated and interpreted, and the information collected by organic agencies at lower echelons is generally acquired by direct observation or actual contact with the enemy.

5–11. Pertinence

The examination of information for pertinence specifically determines whether or not the information is—

a. Pertinent with regard to the enemy or to the characteristics of the area of operations.

b. Needed immediately, and if so, by whom.

c. Of possible present or future value, and if so, to whom.

5–12. Reliability

a. The source of information and the agency by which it was collected are both evaluated for reliability. The principal basis for judging the reliability of a source or an agency is previous experience. Other criteria include a knowledge of the training, experience, and past performance of troop units.

b. The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily the best judge of the reliabil-

ity of the source or agency. Consequently, a higher headquarters normally accepts the reliability evaluation of the lower headquarters and will consider only the reliability of the reporting headquarters.

5–13. Accuracy

a. Accuracy means the probable truth of the information. Judgment of accuracy is based on the answers to the following questions:

(1) Is it possible for the reported fact or event to have taken place?

(2) Is the report consistent within itself?

(3) Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or agencies?

(4) Does the report agree or disagree in any way with other available information?

(5) If the report does not agree with information from other sources or agencies, which one is more likely to be true?

b. The most reliable method of judging the accuracy of a report is by comparing it with similar information which may already be available under the proper category in an intelligence file or workbook. When possible, the intelligence officer obtains confirming or refuting information through different agencies and from many sources.

c. Marked differences in the evaluation of the accuracy of information may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this difference is the fact that higher echelons, which have more sources of information and intelligence than lower echelons, have a correspondingly greater opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of reported data. Regardless of the source, the accuracy of incoming information and intelligence is re-evaluated at each echelon.

5–14. Evaluation Rating

a. The evaluation of each item of information is indicated by a standard system. The evaluation

of reliability is show by a letter and the evaluation of accuracy by a numeral as depicted in the paragraphs to follow. Evaluation ratings are made at the lowest headquarters possible.

b. Evaluations of the reliability of source and agency are as follows:

    A—Completely reliable.
    B—Usually reliable.
    C—Fairly reliable.
    D—Not usually reliable.
    E—Unreliable.
    F—Reliability cannot be judged.

(1) An "A" evaluation of a source is assigned under only the most unusual circumstances. For example, this evaluation may be given when it is known that the source has long experience and extensive background with the type of information reported. A rating of "B" indicates a source of known integrity. An "F" rating is assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source.

(2) Agencies are ordinarily rated A, B, or C. However, when the source of an item and the collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the lower degree of reliability is indicated.

c. Evaluation of the accuracy of an item of information is indicated as follows:

    1—Confirmed by other sources.
    2—Probably true.
    3—Possibly true.
    4—Doubtfully true.
    5—Improbable.
    6—Truth cannot be judged.

(1) If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from a source other than that for already existing information on the same subject, it will be classified as "confirmed by other sources" and will be rated "1."

(2) If no proof in the above sense can be established, and if no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source as the information already available on this subject, it will be classified as "probably true" and will be rated "2."

(3) If the contents of the report are confirmed in essential parts by information already available, the procedure ((2) above) will also apply to unconfirmed information contained in the report.

(4) If the investigation reveals that the reported facts—on which no further information is yet available—are compatible with the previously observed behavior of the target, or if the known background of a person leads to the deduction that he might have acted as reported, the information received will be classified as "possibly true" and will be rated "3."

(5) Reported but unconfirmed information, the contents of which contradict the estimate of the development or the hitherto known behavior of the target, will be classified as "doubtful" and will be rated "4" as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.

(6) Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and which contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a target or issue is classified as "improbable" and will be rated in category "5." The same classification is given to reported information that contradicts existing data on a subject originally rated "1" or "2."

(7) If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings "1" to "5" is not given, the reported information will be classified as "Truth cannot be judged" and will be rated "6."

(8) The statement that a report cannot be judged as to accuracy must always be preferred to an inaccurate use of the ratings "1" to "5." If there is no sound basis for a rating of "1" to "5," because of the complete absence of other information on the same target, the rating "6" has to be given.

(9) It must be recognized that the scale "1" to "6" does not represent progressive degrees of accuracy. The stress must be given to the literal rating represented by the numeric symbol.

d. Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A completely reliable agency may report information obtained from a completely reliable source which, on the basis of other information, is judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the information is A–5. A source known to be unreliable may provide raw information that when confirmed by reliable sources is accepted as accurate information. In such a case, a report is evaluated E–1. A report evaluated F–6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily discarded.

e. A report disseminated to higher, lower, and

adjacents units contains the evaluation for each item of information. For example, "The division artillery of the Aggressor 46th Tk Div can fire nuclear rounds of 0.5 KT yield (C–3) * * *."

f. The evaluation and interpretation of information at the brigade and battalion level is a simplified mental process involving only the intelligence officer; thus, the standard evaluation rating has a limited application. However, the S2 must understand this system to assist him in processing information received from other headquarters and, when appropriate, to evaluate information he disseminates to other headquarters.

Section IV. INTERPRETATION

5–15. General

The processing of information continues with interpretation, which consists of three steps—analysis, integration, and deduction.

5–16. Analysis

a. Analysis is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the command. Analysis requires good judgment and a thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations, the characteristics of the area of operations, and the enemy situation, to include enemy doctrine and past practices.

b. Analysis at headquarters above division level often involves detailed research with greater difficulty caused by the increased volume of information. The many individuals who will be involved in performing analysis must relate their efforts to the mission of the command in order to avoid the needless expenditure of time and effort.

5–17. Integration

a. Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in analysis with other known information to form a logical picture or hypothesis of enemy activities or the influence of operational area characteristics on the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated, based upon existing intelligence.

b. Integration, particularly the development of hypotheses, requires the same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential to making a good analysis. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer must avoid preconceived opinions and hypotheses based on what he would do if he were the enemy commander.

c. After they are formulated, all hypotheses are analyzed and tested. Analysis of an hypothesis includes determining the indications that should exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the existence or nonexistence of these indications within the limitations of available time and means.

d. Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments, or it may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of additional information.

5–18. Deduction

The last step in the interpretation of information is deduction. Here meaning is deduced from the hypothesis developed; it is then tested and considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction is designed to answer the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the area of operations and the enemy situation?" The resulting answer provides a useful conclusion which can serve as a basis for determining future enemy courses of action and for keeping the intelligence estimate current.

CHAPTER 6

DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

(STANAG 2008, 2014, 2020, 2022, 2097, 2103, 2118, 2134, 3377; SEASTAG 2008, 2020, 2022, 2118; SOLOG 2R2, 5R2, 16R, 90, 123)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6–1. General

Dissemination can be defined as the timely transmission of information and intelligence in an appropriate form to the units or agencies which can make timely and effective use of the data. The primary purpose of dissemination is to enable the commander to make decisions with confidence; a secondary purpose is to provide knowledge, in the light of which new information may be processed. Intelligence is used in much the same manner at all echelons. The means of dissemination are likewise the same at all levels, with variations occurring in the volume, coverage, and frequency.

6–2. Dissemination Criteria

a. One objective in disseminating intelligence is to insure that the intelligence staffs at various echelons of command have the same general picture and use the same frame of reference in planning their operations.

b. Intelligence is disseminated within the producing headquarters, to next higher, next lower, and adjacent units. Dissemination to lower and adjacent units is more difficult and yet important because—

(1) The intelligence picture at lower echelons changes more rapidly.

(2) The requirement for a greater amount of detail may result in delay.

(3) The intelligence produced at levels above division by specialized means must also be disseminated to lower echelons.

c. The adequacy of intelligence dissemination is judged, in order of priority, by the following criteria:

(1) Information and intelligence are placed in the hands of the ultimate user in time to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation before the intelligence picture changes. If the information is of such value that time does not permit complete processing before the information is disseminated, the recipient is made aware of this fact. The source of the information being sent is given if security permits.

(2) Only intelligence which can be used by the unit concerned is disseminated; however, if there is any doubt as to the usefulness of the intelligence, it will be disseminated to the user.

(3) The importance and priority of the intelligence furnished are carefully considered. The dissemination means selected should be one that, based on priority, interferes least with other operational messages.

(4) The information being disseminated is in such form that the recipients may readily locate details of interest.

d. During stability operations, it is imperative that dissemination of appropriate information and intelligence be made to both host country and allied forces operating in the area of operations consistent with security requirements.

Section II. DISSEMINATION MEANS

6–3. General

a. Dissemination within a headquarters is usually made by personal contacts, oral reports, briefings, and by distribution of intelligence estimates, analyses of the area of operations, and written reports.

b. Dissemination to higher, lower and adjacent units is by means of reports, summaries and studies, intelligence estimates and analyses of the area of operations, operational plans and orders, overlays and maps. Command SOP will dictate how intelligence reports will be disseminated between US/allied and host country units.

6–4. Spot Reports

Spot reports are one-time reports used by all echelons to transmit intelligence or information of immediate value. Since the information or intelligence may have an immediate and significant value on current planning and operations, speed of transmission of the spot report is essential. The spot report is afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. No format is prescribed for the spot report; however; the spot report should be as far as practicable, answer the questions who?, what?, where?, when?, and how?

6–5. Intelligence Report (INTREP)

a. The INTREP is a standardized intelligence report which is sent out spontaneously and without regard to a specific time schedule in all cases where the information might be of importance to the recipient to enlighten him on enemy capabilities. Consideration will be given to dispatch of an INTREP when facts influencing the enemy capabilities have been observed, or when a change in enemy capabilities has taken place.

b. The INTREP is passed to higher, lower, and adjacent units at the discretion of the commander producing the report.

c. The INTREP will be dispatched as quickly as possible following receipt of the information, and will be sent by the most expeditious means available.

d. There is no prescribed format for the INTREP except that the word "INTREP" will be the first item to appear in the report. However, when involved in joint service operations, originators of INTREPs will use the prescribed format as contained in JCS Publication 12.

e. The INTREP should include the intelligence staff's deduction, which in principle should be approved by the commander.

6–6. Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP)

a. The SUPINTREP is a NATO standardized report form used for more comprehensive reviews concerning information on one or several specific intelligence targets. In addition, the SUPINTREP may also contain selected intelligence data collected over an extended period of time, and may include items contained in previous INTREP or INTSUM.

b. The nature and content of data contained in the SUPINTREP dictate the specific dissemination. At the commander's discretion, the SUPINTREP is passed to higher, lower, or adjacent units.

c. The SUPINTREP normally is produced on special request or in support of a particular operation, and is dispatched by the most suitable means available.

d. There is no prescribed format for the SUPINTREP except that the term "SUPINTREP" will appear at the beginning of the report.

6–7. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

a. The INTSUM contains a brief summary of information of intelligence interest covering a period of time designated by the commander. Although the length of the period will vary with the desires of the commander, the INTSUM is normally prepared every 6 hours during combat. The INTSUM provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, enemy operations and capabilities, and weather and terrain characteristics. The INTSUM is in fact an aid in assessing the current situation and updates other intelligence reports. Negative information will be included in the INTSUM but nonoperational information will be excluded. The INTSUM reflects the intelligence staff officer's deductions which, in principle, should be approved by the commander.

b. The INTSUM normally is prepared at brigade and higher echelons and is disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

c. An INTSUM has no prescribed format except that the word "INTSUM" will be the first item of the report. However, when involved in joint service operations, originators of INTSUMs will use the prescribed format as contained in JCS Publication 12. Nonessential detail should be excluded from the INTSUM, but as indicated by the example format, information concerning the issuing unit, date-time-group (DTG) of issue, brief discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities, and conclusions should always be included. A type format and an example of an INTSUM are provided in appendix F.

6-8. Periodic Intelligence Report

a. The periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) is a summary of the intelligence situation covering a longer period than the INTSUM. The PERINTREP is a means of disseminating detailed information and intelligence. It covers the enemy situation, operations, capabilities and vulnerabilities; characteristics of the area of operations; and counterintelligence. No details of friendly forces which may be of value to the enemy are included. Other intelligence documents such as technical intelligence summaries, prisoner of war interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, and weather and climate summaries may be disseminated as annexes to the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is concise, but complete, and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, and annotated maps. The use of abbreviations and unnecessary references to map coordinates are avoided. The correct format for the PERINTREP is shown in appendix D..

b. The PERINTREP normally is prepared at corps and higher echelons. Corps may dispense with the PERINTREP if the situation does not permit timely dissemination. At field army, a PERINTREP is always issued. Dissemination is made by the most suitable means—usually by liaison officers or messengers—to the staff, adjacent units, and to the subordinate and higher headquarters at the next two higher and lower echelons. The period covered by the document is prescribed by the next higher headquarters and varies with the tempo of intelligence activities. Normally, a 24-hour period is covered during combat. The PERINTREP should be disseminated in time for use in daily planning.

c. In joint service operations, the PERINTREP is replaced by the periodic intelligence summary, PERINTSUM. The correct format for the PERINTSUM is contained in JCS Publication 12.

6-9. Weekly Intelligence Summary

The weekly intelligence summary generally follows the format of a PERINTREP (or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations). It serves to highlight trends that are useful in planning future operations and in processing current information. This report normally is prepared at field army and higher headquarters.

6-10. Imagery Interpretation Reports

Information or intelligence obtained by imagery interpretation is disseminated through the use of imagery interpretation reports. The basic types of imagery interpretation reports are the mission report, hot report, initial imagery interpretation report, and the supplemental imagery interpretation report. A detailed discussion and examples of these reports are contained in FM 30-20. In addition, during joint service operations the applicable portion of JCS Publication 12 will be used.

6-11. Prisoner of War Interrogation and Translation Reports

Prisoner of war interrogation and translation reports summarize, or report in full, the results of interrogations of prisoners of war and translations of extracts or summaries of enemy documents. Information of immediate value is disseminated as a spot report. Other information is disseminated in the most convenient form, considering the needs of the users. At corps and higher echelons, detailed interrogation and translations reports usually are distributed as annexes to the PERINTREP (or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations). For a detailed discussion of specific intelligence interrogation reports, See FM 30-15.

6-12. Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring (BOMREP, SHELREP, MORTREP) and Aircraft Hostile Fire Reports

a. Information on enemy bombing, shelling, or mortaring activity is initially disseminated by means of a BOMREP, SHELREP, or MORTREP, as appropriate. Submission is a responsibility of the affected unit. Reports are rendered as normal messages and are transmitted by the fastest means available (app H). Each transmission is preceded by the code word "SHELREP" in the case of enemy artillery, by the code word "MORTREP" in the case of an enemy mortar or rocket fire, and by the code word "BOMREP" in the case on an enemy air attack. The text of the message is transmitted in the clear except that the current call sign of the unit or origin will be used rather than referral to unit identification. Also the position of the observer will be encoded if it discloses the location of a headquarters or an important observer post (app G).

b. The Aircraft Hostile Fire Report should be completed by the air mission commander at the end of each day's activities or after each mission completion. Intelligence officers at each level of command should require the submission of a report in each instance where an aircraft was engaged by fire. Information contained in the report

will be incorporated into the intelligence situation. The information contained in the report should be substantially as indicated in appendix R.

6-13. Nuclear Burst and Biological or Chemical Attack Reports

a. General. Initial reports and data of enemy or unidentified nuclear detonations and reports of enemy or unidentified biological or chemical attacks are disseminated from the source level through designated headquarters to the highest headquarters in the area of interest. Reporting will be by the most expeditious means available, with a flash precedence. Type formats (FM 21-40 and app H) used when reporting NBC attacks include the following:

(1) NBC 1—A report used by observing unit to give initial and subsequent data.

(2) NBC 2—A report used for passing evaluated data.

(3) NBC 3—A report used to issue immediate warning of expected contamination.

(4) NBC 4—A report used to provide radiation dose-rate measurements.

(5) NBC 5—A report used for locating areas of contamination.

Initial and followup reports are evaluated at each headquarters and the results are appropriately disseminated.

b. Warning of expected contamination from a nuclear burst or biological or chemical attack is disseminated by the first headquarters capable of determining such information.

c. Information pertaining to the submission and transmittal of NBC reports is contained in FM 21-40 and FM 3-12.

6-14. Radiological Contamination Estimates and Reports

a. Radiological contamination information is disseminated by means of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reports (app H) and by means of current or future radiological contamination overlays. The current radiological contamination overlay is a plot of dose rate contours of operational interest extracted from the radiation situation map maintained by the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Element (CBRE) within the appropriate TOC. In future radiological contamination reports, decay factors are applied to estimate the radiation situation at future times. Current and future contamination reports and overlays are disseminated to interested headquarters, staff sections, and agencies. Contamination overlays or reports are prepared and disseminated by the CBRE of the command. (See FM 3-12 for details.)

b. Fallout predictions from enemy or friendly use of nuclear weapons are prepared in the CBRE of the TOC or similar agency, before and after the burst and provide information which is used as a basis for planning and estimating. Fallout predictions are reports which indicate the probable areas of contamination resulting from a nuclear burst; dose rates are not predicted. The reports contain information for estimating the time of arrival in a certain area. Fallout predictions are based on current or forecast meteorological data and actual or assumed ground zero, yield, height of burst, and cloud data. Fallout predictions are distributed to interested staff offices; agencies; and higher, adjacent, and subordinate units (FM 3-12). For details concerning radiological survey data, signposting or radiologically contaminated areas, see FM 3-12; for information on friendly nuclear strike warning, see FM 5-26 and FM 101-31-1. Detailed procedures for predicting fallout are contained in TM 3-210.

6-15. Weather Forecasts

a. A weather forecast is a prediction of the weather conditions at a point, along a route, or within an area for a specified period of time. The accuracy and reliability of weather forecasts depend upon such factors as characteristics of the area, available weather data, reliability of weather communications facilities, length of forecast period, and the experience of the forecaster. Reliability of forecasts generally decreases as the forecast period increases. Weather forecasts are in coded (numerical), graphical (pictorial), or written (plain language) format. Weather forecasts for use by troop units are usually in plain language form. The contents of weather forecasts are as shown in figure 6-1.

b. There are three types of weather forecasts: a Short Period Forecast which is any forecast covering up to a 48-hour period; an Extended Period Forecast which covers a period of between 3 and 5 days; and a Long Period Forecast which covers a period of 5 days or longer. In addition to the forecasts mentioned, an outlook may also be given as an extension to the basic weather forecast; e.g., a 48-hour outlook beyond a 24-hour

Figure 6-1. (Elements of weather forecasts, climate studies, and weather and climate summaries.)

ELEMENT	DESCRIPTION	12 Hour (Gen)	24 Hour[1]	48 Hour[1]	72 Hour	3-5 Day Extended Period	Route	12 Hour Area	24 Hour Area	12 Hour Terminal	24 Hour Terminal	Artillery[2]	Low Level	Fallout	Dropzone[2]	Engineer	Military Police	Signal	Unconventional Warfare	Transportation	Mission Control[3]	Severe Weather Warnings	Analysis of Area of Operations	Intelligence Estimate	Engineer Intelligence Annex	Terrain Study	Special Area Study	Weather Summary for Engineers	Climate Summary
SYNOPTIC CONDITION	Frontal types, location, movements and intensities; location and movement of major surface High and Low pressure systems.	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓																				
SKY CONDITION	Cloud cover in eights, height of bases and tops above the surface in hundreds and thousands of feet, times of significant changes.	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓														
	Cloud types.	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓											
	Cloud cover, height of bases and amount in general terms.			✓	✓	✓																						✓	
	Frequency of occurrence of various cloud conditions.																										✓		
	Sky conditions in general terms - fair, cloudy, etc.																						✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
VISIBILITY AND OBSTRUCTIONS TO VISIBILITY	Surface horizontal visibility in miles and fractions of miles, time of significant change, Obstructions.	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓														
	Surface visibility in general terms with Obstructions. Flight level visibility.																						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
PRECIPITATION	Type, location, character, intensity, time of beginning and end.	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓									✓
	Accumulation.																	✓											
	Character and intensity in general terms.																						✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
	Frequency of occurrence by type and amount.																										✓		
WEATHER PHENOMENA	Tornadoes, thunderstorms, lightning, squalls, hail, etc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓			✓		✓						✓
TEMPERATURE	Surface temperature, daily maximum and minimum in degrees Fahrenheit, abrupt changes and times thereof including freezing, thawing, and wind chill factor.	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓										✓											✓
	Surface temperature in degrees Fahrenheit, and temperature gradient, as a reflection of stability, between 0.5 and 2 meters.												✓																
	Aviation terminal temperatures in degrees Fahrenheit.									✓	✓																		
	Surface temperatures in general terms - cold, warm, etc.																										✓		✓
	Surface temperature range.																						✓	✓			✓		
	Frequency of occurrence of temperatures.																										✓		
	Flight level temperatures in degrees centigrade.							✓	✓	✓																			
	Temperature variations from a mean.																												✓
	Temperatures aloft in degrees centigrade, to 30,000 feet above sea level, at 2,000 foot intervals.							✓	✓																				
	Temperature profile - from the surface to 30 km.														✓														

Column group headers: **WEATHER FORECASTS** (GENERAL, SPECIAL — Aviation, CBR) and **CLIMATE DATA** (STUDIES). Mission Control / Severe Weather Warnings columns marked "AS REQUIRED."

Notes:
1. Weather section of Intelligence Summary is derived from this forecast.
2. Data provided on an "as required" basis only.
3. Data provided only for specific operations having weather effect criteria.
4. Based on predetermination of what "severe weather" means.
5. Climate data contents are established locally. Listed elements are typical.

Figure 6-1. Elements of weather forecasts, climate studies, and weather and climate summaries.

ELEMENT	DESCRIPTION	12 Hour	24 Hour1	48 Hour	72 Hour	3-5 Day Extended Period c	Route	12 Hour Area	24 Hour Area	12 Hour Terminal	24 Hour Terminal2	Artillery2	Low Level	Fallout	Dropzone2	Engineer	Military Police	Signal	Unconventional Warfare	Transportation	Mission Control 3	Severe Weather Warnings 4	Analysis of Area of Operations	Intelligence Estimate	Engineer Intelligence Annex	Terrain Study	Special Area Study	Weather Summary for Engineers	Climate Summary
HUMIDITY AND DEW POINT	Relative humidity in percent.	✓	✓									✓											✓	✓			✓		
	Relative humidity in general terms - humid, dry, etc.			✓	✓																							✓	
	Surface dew point temperature in degrees Fahrenheit.						✓			✓	✓																		
	Relative humidity in percent, from the surface to 15 km.													✓															
WINDS	Surface winds, average speed in knots, direction in tens of degrees, significant changes thereof, maximum wind speeds and gusts.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓							✓											
	Wind direction to eight points of the compass, wind speed in miles per hour.																						✓	✓					
	Frequency of occurrence of specified wind directions and speeds.																										✓	✓	✓
	Surface to four meters - effective wind direction in degrees and wind speed in knots.																												
	Wind direction in degrees and speed in knots at surface and at 2,000 feet above the terrain.							✓	✓								✓		✓										
	Flight level winds - direction in tens of degrees and speed in knots.						✓	✓	✓																				
	Wind direction in tens of degrees and speed to nearest five knots at 2,000 foot intervals to 30,000 feet.							✓	✓												AS REQUIRED	AS REQUIRED							
	Wind direction in tens of mils and wind speed in knots for 2,000 meter zones to 30 km.														✓						AS REQUIRED	AS REQUIRED							
	Effective winds for estimating movement of nuclear clouds.																						✓	✓				✓	
	Wind direction in degrees and speed in knots from the surface to 30 km.										✓																		
PRESSURE AND DENSITY	Altimeter setting and density altitude						✓			✓								✓											
	Pressure in millibars for from the surface to 30 km.													✓															
	Sea level pressure in millibars																						✓	✓					
SURFACE CONDITIONS	State of the ground in general terms - wet, dry, snow covered, icy, etc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓											✓											✓	
TURBULENCE AND ICING ALOFT	Type and relative intensity.						✓	✓	✓																				
INDEX OF ANOMALOUS PROPAGATION	Qualitative and quantitative.																			✓	✓								
LIGHT DATA	Moon phases, moon rise and set.																						✓			✓	✓		
	Beginning and end of nautical and civil twilight.																						✓			✓	✓		
	Sunrise and sunset.																									✓	✓		
SEA CONDITIONS (Where needed)	State of sea and surf including direction, period and height of waves, direction of swell, and height of breakers.																	✓		✓	✓								

Notes:
1. Weather section of Intelligence Summary is derived from this forecast.
2. Data provided on an "as required" basis only.
3. Data provided only for specific operations having weather effect criteria.
4. Based on predetermination of what "severe weather" means.
5. Climate data contents are established locally. Listed elements are typical.

Figure 6-1—Continued.

weather forecast. (For details, see Air Weather Service Reg 55-1.)

c. Because of the changing nature of weather forecasts, especially short period forecasts, time-liness is a critical factor in their dissemination. Weather forecasts normally are transmitted by electrical means.

d. The intelligence officer makes provisions for

the dissemination of severe weather warnings. These special forecasts of hazardous weather are issued to enable units to take necessary action to prevent injury to personnel and damage to materiel. The type of weather for which severe warnings are issued depends upon the needs of the unit. Severe weather warnings usually cover tornadoes, thunderstorms, dust or sand storms, extremely heavy precipitation, freezing temperatures, winds above specified speeds, and freezing precipitation. Warnings are issued by the supporting air weather service detachment, as required. Flood warnings are the responsibility of the unit engineer. Severe weather warnings are normally disseminated as spot reports.

6-16. Current Weather Reports

These reports contain information on existing weather conditions or specific weather elements. They may be oral, written, or graphic representations prepared by Army aviators, field artillery target acquisition units, artillery meteorological sections, or air weather service detachments. Other units furnish current weather reports as directed. Reports of current weather conditions are used in connection with the operation of aircraft, use of artillery, nuclear weapons, CBR chemical agents, or other activities requiring this information. Normally these reports are disseminated directly to the user by the collection agency.

6-17. Summaries of Weather and Climate

a. Summaries of weather and climate are information summaries used as a basis for other estimates and plans. Usually they are prepared by the supporting air weather service detachments, as requested by the intelligence officer. The summaries are disseminated through the medium of intelligence documents such as written analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and PERINTREP, or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations.

b. A weather summary is a description of the weather at a point, along a route, or within an area during a specified period. Weather summaries are used in analyzing the effects of weather on recent operations and in estimating the effects of weather on future operations. They are required for engineer forecasts of streamflow, condition of ground, and trafficability. Weather summaries have no prescribed format or content. The contents of a weather summary are determined by the requester based on intended use.

c. A climatic summary gives statistical data in terms of averages, extremes, and frequencies of occurrence for a specified period of time such as a year, season, or month, at a given point, along a route, or within an area. Climatic summaries are compiled from historical records of weather observations over long periods. Format or content are not prescribed. Appendix I contains an example of a climatic summary.

6-18. Climatic Studies

A climatic study is the compilation of the climatic data (climatic summary) and the analysis and interpretation of that data in the light of its possible effects on military operations. Climatic studies usually are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. Detailed climatic studies for strategic areas of the world are included in the National Intelligence Survey (NIS). The supporting air weather service element, at the request of the intelligence officer, prepares climatic studies to meet the particular requirements of the command. Climatic studies are disseminated on the same basis as weather and climatic summaries.

6-19. Technical Intelligence Bulletins and Summaries

Technical intelligence bulletins and summaries are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. These reports are used to disseminate the results obtained from an examination of enemy materiel. Bulletins usually deal with individual items, while summaries are broader in scope. They are disseminated through command, technical intelligence, or combat service suport channels depending upon the scope and nature of the contents. The current NATO standardized nomenclature for Soviet Block army weapons and equipment described in FM 30-16 will be used in technical intelligence reports when possible.

6-20. Geographic Intelligence

Engineer units provide terrain reports and specialized engineer reports in support of the G2.

6-21. Signal Intelligence Reports

ASA units provide signal intelligence reports, both spot and periodic reports, in accordance with the desires of the G2 of the appropriate command.

6-22. Order of Battle Books and Handbooks

a. Order of battle books contain lists, histories, code names, and other data of foreign units,

and biographical data on foreign military personalities.

b. Order of battle handbooks contain data concerning the political structure, military system and organization, and tactical doctrine of foreign nations.

c. Order of battle books and handbooks are usually prepared by the Department of the Army and theater headquarters. Field army may issue supplements to keep these documents current.

Section III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

6-23. General

The analysis of the area of operations is a detailed comprehensive study which is designed to enable the commander to determine the effects of the area of operations on the opposing forces, with emphasis on weather and terrain data. It may also include information about people in the area, their economy, sociology, religion, psychology, etc. Its preparation is the responsibility of the intelligence officer, although other staff officers assist in its preparation. The analysis includes use of intelligence to serve as a basis for development of specific friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities (courses of action) in the commander's estimate, the operations estimate, the intelligence estimate, and other staff estimates. The analysis is oriented on the mission of the command with limiting considerations such as operational environment, time, and boundaries. Appendix B provides additional guidance and information concerning the preparation of the analysis of the area of operations.

6-24. Frequency of Preparation

a. An analysis of the area of operations is required for each mission. It may involve the preparation of an entirely new analysis or the updating of an existing analysis.

b. An analysis of the area of operations is prepared before the mission is received, if a logical mission can be assumed based upon the known situation. Analyses based on assumed missions are re-evaluated upon receipt of the actual mission.

c. Analyses usually require revisions in light of the commander's decision, the uncovering of new areas, or the receipt of additional or more accurate information.

6-25. Form of Presentation

a. At corps and higher headquarters, the planning of projected operations requires the preparation of a written analysis of the area of operations.

b. At division level and below, an abbreviated form of the analysis is included in the intelligence estimate (app J). As with the other contents of the intelligence estimate, this abbreviated analysis is given orally. A written analysis at division level usually is prepared only for operations to be carried out at a future time, e.g., amphibious, long-range airborne, airmobile.

Section IV. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

6-26. General

a. The intelligence estimate is a logical and orderly examination of the intelligence factors affecting the accomplishment of a mission. It provides the commander with an anlysis of the area of operations, enemy strength and enemy capabilities that can influence his mission. It provides the commander with a basis for planning operations and for disseminating intelligence to his staff and to other headquarters. The conclusions paragraph of the intelligence estimate should include:

(1) Effects of the area of operations on friendly courses of action.

(2) The most probable enemy course of action.

(3) Enemy vulnerabilities.

b. Appendix J and FM 101-5 contain additional guidance on content and format.

c. In joint service operations, where international standardization agreements do not apply, the intelligence estimate outlined in JCS Publication 12 will apply.

6-27. Frequency of Preparation

The intelligence estimate is continually revised and kept current in the light of new intelligence.

As each new item of information is processed, it affects in some way, the current intelligence estimate of the situation. Therefore, the conclusions already drawn in the current estimate are altered or confirmed. New capabilities are determined and obsolete ones are discarded; as a result, the relative probability of adoption by the enemy of a particular course of action becomes clearer.

6–28. Forms of Presentation

a. The intelligence estimate may be presented orally or in writing. A written intelligence estimate is prepared for projected operations, when time is available, when dissemination is required and oral presentation is not possible, and when a historical record is desired. Oral and written presentations are brief, consistent with adequacy of detail.

b. In oral presentations, maximum use is made of graphic aids such as terrain models, colored maps and overlays, charts, and graphs. Information and intelligence that are common knowledge or readily apparent from the graphic aids are not repeated. At appropriate points in the presentation, previously furnished intelligence or information which have not changed may be identified (app J).

Section V. OPERATION PLAN OR ORDER AND REPORTS

6–29. Operation Plan or Order

Intelligence is disseminated in paragraph 1a of the operation plan or order. The paragraph may either make reference to an intelligence document such as a summary or annex or it may include specific intelligence or information, sometimes both. Paragraph 3, "Coordinating Instructions," may be used to disseminate orders to obtain or report specific items of information and to disseminate intelligence countermeasures applicable to two or more units.

6–30. Intelligence Annex

The intelligence annex is a formal intelligence order that may accompany an operation plan or order. The first paragraph of an intelligence annex gives a summary of the enemy situation required to understand the plan or order. This paragraph may refer to annotated maps, enemy situation overlays, or current intelligence reports. Appendix N is an example of a division intelligence annex to an operation order; however, in joint service operations, where international standardization agreements do not apply, the intelligence annex shown in JCS Publication 12 will be used.

6–31. Operational Situation Report (SITREP)

The operational situation reports are the principal means used to report to higher authority information of the tactical situation and such administrative information as may affect the tactical situation. Although its preparation and dissemination is a staff responsibility of the operations officer, the intelligence officer prepares paragraph 1 (Enemy) of the SITREP (FM 101–5).

Section VI. MAPS

6–32. Responsibility

a. The intelligence officer prepares plans and policies concerning military maps and determines map requirements for the command.

b. At division, the division support command is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps under the general staff supervision of the division G2. At corps and field army, the engineer staff officer is charged with the procurement, storage, reproduction, and distribution of maps and map substitutes under the general staff supervision of the respective G2.

c. Intelligence officers of units below division are responsible for determining the map requirements for the command and normally store and distribute military maps; however, the logistical staff officer is responsible for the procurement of military maps.

6–33. Military Maps

The term "military maps" refers to all maps (other than aeronautical and hydrographic charts) used for military purposes. Military maps are classified generally according to the military use for which the map is best suited. This classification depends largely on the scale which is indicative of the precision of the map

and is an indication of the amount of detail shown in the map. Certain general classifications are also commonly used to indicate the extent of geographic information given as well as the manner in which it is portrayed.

a. Military Classification.

(1) *By scale.*

(a) *Small scale.* 1:600,000, and smaller.

(b) *Medium scale.* Larger than 1:600,000, but smaller than 1:75,000.

(c) *Large scale.* 1:75,000 and larger.

(2) *By use or description.*

(a) *General.* Maps smaller than 1:1,000,000—used for general planning purposes.

(b) *Strategic.* 1:1,000,000—used for strategic planning purposes.

(c) *Strategic-tactical.* 1:250,000 (1:500,000 alternate)—for use when other scales are unsuitable or unavailable.

(d) *Road.* 1:250,000—for tactical and administrative troop movements.

(e) *Tactical.* 1:50,000 (1:100,000 alternate)—for tactical and administrative purposes.

(f) *Artillery.* 1:50,000— for artillery fire control.

(g) *Photomap.* 1:5,000–1:60,000 (1:25,000 preferred)—tactical and administrative purposes.

(h) *Town plan.* 1:12,500.

b. General Classification.

(1) *Planimetric map.* A map showing only the horizontal (flat) position of features.

(2) *Topographic map.* A map that presents the horizontal and vertical positions of the features represented.

(3) *Plastic relief map.* A topographic map printed on plastic and molded into a three-dimensional form.

(4) *Photomaps.* A reproduction of a photograph or photomosaic on which grid lines, marginal data, place names, and boundaries are added, and which, in some instances, depicts relief graphically.

(5) *Plastic relief photomap.* A photomap printed on plastic and molded into a three-dimensional form.

(6) *Photomosaic.* An assembly of aerial photographs to form a composite picture.

(7) *Military city map.* A large-scale topographic map (usually 1:12,500) of a town or city.

(8) *Special maps.* Maps for special purposes, such as trafficability maps, transportation maps, and boundary maps.

(9) *Terrain Model.* A three-dimensional representation of an area, modeled in plaster, rubber, or other materials. It is distinguished from other map types by showing some cultural and terrain features realistically instead of symbolically.

(10) *PICTOMAP.* A photomap type product usually published at the scale of 1:25,000 or larger, depicting terrain and vegetation in near natural colors and with important cultural features and drainage systems overprinted in red and blue, respectively. Names, contours, grids, and marginal data are depicted.

(11) *Joint Operations Graphics (JOGS).* A 1:250,000 scale series of maps printed in a ground (G) or air (A) version. JOGS are designed to provide a common base map of an area for combined air/ground operations. The ground version shows elevation and contours in meters while the air version emphasizes air landing facilities, and depicts elevation and contours in feet.

(12) *Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis (TACCTA) Maps.* Contingency maps that are periodically updated for issue only when troops are committed in the area covered. These maps contain, or have printed on their back sides, significant information not found on ordinary tactical maps.

6–34. Requirements

a. General. Timely planning is necessary to insure that sufficient quantities of suitable maps are available to units at the time and place needed. The basic factors that govern this planning are—

(1) The area of map coverage.

(2) The map scales required.

(3) Initial allowances.

(4) Replenishment issues.

(5) Replacement issues.

(6) Emergency issues.

b. Initial Allowances.

(1) Initial allowances prescribe the number of copies of map sheets, by type or scale, that can be requisitioned by each organization without further approval. Initial allowances furnish units and individuals with a sufficient number of copies of map sheets to provide adequate coverage of each scale required. Difficulties of production and

distribution, as well as the weights involved, necessitate economy in map issue. Various factors, such as the strength, composition, and functions of a unit, are combined with experience data to determine the quantities of maps to be allowed the unit in tables of initial allowances. The allowances prescribed in FM 101–10–1 are based on experiences of World War II and are a guide only. The wide dispersion required by the nuclear battlefield may require increased allowances.

(2) Tables for determining map requirements and discussions of the subject frequently employ the terms "sheet" and "copy." The term "sheet" is used to describe a map of given scale that covers a given area of ground. It is a single piece of paper. The term "copy" designates any exact counterpart or facsimile of a sheet. Physically, as an imprinted piece of paper, a sheet and a copy are identical. As used in connection with map requirements, the term "sheet" conveys the idea of an area of terrain cartographically depicted on a piece of paper. The term "copy" connotes quantity.

(3) The determination of initial map requirements can be illustrated by the procedure employed by a division in calculating the needs of its subordinate units. The job is done by the G2, G3, and support command commander. The G3 outlines the operational plan. The G2 and G3 together decide on the types and scales of the maps to be used. The support command commander advises on the availability of maps, including types and scales. In accordance with the plan for future tactical operations, the G2 marks the projected boundaries of the division and its subordinate units and the overall area for which coverage is desired. This area extends forward of the present lines to include objectives of the contemplated operation. Allowance is made for the time necessary for procurement and distribution. The G2 also informs the support command commander of other factors involved in the scheme of maneuver which are pertinent to map requirements.

(4) With the information obtained from the G2 and the data contained in experience tables, the support command commander is now ready to calculate map requirements for all units of the division and division headquarters. The procedures is essentially as follows:

(a) Determine the projected division area for which coverage is desired taking into consideration the scale of the map being considered.

(b) Show the tentative battalion and brigade boundaries in the division area outlined on the map index. Project these boundaries sufficiently forward to cover the entire area for which map coverage is desired at each scale.

(c) List the identifications of the sheet required to cover the area included within the boundaries of each echelon of command, from battalion to division inclusive.

(d) Determine the number of copies of each sheet required at each echelon from the experience table.

(e) List the total number of copies of each map sheet required. These are planning figures for initial issue.

(5) The support command commander requisitions, stores, and issues maps in addition to advising on availability and ascertaining specific requirements. The division engineer provides technical information on methods, facilities, and quality of reproduction.

(6) In the above illustration, it is assumed that the division is calculating its own initial allowances. Initial allowances for a division are determined at field army in most situations.

c. Replenishment Issues. A replenishment issue is based on replenishment allowances that include authorized supplemental issues to cover normal losses and authorized quantities to cover areas of new interests. Replenishment requirements are calculated by applying a percentage factor to the number of copies required for initial issue. The sum of the initial requirement, plus the replenishment requirement for each sheet, represents the total number of copies of each sheet that the field army is prepared to distribute.

d. Replacement Issues. A replacement issue refers to the recall or voiding of old map issues and the issuing of new editions. Replacement issues are made on the basis of initial allowances.

e. Emergency Issues. An emergency issue has no particular basis except the emergency of combat. Emergency issues are kept to a minimum.

6–35. Distribution

a. General.

(1) The distribution of maps is keyed to the operation plan. Only the particular map sheets which cover the area of interest are of any immediate use to troops. Changes in tactical plans may not affect other supplies, but they do have an immediate effect on map requirements. The distribution system must respond instantaneously to such changes if the required maps are to be provided

in time. This sensitivity to the tactical situation demands close staff supervision over map supply.

(2) Premature issue of maps not of immediate interest to friendly forces is inadvisable. The issue may be a needless one due to a change in the operation plan, and, once issued, the maps can seldom be withdrawn for reissue to another unit.

(3) In a mobile situation, detailed issues to individuals and small units are difficult to make. The bulk of maps needed to cover any substantial area makes it impractical to supply a unit with maps for any prolonged period of mobile operations. In airmobile situations, detailed issue to individual aviators and small aviation units is necessary. Normally the G2 solves the problem by providing organic and attached aviation units with a bulk issue of maps for the operational area and updates the issue as necessary.

(4) Logistical limitations prevent maintaining excessive reserves of maps; hence, map distribution is carefully controlled to prevent waste.

b. *Maps and Intelligence Documents.* Maps are valuable sources of information concerning the area of operations. They are intelligence documents. From the distribution standpoint, because they are considered as intelligence documents rather than as items of supply, they are handled separately by an independent system set up exclusively for this purpose. Corps, primarily a tactical headquarters, is an integral part of the system. Divisions requisition and draw their maps from corps and not directly from the field army as in the case of other supply items.

c. *Map Designations.* The intelligence annex to the operation order designates the maps to be used during an operation. In paragraph 5 of the annex, the intelligence officer lists the maps that will be supplied to each unit, in the number of copies of each classification or scale, and includes instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

Section VII. AERIAL IMAGERY

6–36. Types of Aerial Imagery

a. Aerial imagery is normally broken down into three basic types. These are photographic, infrared, and side looking airborne radar (SLAR). Each one is discussed separately below. For additional information see FM 30–20.

b. *Photographic Imagery:* Photographic imagery includes the following types:

(1) *Vertical.* Vertical photography furnishes coverage of a target photographed from directly overhead. It provides photography of relatively constant scale and allows the interpreter to achieve the best stereovision and the most accurate measurements and is therefore most suitable for mapping in image interpretation. A variation of the conventional vertical photograph is the split vertical which provides essentially two side-by-side vertical photographs with minimum center overlap.

(2) *Oblique.* Oblique photography furnishes coverage of a target area photographed at an angle from the vertical. Oblique photography closely resembles the normal eyeview and allows the interpreter to "see" into an area in a more normal fashion, rather than seeing the target as it appears from directly overhead and allows inspection of cloud covered areas normally obscured in vertical photography. High oblique photography includes a portion of the skyline behind the target area; low oblique photography does not.

(3) *Panoramic.* Panoramic photography is taken with a special camera capable of scanning a wide area of terrain, usually from horizon to horizon. It provides rapid coverage of large areas of the terrain on both sides of an aircraft's line of flight during one pass over the target area.

(4) *Stereopair.* A stereopair consists of two aerial photographs in which a portion of the total area projected thereon is common. Examination of such pairs with a stereoscope gives an exaggerated three-dimensional view of the terrain in the area of overlap. Limited stereoviewing can be accomplished with overlapping oblique and panoramic photography; however, the best stereoviewing is achieved through vertical and split-vertical type photography. A special type of stereopair is the vectograph which is two specially printed overlapping airphotographs. These give the illusion of the third dimension when viewed with polaroid spectacles.

(5) *Wide-Angle Photo.* A wide-angle photo is an aerial photograph taken with a camera that has a wide-angle lens which photographs a cone of approximately 90°.

c. *Infrared (IR) Imagery.*

(1) An IR system is a passive sensor which

detects emitted and reflected thermal radiation coming from the terrain and objects on the terrain. Current IR systems filter out reflected radiation and only record that radiation emitted by the target area and objects. The total emitted radiation is a function of an object's temperature and its emissivity. Emitted radiation will differ between objects and the resultant differences will be sensed and recorded by the IR system. The IR sensor can detect minute differences and, therefore, differentiate between objects close to each other. To achieve the maximum capability, the IR system must operate at low altitudes and its scan coverage is limited to the area directly below the flight path of the aircraft; therefore, it is used normally only for point, linear, or small area targets.

(2) IR aircraft are equipped for both a real time pictorial display of the IR returns as the aircraft is passing over the terrain and the recording of the sensor acquired information on strips of film for later development and interpretation. Army IR aircraft can also transmit their imagery to a ground sensor terminal (GST), thereby providing a real-time presentation of the target area to personnel on the ground. The GST also records these presentations on film; however, both the film from the aircraft and the film from the GST must be processed by an imagery processing facility before they become permanent record imagery and can be interpreted by trained imagery interpreters. (Use of the nomenclature "ground sensor terminals" (GST) throughout this manual refers to new equipment now coming into the Army inventory to replace the current data terminal teams (DDT).)

d. Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR).

(1) SLAR is an active electronic device which emits energy and senses that portion of the emitted energy which is returned by reflection off the terrain and objects thereon. The radar's energy may be directed at terrain to the left, right, or both sides simultaneously along the flight path of the aircraft. The energy that is reflected from objects on the ground, both fixed and moving, are recorded on strips of film. It should be noted that since the radar pulse is line-of-sight, any high ground or tall objects in the path of the radar pulse will block out radar returns from any smaller objects which they mask. This causes SLAR returns to leave blank spots, called radar shadow, or nonsensed areas, wherever these hidden areas occur.

(2) The SLAR produces two images simultaneously: one depicts fixed target information (FTI), such as terrain features and buildings, and the other depicts moving target information (MTI); however, in order for the SLAR to acquire MTI, movement of the object must be greater than 3 MPH. These two strips of film when developed are called SLAR imagery. Army SLAR aircraft are equipped to continuously process exposed film and provide the airborne sensor operator a pictorial display of the returns while the aircraft is still in flight. Time delay from the time of film exposure until it is developed and ready for viewing is approximately two minutes. Army SLAR aircraft like the Army IR aircraft have a capability for transmission of imagery data to ground sensor terminals. At the GST these sensings are recorded on film, developed, and ready for viewing by image interpreters in approximately two minutes.

6-37. Aerial Photographic Coverage

a. Aerial photographic coverage includes ground area represented on aerial photographs, photomaps, and mosaics. It falls into two general classes of permanent record imagery and mapping photography as follows:

(1) *Permanent record imagery.* The three categories of permanent record imagery commonly used by the imagery interpreter are initial record, general intelligence record, and detailed intelligence record.

(a) *Initial record.* The initial record is complete permanent imagery coverage, flown seasonally, of a projected area of operations usually extending from the line of contact with enemy ground forces to deep within the enemy territory. Photographic coverage is of small scale (1:20,000 to 1:60,000) and suitable for stereoscopic study. The initial record imagery provides basic information about enemy installations and defenses, cultural features, trafficability, and soil and vegetation. Its principal value is to provide a basis for evaluating changes in enemy-occupied territory. Areas subject to seasonal changes are recorded under conditions characteristic of each season to eliminate the observed differences caused by these changes. Vertical initial record serves as a map substitute or supplement. The field army normally supervises the automatic initial distribution to subordinate units according to areas of interest, and supplementary issues are made as necessary. Typical allowances are shown in FM 101-10-1.

(b) *General intelligence record.* The gen-

eral intelligence record is vertical, medium scale (1:10,000 to 1:20,000) imagery covering the field army's area of interest. It provides current intelligence and is compared with initial record imagery to determine current location and disposition of enemy installations, troop concentrations, troop movements, equipment, and supplies. This type of imagery is normally requested by divisions and higher headquarters.

(c) *Detailed intelligence record.* Detailed intelligence record is obtained to supplement the general intelligence record by providing large-scale imagery of areas of specific interest in the battle area. It provides the imagery for detailed analyses of selected terrain features, installations, and equipment. It is frequently necessary to use more than one sensing or recording system over the target. Types of detailed analyses are—

1. *Vertical analysis.* The study of large scale (1:10,000 and larger) photography reveals the plans and heights of installations now shown in general intelligence record.

2. *Oblique analysis.* The study of air photographs taken at an angle from the vertical reveals installations from the elevation viewpoint. This type of imagery is particularly important in the analysis of features not suitable for vertical analysis, such as concealed or well-camouflaged installations.

3. *Concealment analysis.* Installations and equipment hidden from observation are detected and subjected to study by special recording techniques; for example, a camouflage net located through general intelligence record photography may be identified as a covering for mechanical equipment when the area is subjected to infrared (IR) search.

4. *Deception analysis.* Enemy measures designed to develop and confuse friendly intelligence collection agencies are detected through analysis and comparison of photographic and electronic presentation such as radar, infrared, and electronic intelligence.

(2) *Mapping photography.* Mapping or charting photography is taken for the purpose of preparing or revising maps and charts. It is generally taken at much smaller scales (1:20,000 to 1:50,000) than intelligence photography and is used for intelligence purposes only when no other intelligence photography is available. This photography is taken with specially stabilized cameras and other equipment. The flight pattern and elevation are carefully controlled.

b. Imagery obtained by the use of Army aircraft is a type of detailed intelligence record. Air observers or photographers equipped with suitable cameras can, in many cases, provide commanders with low-altitude (orientation) obliques and limited vertical photography under conditions and at times when high-performance aircraft are unable to meet Army requirements. This is in addition to the Army capability with conventional mounted cameras. Commanders should fully exploit the employment of Army aviation in a supplemental photoreconnaissance role.

c. In stability operations, the scale of coverage, as a general rule, should be the largest possible consistent with the type of coverage desired, intended use, size of area to be recorded, time allocated for the mission, type of aircraft and systems available and the degree of urgency of the desired information. Due to the special factors inherent in stability operations the following photography imagery scales are recommended: Initial record 1:10,000 to 1:25,000; General intelligence record 1:5,000 to 1:10,000; and Detailed intelligence record 1:5,000 or larger.

6-38. Mosaics

A mosaic is an assembly of overlapping aerial photographs that have been matched to form a continuous photographic representation of a portion of the earth's surface. There are three types of mosaics: controlled, uncontrolled, and strip.

a. A controlled mosaic is laid on ground control to provide an accurate representation of distances and directions. It can be made quite accurate if sufficient control data exist, but its preparation is slow and tedious. For controlled mosaics, photography taken by a mapping camera should be requested.

b. An uncontrolled mosaic is made without the check of scale or position that would be given by a framework of control points. In comparison with a controlled mosaic, its preparation is quite rapid, but it is much less accurate.

c. A strip mosaic consists of one strip of aerial photographs taken on a single flight. Depending on the time and the amount of control available, it may be controlled or uncontrolled. For a mosaic to provide maplike presentation, vertical photography normally is used. For special mosaics such as coastlines, head-on views of mountainous terrain or built-up areas, oblique or forward panoramic photography can be used.

CHAPTER 7

ORDER OF BATTLE

(STANAG 2077; SOLOG 93, 109)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

7-1. General

a. Order of battle (OB) is the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Complete OB data is not furnished the commander. Instead, he is provided conclusions, estimates, or analyses of enemy courses of action determined by the intelligence analyst based on collated OB information. In campaigns involving irregular force units all such units as well as auxiliary and underground elements will be included. OB consists of evaluated information regarding the following elements:

(1) Composition.
(2) Disposition.
(3) Strength.
(4) Training status.
(5) Tactics.
(6) Logistics.
(7) Combat effectiveness.
(8) Miscellaneous.

b. Order of battle intelligence is an integral part of combat and strategic intelligence and is of particular importance during stability operations. Recognition and identification of insurgent elements is of paramount importance particularly during phase I of an insurgency. In determining enemy capabilities and probable courses of action, commanders must consider order of battle intelligence together with other intelligence pertaining to the enemy, weather, and terrain.

c. In general, order of battle personnel are responsible for all information concerning foreign military forces. In order to accomplish this mission, the order of battle analyst has to consider and develop intelligence concerning the order of battle elements as they pertain to foreign military forces. Order of battle techniques employed in support of stability operations parallel those used during conventional warfare; however, the nature of stability operations, and particularly of the enemy forces encountered, will require modification of techniques and expansion of the scope of order of battle to include both military and nonmilitary personnel of significant interest. A major problem in stability operations is the locating and identifying of insurgent forces. This problem is compounded by the elusive nature of the insurgent and his ability to blend with the local populace, change unit identification frequently, and also his ability to rapidly disperse to avoid detection.

7-2. Relationship to Other Intelligence

Military intelligence is developed in many fields outside the scope of order of battle, but all intelligence is ultimately related to it. For example, technical intelligence produces intelligence on the capabilities and characteristics of a weapon or weapons system but order of battle intelligence determines the effect of the weapon capabilities and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and organization. Enemy military intelligence organizations are of primary interest to counterintelligence, but as part of a military organization, they are also of interest to order of battle personnel. Communications intelligence can contribute to development of communications order of battle and to other order of battle information. The relationship between order of battle intelligence and other military intelligence cannot be overemphasized.

7-3. Composition

Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units.

a. Unit identification is often called the key to order of battle intelligence because it leads to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification in order of battle intelligence consists of the complete designation of a specific unit. It identifies the unit, indicates what type it is, and gives relative size or strength. Through identification, the order of battle analyst is able to develop a picture of the enemy. Combined with organization, the identification of a specific unit alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified units of the same organization. This operation becomes more difficult during stability operations when insurgent elements operate without apparent support from logistical bases, but rather obtain support from within the populace or from base areas established in third country sanctuaries.

b. Organization is the structure of a unit and the relationship of the various echelons within the structure. A knowledge of the organization of a military force is necessary to develop accurate intelligence concerning strength, tactics, training, logistics, and combat efficiency. The capabilities of an enemy are difficult to assess accurately without knowledge of organization. The organization of all types of armies is constantly changing. Thus, organization is an element of order of battle to which continuing attention is devoted.

c. The basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit (in the U.S. Army a combat division) must be considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. In some countries the field army is considered the basic self-sufficient, tactical unit. The importance of this concept lies in the term self-sufficient. Organic units, although capable of independent action, cannot sustain themselves over a long period of time. They are dependent upon higher headquarters or upon that unit which by design is self-sufficient. For this reason, subordinate units are seldom employed independently or separately from the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit. The following example will show clearly the importance of this concept. An order of battle analyst reports a new enemy mechanized regiment in his section. Aware that the mechanized division is the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit and

therefore that its three mechanized regiments are seldom employed independently, he tentatively accepts the presence, not of an entirely new regiment, but of an entire new mechanized division. When one of these regiments is located, it may be reasonably assumed that the remaining elements of the division are also somewhere close by. This principle, however, may not apply in stability operation since subordinate units may be employed independently or subordinately to local units for limited periods of time. Support for a particular operation may be furnished, not by the immediate higher headquarters, but rather by the local populace or logistical units assigned to support insurgent elements operating in that particular area.

7-4. Disposition

Disposition in order of battle terminology consists of the location of enemy units and the manner in which these units are tactically (or administratively in times or peace), deployed in addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and proposed (or probable) movements of enemy units. During stability operations, determining the disposition of enemy, particularly insurgent, elements becomes increasingly difficult to determine since they have the capability to merge, disperse, and reform on order.

a. Location referes to a geographical location or position occupied by any unit or units. It is important primarily because it answers the commander's question, "Where is the enemy?" Without this information, the commander and his staff are incapable of performing effective planning and are unable to make an acceptable estimate of the situation or arrive at sound decisions for the employment of friendly troops. Knowledge of the strength and the location of an enemy force assists the commander in determining the capabilities of this force and its effect upon the accomplishment of his mission. Data of this type are also collected during times of peace, but, as can be expected, knowledge of foreign military forces is severely limited due to limitations on collection elements.

b. Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with respect to one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for executing the various tactical maneuvers. If this deployment can be predetermined, it may lead to an accurate appraisal of probable enemy courses of

action. The knowledge of how enemy units are echeloned may indicate (if the enemy assumes the offensive) which units will be used in the initial attack and which units will be employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical deployment with respect to terrain is also important. A study of dispositions, coupled with an analysis of the area of operations, leads to conclusions concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. During stability operations, care must be taken to insure that proper assessment of enemy capabilities is based not only on tactical deployment but also on the possibility of support from local forces friendly to the insurgent cause.

c. Movement of enemy units is another subelement of disposition. Movement is the physical relocation of a unit from one geographical point to another. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the tactical deployment of the opposing forces; quite properly, it is referred to as enemy redeployment activities. Movement or redeployment is also important for other reasons. When an enemy has moved, is moving, or will possibly move in the future, it becomes capable of a number of actions which affect the order of battle situation. Such a unit may be moving into an attack position, or moving to reinforce, or to replace a unit, or to perform other missions unknown to friendly forces. During stability operations, movement of insurgent elements becomes particularly significant since these forces have the capability of moving in small undetected groups, which may later reform into organized units possessing the capabilities mentioned above. In view of these possibilities, movement of an enemy unit becomes important and units must be monitored at all times in order for the OB analyst to provide correct and detailed data on enemy dispositions.

7-5. Strength

The term "strength" covers the description of a unit or force in terms of men, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of enemy capabilities, and assists him in determining the probable courses of action or options open to enemy commanders. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or buildup of units in an area gives the commander certain indications of enemy objectives

and probable courses of action. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential enemy forces are important factors which indicate the enemy's intention to wage war. During stability operations, estimation of enemy strength becomes increasingly difficult, since all enemy units to include local and main force units, guerrillas, sympathizers, etc., must be considered by the analyst in order to provide the commander with a true picture of enemy capabilities based on strength. Strength computations are discussed in appendix K.

7-6. Tactics

Tactics in order of battle intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted principles of organization and employment of forces for the conduct of operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describe the manner in which the enemy conducts an operation. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the OB analyst knows how the enemy may employ his forces under various conditions and in certain type situations or special operations. Conventional enemy forces normally can be expected to perform according to certain patterns within the framework of tactical doctrine. There are established principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, mechanized, armor, and artillery in the offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of employment and enemy action or reaction is extremely important in the planning phase of an operation as well as in the execution phase.

7-7. Training

Training is closely related to combat effectiveness in times of peace and war. Each type or phase of training analyzed (individual or unit) contributes to the overall picture of potential or actual enemy capabilities. Units usually are engaged in field exercises and in maneuvers during the latter part of the training cycle. Thus, the combat efficiency and capabilities of units at the peak of proficiency can be appraised. The thoroughness, degree, and quality of specialist, NCO, and officer training determine to a large extent the overall efficiency of the armed force.

7-8. Logistics

a. Logistics also is closely related to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action is influenced by the ability of the logistical system

to support that action. Knowledge of the enemy's logistics facilitates a more accurate evaluation of enemy capabilities as well as strength, combat efficiency, and disposition. Types of logistic information of interest to the order of battle analyst include—

(1) All classes and types of supply.

(2) Requirements.

(3) Procurement.

(4) Distribution.

(5) Transportation.

(6) Installations.

(7) Terminals.

(8) Evacuation and salvage.

(9) Maintenance.

b. During stability operations, assessment of the insurgent's logistic base will be difficult since logistical support being provided the insurgent may come from different sources (i.e., from the local population, external support, or in some cases from his own logistic support system).

7-9. Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness is a term used to describe the abilities and fighting quality of an enemy unit, element, or entire national army. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army. How well a unit will perform in combat may be predicted by analyzing—

a. Personnel strength.

b. Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.

c. Status of training.

d. Efficiency of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

e. Length of time a unit has been committed in combat.

f. Traditions and past performance.

g. Personality traits of the unit commander.

h. Geographical area in which committed.

i. Morale, health, discipline, and political reliability (or belief in the cause for which they fight).

j. Status of technical and logistic support of the unit.

k. Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.

l. National characteristics of the people.

7-10. Miscellaneous Data

Miscellaneous data include various types of supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of the other order of battle elements. Miscellaneous data include basic intelligence that can be described as "know your enemy."

a. Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of an enemy military force. A knowledge of personalities is important as an aid to identifying units, and, in some cases, predicting the course of action the unit will take. Personality data, therefore, is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are closely related to key individuals.

b. Unit history includes information and intelligence on component elements of a specific unit; on present and past parent units; personalities who have commanded the unit; and other details such as past performance and activities which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit concerned. The development of unit history is important because it aids in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military or paramilitary units, like individuals, develop certain outstanding characteristics which distinguish them from other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits of enemy personalities, order of battle personnel must also consider an enemy unit as a "personality" in analyzing its capabilities and limitations.

c. Information on uniforms and insignia is an important part of know-your-enemy intelligence. This information assists in establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

d. Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers (and names) to conceal true designations (or affiliation) of units, field post numbers (FPO), and vehicles. These code number systems, when properly analyzed, are valuable sources of information related to composition and disposition.

e. The order of battle analyst must be able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of weapons and equipment characteristics and capabilities, the analyst uses this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the military force.

Section III. PLANNING THE COLLECTION EFFORT

7–11. Responsibility

Order of battle personnel assist the G2 in continuously planning the collection effort. At times, they may be required to draft collection memorandums for the guidance of collection agencies. As intelligence is developed, the need for new information arises, and every effort is made to maintain a continuous flow of order of battle information by timely requests to the collection agencies.

7–12. Collection

Order of battle personnel do not have a collection capability; therefore, most of the information is received from agencies and sources outlined in paragraphs 4–17 through 4–45. The G2 section sends information it receives to the order of battle section for detailed processing. From the standpoint of report and source evaluation, order of battle personnel must know which agencies are available and their capabilities to supply accurate information.

Section IV. PROCESSING ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

7–13. Introduction

Order of battle personnel are responsible to the intelligence officer for the processing of order of battle information. The intelligence and information received and processed by an order of battle section normally becomes voluminous in a short period of time. In organizing this information, order of battle personnel maintain extensive and systematic filing and compilation systems. Specific items of intelligence and information must be located on short notice and incorporated into comprehensive reports or analyses. These requirements necessitate a high degree of efficiency in the processing of data received.

7–14. Order of Battle References

Typical order of battle references currently published are—

 a. *Order of Battle Handbooks.* Order of battle handbooks (often known as "Handbooks of Military Forces") contain background data including descriptions of a foreign nation's political structure, typical organization of that nation's military establishment, tactical doctrine applicable to various types of military units, and other more technical data, such as the logistic system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment.

 b. *Order of Battle Books.* Order of battle books are compilations of current intelligence which show the composition and disposition of the military establishment of foreign nations. They are normally published by headquarters of higher commands or at the departmental level. Unlike the order of battle handbooks, they contain established intelligence data on major identified units

and their subordinate elements. They may also contain personality data, lists of logistic installations, unit history data, and other order of battle data. Changes or updated versions normally are disseminated on a regular basis by the publishing headquarters.

 c. *Installation Handbooks.* Ideally, installation handbooks contain complete information concerning every military installation in every city in the country or area of interest. They are useful, particularly during peacetime, for establishing disposition of forces.

 d. *Miscellaneous References.* Other publications and periodicals prepared at departmental and area command levels are of value to the order of battle specialist. These references may deal specifically with order of battle or with any and all phases of combat and strategic intelligence. Civilian organizations under contract to the various subjects concerning foreign and enemy Department of Defense make special studies on military forces. These studies are usually detailed and technical in nature, but provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.

7–15. Recording Order of Battle Data

 a. The recording aids outlined in paragraphs 5–4 through 5–9 may be adapted to order of battle use (for example, the index tabs on the workbook corresponding with the order of battle factors). Order of battle records and files are consulted continually for the purpose of producing new intelligence. Files are established to catalog incoming information for easy reference and for use as a basis for comparison and contrast in the production of new intelligence. Because of this,

order of battle files must be simple, yet complete. One or more of the typical aids discussed below may be used; the type used depends upon the existing situation and the echelon maintaining the files:

(1) Unit workbook.

(2) Order of battle workbook.

(3) Order of battle situation map.

(4) Order of battle card file.

(5) Personality file.

(6) Military installation file.

(7) Organizational file.

(8) Strength file.

(9) Topical file.

b. Other file systems or forms are developed locally to cope with special situations; however, the primary purpose of these other file systems is the production of intelligence.

7-16. Unit Workbook

The format of the unit workbook depends entirely on the structure of the foreign army being monitored. Typically, the unit workbook consists of a collection of unit worksheets arranged by type of unit or in numerical sequence (fig. 7-1 and 7-2). Analysts, with order of battle books at their disposal, may use them as unit workbooks by inserting additional pages as new information is received. Generally, the enemy parent unit listed on the unit worksheet is of division size or larger. Personalities are listed on the worksheet as a ready reference to the personalities of the enemy unit. Unit, postal, and vehicle numbers are noted on the worksheet and are used in determining order of battle changes or as confirmation of current data. Details which may reveal any facet of the enemy unit's order of battle are noted in the remarks column. Such items as reports of branch insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents are entered in this column in abbreviated form. The date and the source of information are entered for each entry. The installation column of the worksheet shows the numerical designation assigned a particular enemy installation when plotted on a sketch, map sheet, or town plan attached to the workbook.

7-17. Order of Battle Workbook.

a. The order of battle workbook aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence re-

ports. Its purpose and use are identical to those of the intelligence workbook (fig. 7-2).

b. There is no prescribed form for the order of battle workbook. At corps level and higher, the order of battle workbook is tabbed to conform with paragraphs of the order of battle annex of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 7-3 shows the method of tabbing the workbook.

c. Information is entered under the appropriate heading or headings as either a complete report or a digest of the original report. All entries contain a journal date and number in addition to identification of the source. Comments, when appropriate, are added after each entry to show the significance of the report when compared with the overall tactical situation.

7-18. Order of Battle Situation Map

The order of battle situation map is a graphic portrayal of current enemy order of battle, either confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and dispositions of the enemy units and any other information which will assist in developing the enemy order of battle (fig. 7-4).

a. As a general rule, enemy units down to and including two echelons below the analyst's own level of command are plotted by using the appropriate symbols in FM 21-30. For example, at division, enemy regiments and battalions are plotted; at corps, enemy divisions and regiments. Higher units are plotted to the extent practicable. The foregoing information is only a guide. Analysts at theater level who are responsible for publication of order of battle books may plot separate battalions. Peculiarities of enemy organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel available determine more precisely what will be plotted and what will be omitted on order of battle maps. The time and date of the information are entered below each symbol or plotting. During stability operations, however, it may be necessary to plot enemy/insurgent units down to the squad level, since, depending on the situation and the area, there may be no large sized units operating against friendly forces.

b. A caption box on the order of battle situation map is an annotation containing information which helps to identify and explain the order of battle situation graphically. Although any number of caption boxes may be used, normally three types are necessary—strength, unlocated units, and legend caption boxes.

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS

5 MECHANIZED
DIVISION

GROUP
HEADQUARTERS
ARMY

7 MECHANIZED
DIVISION

ARMY
GROUP

107 MECHANIZED
DIVISION

1 ARMY
(COMBINED)

3 TANK DIVISION

2 ARMY
(COMBINED)

5 TANK DIVISION

UNIT WORKBOOK

AGGRESSOR ARMY

ARTILLERY
DIVISION

3 ARMY
(COMBINED)

ANTI–AIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY

4 ARMY
(COMBINED)

ARTILLERY
DIVISION
GUN

1 TANK ARMY

MISCELLANEOUS

1F MECHANIZED
DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 7–1. Example of a unit work book.

PARENT UNIT _____110 Mechanized Division_____

SUBORDINATE UNITS	CITY	COORDINATES	INSTL	PERSONALITIES	ID OR CODE NO	REMARKS
Division Headquarters	Stein	PV818147	1 & 3	CG G/D Murdock Edward R		PW No 26, Captured 2 Feb 68
96 Mechanized Regiment	Delitsch	PU81934	4	CO - COL Oldham Ernest B	16181	Document captured 19 March 68
145 Mechanized Regiment	Eilenburg	PU852961	2		16182	Deserted 21 March 68
3d Battalion	Gladbach	PV891024	1			Gladbach residents report battalion subordinate to Headquarters in Eilenburg, 3 Feb 68
63 Medium Tank Regiment	Linburg	PV863106	3	CO - COL Bhartrhari, Kerala N		Agent report 26 May 68
358 Transportation Battalion	Lehrt	PV825158	1		16195	Order of Battle Book

Figure 7-2. Example of a unit worksheet of a unit workbook.

CLASSIFICATION

1. COMPOSITION &
DISPOSITION

2. STRENGTH

3. TACTICS

4. TRAINING

5. LOGISTICS

6. COMBAT
EFFECTIVENESS

7.
MISCELLANEOUS
DATA

ORDER OF BATTLE
WORKBOOK

G2 SECTION, _____ CORPS

FROM: _____
(HOUR AND DATE)

TO: _____
(HOUR AND DATE)

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 7–3. Example of an order of battle workbook.

I
030040

?
57
01 1400

XX
22
020330

?
22
01 1945

19 X 22
X

?
140
011010

1 24
021410

24 ≡ 23

?
122
022300

?
100
Ð40200

22 X 66
X

2 24
041700

24
040900

3 24
012230

23
041630

2 23
032120

3 23
041040

1 23
031610

72 X 24
X

1 X 2

XX
24

24 X 55
X

STRENGTH			UNLOCATED UNITS	LEGEND
COMMITTED FORCES			Recon Co, 22 Div	I Irregular
	NR	PERS	WPN	160 mm Mort Bn, 22 Div	
Mech Bn	5	2625		How Bn, 22 Div	
Mdm Tk Bn	2	384	62xMdm Tk	Gun How Bn, 22 Div	
FIRE SUPPORT				
Gun-How Bn	1		18x152 Gun-How	
Mort Bn	1		18x160 Mort	
At Bn	1		18x100 Gun	
How Bn	1		18x122 How	
MRL Bn	1		18x140 Rkt	
RL Bn	1		2x200 RL	
			2xNERONO	
AD Bn	1		18x57 Gun	
REINFORCEMENTS				
Mech Bn	1	252		
Mdm Tk Regt	1	842	95 Mdm Tk	
			3xAMPH Tk	
			6x57 mm AD Gun(SP)	
Mech Regt	1	2350	31xMdm Tk	
			3xAmph Tk	
Irregular Co	1	95		
Recon Co	1	129	12 Amph Tk	

Figure 7-4. Order of battle situation map.

(1) The entries in the strength caption box usually consist of a digest of strength computations in numbers of personnel, types of units, and weapons and equipment categorized as committed forces, their fire support units, and reinforcements (fig. 7-4). Since a reconnaissance company is part of an aggressor mechanized division, it is considered a reinforcement which is unlocated since its position is unknown. Assumptions such as these must be made to portray significant enemy probable capabilities.

(2) It is important that the order of battle analyst be aware of that which is not known about the enemy. The unlocated units caption box calls to his attention existing units which remain unlocated. It is a reminder that maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of unlocated units in the area of operations and that these units pose a threat to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Since insurgent units possess the capability of frequent unit redesignation, the OB analyst is confronted with the problem of continual update of the OB situation map. This assures him that all listings are as current as possible and that they accurately portray the latest information on current enemy order of battle.

(3) A legend caption box is included on the order of battle situation map when it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units. Within this caption box, the exact meaning of each improvised symbol is explained.

7-19. Order of Battle Card

Order of battle card files are used to maintain accurate and complete data on any enemy unit (fig. 7-5). Order of battle cards will be maintained at all echelons down to and including division or such lower levels as may be necessary. (To meet the requirement for more detailed recording and filing or order of battle intelligence, particularly at higher levels, a supplementary filing system may be maintained. This system generally will be based on the component parts of the order of battle card.) Normally, one card will be maintained on each enemy division or any other unit in a position to affect current operations. The order of battle card contains the following minimum information, numbered as follows:

1. TITLE (number and designation of unit/formation—NATIONALITY

2. CODE NAME (official name assigned by the enemy for convenience)

3. NICKNAME (unofficial popular name)

4. PARENT FORMATION

5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS

6. FIELD POST NUMBER (FPO)

7. INSIGNIA
   (a) Personnel
   (b) Equipment

8. COMMANDER

9. UNIT HISTORY

10. MISCELLANEOUS

11. LOCATION

12. TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT (to include initial and effective strengths and casualties)

13. COMBAT EFFICIENCY

Note. Data contained in items 11, 12, and 13 are subject to frequent change and are listed on the back of the card.

7-20. Personality File

Personality data on designated categories of individuals are recorded in a personality file. The purpose of this file is to provide reference material used in the development of other order of battle intelligence. Information on key military figures can be of significant value in the establishment of unit identifications, tactics, and combat effectiveness. The file is kept in alphabetical order. The card (or sheet) contains information concerning the individual's name, rank, current assignment, date and place of birth, civilian education, political affiliation, nicknames, and physical peculiarities. Reference also is made to the individual's school qualifications, awards, decorations, Chronology of assignments, campaigns, engagements, demonstrated performance in leadership assignments, and important activities participated in, as well as character traits such as morals, reputation, appearance, and mannerisms. Source and date of information are recorded with each entry.

7-21. Military Installation File

Military installation files normally are maintained during peacetime by higher echelons to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. A collation or explanatory sheet contains all information that has been collected on each installation to include the number and types of buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major items of unit equipment (fig. 7-6). Maps, town plans, or sketches showing the location of each installation within the city supplement this file.

7-22. Organizational File

The organizational file provides a convenient method of showing types of units within an armed force. Organizational files depict the com-

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD (STANAG 2077)		
1. TITLE-NATIONALITY:	2. CODE NAME:	3. NICK NAME:
4. PARENT FORMATION:	6. FIELD POST NO.	8. COMMANDER:

5. SUBORDINATE. FORMATIONS/UNITS: (List only major subordinate elements)	FPN	COMMANDER	7. INSIGNIA: a. Personnel: (Attach patch)
			b. Equipment: (Sketch)

9. UNIT HISTORY:	10. MISCELLANEOUS:
	a. Logistics:
	b. Training:
	c. Tactics:
	d. Other:

NOTE: . This card is a summary of OB information pertaining to the division. Other card files containing information pertaining to the subordinate elements are necessary.

Figure 7–5. Format for Order of Battle Card. (STANAG 2078).

11.	LOCATION:															

12. TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT (Ref STANAG 2077)

		PERSONNEL: TOE			ARMOR: TOE			ARTILLERY: TOE			AIR VEHICLE: TOE			GEN VEH: TOE		
DATE	J No	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %
TOTALS																

13. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

a. Strengths:

b. Weaknesses:

Figure 7-5—Continued.

TOWN HEIMERZHEIM   COORD 33ULB 5220

INSTL	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	USE	CAPACITY	STRENGTH	UNIT	TIME LAST INFO	EVAL	REMARKS
1	523208 (201-4th St)	5 story, red brick bldg, Flagpole extends from 5th story window	Unident Hq	400	Unk	Unk	0758	B-2	Many high ranking officers and official sedans observed
2	522211 (Hwy 2 between K & L Sts)	4x 2-story, wood barracks surrounded by 8' board fence	Trps	500	350?	Engr?	0758	C-2	Sentry observed wearing engineer insignia.
3	531215	6x 4-story, red brick barracks with 2-story bldg	Trps	1,000	850	Unidentified Army	0458	B-2	Sentry observed wearing art insignia. Known to local residents as "Kaiser Bks"
4	533218 (N of Instl 3)	8x 1-story garage-type bldg	gun park	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Probably belongs to unit in Instl 3. 9x100mm guns observed
5	514231	2x 3-story, stucco bldg	Trps	Bn	Bn	1st Bn 19th Mtz R Regt	1257	A-1	
6	535211	Local tng area, obstacle course in NW corner	---	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Believe used by trps from both Instl 2 and 3
7	554205	Several underground bunkers inclosed by 8' barbed wire fence. Guard towers located on each corner.	Ammo dump	10 Tons (est)	---	---	1257	F-6	

Figure 7-6. Example of an installation handbook explanatory sheet.

UNIT	PERSONNEL*		SMALL ARMS		MORTARS	AAA	ANTITANK ARTILLERY			VEHICLES		ELECTRONIC	
	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	LIGHT MACHINEGUN	HEAVY MACHINEGUN	82-mm MORTAR	14.5-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT MACHINEGUN (DUAL)	57-mm ANTITANK GUN	82-mm SQUADRON ANTITANK LAUNCHER	82-mm RCL RIFLE	APC	TRUCKS	MANKO	RADIOS
Rifle Company (3)	18	315	27	18				27		27	3		15
Mortar Battery	5	43			6					4	2		3
Support Battery	5	48				2	3		3	6	2		3
Headquarters and Service Company	10	81								48	10	1	13
TOTALS	38	487	27	18	6	2	3	27	3	85	17	1	34

* Individual weapons: Officers - pistol; Enlisted men - 5 percent pistol, 35 percent submachinegun, 60 percent rifle.

Figure 7-7. Example of a principal weapons and equipment chart.

STRENGTH WORKSHEET UNITS BY TYPE																								
		ARMOR																						
1. COMMITTED FORCES	PERSONNEL	HV	AMPH	MDM	ASLT GUN																			
FIRE SUPPORT																								
2. REINFORCEMENTS																								

Figure 7-8. Strength worksheet.

plete breakdown of all units, from the highest type headquarters to the lowest unit, including personnel and major weapons strengths. Since this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, a chart showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts for each of its subordinate units are prepared. Principal weapons and equipment charts may be prepared to supplement organizational charts (fig. 7–7).

7–23. Strength Worksheet

The strength worksheet (fig. 7–8) is used to maintain a running numerical tabulation of the enemy's personnel and equipment strengths. This information is recorded on committed units, fire support units, and reinforcements.

7–24. Topical File

This file is maintained when detailed information is desired on new items of enemy equipment, changes or clarification of tactical doctrine, or on any additional data which will clarify enemy order of battle. Cards or sheets are filed alphabetically by subject.

7–25. Evaluation and Interpretation

The same methods of evaluation and interpretation discussed in chapter 5 are used. An analysis of the order of battle elements is required in the interpretation of order of battle information. The interrelationship of these elements is such that it is difficult to place a greater importance on one than another. Similar difficulty is encountered in analyzing one element without reference or dependence upon another. Therefore, a combination of data pertaining to all elements is required to accomplish complete interpretation.

Section V. DISSEMINATION OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

7–26. General

The methods of dissemination are discussed in detail in chapter 6. The order of battle section is normally responsible for most of the enemy situation of the intelligence estimate. Paragraphs J–6 through J–11 are primarily its concern. Although paragraphs J–12 and J–13 usually involve the order of battle analyst, other intelligence personnel may also contribute to these paragraphs.

7–27. Order of Battle Annex

An order of battle annex is a document containing order of battle information/intelligence which normally is disseminated with the PERINTREP. Since it is a means of disseminating newly developed intelligence, only the intelligence produced during the reported period is presented. Appendix L provides additional guidance and a sample annex.

CHAPTER 8

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

8-1. General

Counterintelligence is essential to the success of any military operation and is a major part of the overall operations security concept. The element of surprise in military operations depends not only upon reliable intelligence and rapidity of movement, but also upon effective counterintelligence. By denying information to the enemy and thereby decreasing his ability to use his combat power effectively, counterintelligence aids in reducing the risks of a command.

8-2. Counterintelligence Measures

a. *Defensive.* Defensive counterintelligence measures are designed to conceal information from the enemy. They include measures such as secrecy discipline, personnel security, security of classified documents and materiel, installation security, signal security, movement control, censorship, camouflage, and use of concealment and electronic counter-countermeasures. Defensive counterintelligence measures are readily standardized in the unit SOP regardless of the specific nature of the unit's mission.

b. *Offensive.* Offensive counterintelligence measures actively block the enemy's attempts to gain information or to engage in sabotage or subversion. They include counterreconnaissance, counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, deception programs, to include confusion and harassment, electronic countermeasures against hostile SIGINT and ESM collection activities, camouflage, and the use of smoke to deny enemy observation. Offensive counterintelligence measures vary with the mission of the unit.

8-3. Counterintelligence Agencies

a. The individual soldier is the ultimate counterintelligence agency. Defensive counterintelligence operations depend upon his ability to carry out proper security, camouflage, and observation and reporting procedures in his daily activities. It is also important for the individual soldier to evade the enemy if cut off from his unit, and, if captured, to resist enemy interrogation, adhere to the Code of Conduct, and escape if possible. Evaders and recovered U.S. prisoners of war are valuable counterintelligence sources for obtaining information concerning enemy intelligence activities, including subversion.

b. Counterintelligence personnel are assigned to military intelligence companies, battalions, and groups (FM 30-9), to provide the command with an operating element in the field of counterintelligence.

c. All units are, in effect, counterintelligence agencies since they must implement appropriate counterintelligence measures to keep information on their activities, locations, and disposition from the enemy. Some units, such as U.S. Army Security Agency units and censorship units, have specialized counterintelligence functions based on the nature of their missions. Every staff officer and subordinate commander must be cognizant of the counterintelligence aspects of his particular activity.

d. Other agencies, including the Naval Investigative Services Office, the Office of Special Investigations (USAF), the Coast Guard's Intelligence Division, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Justice Department, perform certain functions that assist Army counterintelligence operations.

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

8-4. General

Counterintelligence operations are classified generally as those pertaining to military security; post security; civil security, frontier security, and travel security; censorship; and special operations. (See FM 30-17 and FM 30-17A for de-

tailed discussion of counterintelligence operations, and FM 30–28 for Armed Forces Censorship.)

a. *Military Security.* Counterintelligence operations taken to increase military security include both offensive and defensive counterintelligence measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, enemy observation, subversion, sabotage. General security measures encompass security discipline, safeguarding of classified information and equipment, security of troop movement, neutralization of counterintelligence targets in tactical operations, establishment of a system of passwords, and handling of escapees and evaders. It must be remembered that command security measures require strict adherence to security regulations on the part of the individual soldier. A particular operation may be compromised based on the action of one individual who may deviate from the established security SOP. When considering security measures during the security education program, the following measures should be stressed:

(1) When on tactical operations, information, either personal or official, should not be carried on the person.

(2) Incidents of agitation or other attempts to promote disaffection or subversive activity must be reported immediately through intelligence channels.

(3) Receipt of unsolicited correspondence of an inflammatory nature or correspondence seemingly designed to lower troop morale should be reported through intelligence channels.

(4) Personnel must be encouraged to exercise self-censorship in their personal correspondence.

(5) All correspondence, both personal and official must be destroyed when no longer of value.

(6) Commanders, staff, and individuals must be cautioned against establishing patterns which may indicate a pending operation.

(7) Code of Conduct requirements must include the individual's responsibility to evade and escape, if captured. This information should be stressed in briefings, promoted in security training, and included in locally published directives and SOP.

b. *Civil Security.* All counterintelligence activities affecting the civil population of the area are a part of the civil security counterintelligence operations. These operations are extensive in commands with large territorial responsibilities, in heavily populated areas, and in cold war situations. Typical civil security counterintelligence measures are control of circulation of personnel, civil censorship, security screening of civilian labor, monitoring of suspect political groups, and industrial plant protection. Because many of the civil security counterintelligence measures are within civil affairs areas of interest, close coordination should be maintained with civil-military operations staffs (G5 and S5) and civil affairs units operating in the area.

c. *Port, Frontier, and Travel Security.* These types of counterintelligence operations consist of the special application of military and civil security measures to the control of airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of a theater of operations. Typical of such operations are military travel permit systems, sea and land frontier patrols, and security screening and control of "frontaliers" (legal, daily, frontier crossers).

d. *Censorship.* Censorship is the examination and control of all types of communications other than certain exempted official communications for the purpose of preventing information of value from reaching the enemy, as well as for collecting information of value to the United States or its Allies. Following are the four basic types of censorship with a notation of the G2 responsibility for each:

(1) *Armed forces censorship.* The examination and control of personal communications to or from persons in the Armed Forces of the United States and persons accompanying and serving with the Armed Forces. The G2 has primary staff responsibility for this type of censorship (AR 380–200 and FM 30–28).

(2) *Civil censorship.* The censorship of civil communications, such as messages, printed matter, and films, entering or leaving or circulating within areas or territories controlled by the Armed Forces of the United States. This type of censorship falls within the scope of civil security. The G2 has staff supervision and control over this form of censorship. Principal civil military operations staff officers coordinate with the G2 in the planning and implementation of this type of censorship (AR 380–83 and FM 45–20).

(3) *Enemy prisoner-of-war and civilian in-*

ternee censorship. The censorship of communications to and from prisoners of war and civilian internees held by the Armed Forces of the United States. The G2 has primary staff responsibility for this type of censorship (AR 380-235).

(4) *Field press censorship.* The security review of news material subject to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States, including all information or material intended for dissemination to the public. The G2 has *no* responsibility for this type of censorship (normally responsibility of the command public information officer) except as such matters may be coordinated with him by the command chief field press censor (AR 360-65 and FM 45-25).

e. Special Operations. Counterintelligence special operations include both offensive and defensive operations of a special nature, directed against hostile intelligence organizations and activities. During stability operations, these operations assist in neutralizing the insurgency. Special operations normally will not be conducted lower than separate brigade. They will be oriented toward tactical operations and closely coordinated with military intelligence units having area intelligence responsibilities (FM 30-17, FM 30-17A, and FM 30-31A).

8-5. Brigade and Battalion

a. A basic counterintelligence function of the S2 consists of implementing and supervising counterintelligence measures directed by higher headquarters. At lower echelons the emphasis is on denial (defensive) measures—measures which are applied to prevent the enemy from obtaining information—rather than detection (offensive) measures used to expose and neutralize the enemy effort. Deception measures are employed to mislead the enemy as to the true status or purpose of friendly activity, personnel and weapons, strength, disposition, and logistical buildup. These denial measures are directed and controlled by higher headquarters through the use of standing operating procedures (SOP), standing signal instructions (SSI), signal operating instructions (SOI), administrative orders (ADMIN O), and operation orders (OPORD). The application of the measures should be closely coordinated with other command and staff personnel, particularly with the S3 (who has staff responsibility for deception measures), and the communications officer.

b. The S2 functions as a staff advisor for the

application of counterintelligence measures in an operational situation. Operational activities, such as the establishment of outposts, listening posts, and ambushes, which are normally S3 functions, also have counterintelligence implications. These activities are designed not only to protect the unit, but also to counter the enemy's collection effort. Therefore, the location of such positions or activities should be selected based on their security and operational values. To arrive at such a determination, close coordination and joint planning by the S2 and S3 are required.

c. The counterintelligence section of the military intelligence company attached to the division provides direct counterintelligence support to the division. Counterintelligence personnel may be deployed as needed but are normally not deployed lower than brigade except during stability operations. Operational control of these personnel is a responsibility of the counterintelligence section chief, but those personnel are responsive to the requirements of the brigade or battalion S2.

d. The S2 assists in planning and supervising counterintelligence training conducted for personnel of lower echelons. The training of these troops should include both unit and individual security measures, to include the counterintelligence aspects of evasion and escape, and conduct in the event of capture.

8-6. Division

a. Counterintelligence at division level is primarily concerned with denying target information to the enemy. Of particular concern are military security measures for the neutralization of enemy target acquisition efforts directed toward locating nuclear weapon systems. To the extent possible, division counterintelligence measures are reduced to SOP.

b. The counterintelligence section chief of the division MI unit is usually designated chief of the counterintelligence branch of the G2 section and, as such, is responsible to the division G2 for implementation and execution of the division counterintelligence efforts.

c. Counterintelligence operations at division level should include internal security measures and counterintelligence coverage of the area for which the division is responsible. Activities appropriate for supervision by the division counterintelligence section and performance by security personnel may include—

(1) Military security measures which encompass personnel, document, and physical security. These measures provide internal security to the division headquarters, communications centers, and other division installations and areas, by conducting counterintelligence surveys, inspections, checks, and personnel security investigations. Specific counterintelligence measures to be adopted for a tactical operation must be established early in the planning phase. Because these measures must support rather than hamper the accomplishment of the mission, they should be closely coordinated with the command and staff elements concerned.

(2) Screening of refugees, line crossers, defectors, and PW of counterintelligence interest. Refugees who are fleeing the battle area or evacuees who are being moved to safer locations pose a threat to tactical units. Because of the large number of refugees, the movement of friendly troops and supplies may be hampered. In addition to refugees hampering friendly movement, hostile agents may use refugee groups as a cover to infiltrate friendly positions, either for short-range or long-range hostile activities. The control of civilians including legal residents in the tactical area and the detection of hostile personnel require close and continuous support on the part of combat units, military police elements, civil affair teams, and counterintelligence elements within the area.

(3) Control, exploitation, and neutralization, to the extent possible, of counterintelligence targets assigned to the division and targets of opportunity. Specific targets include enemy intelligence agents; installations used by enemy intelligence, counterintelligence or paramilitary organizations; enemy communications media; selected enemy personnel in the political and scientific area; records and files of intelligence and counterintelligence interest; and—

(a) *Personalities*. Known individuals and their locations are listed and disseminated to all intelligence and nonintelligence agencies requiring this information.

(b) *Organizations*. Identified political, underground, partisan, insurgent infrastructure, or other groups of counterintelligence interest are listed by priority of importance to the command, and this information is disseminated to agencies concerned.

(c) *Installations*. Buildings, offices, utilities, storage facilities or other installations of counterintelligence interest are cataloged in the appropriate CI file for further exploitation.

(d) *Lists*. Each counterintelligence unit is responsible for the preparation and dissemination of target lists. For ease in identification a color code has been established to indicate the area of counterintelligence interest.

1. *White list*. Contains a listing of friendly targets which may require protection or evacuation.

2. *Grey list*. Contains a list of targets whose purposes and motives are not known.

3. *Black list*. Contains a list of targets that in some manner pose a threat to the command.

d. Frequently situations may arise that are beyond the capability of the counterintelligence section. Examples include the security screening of an abnormally large influx of refugees into the division area and the necessity of reducing an unusually large number of high-priority counterintelligence targets. In such cases, counterintelligence augmentation personnel may be requested by the division G2 from the commander of the military intelligence unit at field or theater army level.

8-7. Corps

a. Corps counterintelligence operations are concerned with long-range as well as current operations. The field army normally will delineate the scope of the long-range counterintelligence operations for subequent implementation by the counterintelligence branch at corps. Activities appropriate for coordination and policy recommendation by a corps counterintelligence branch may include military security, civil security, frontier and travel security, and censorship operations.

b. Normally, corps has no area responsibility; therefore, the counterintelligence section of the military intelligence company attached to corps confines its activities to internal security functions of the corps headquarters and to any other security functions which are related to the mission of the corps and fall within the mission and functions of the security section. However, there may be instances when, because of nuclear battlefield conditions, independent actions, or an increase in the workload and responsibilities of the field army military intelligence company, counterintelligence, the security section of corps may be called upon to assist in area coverage or to engage in counterintelligence operations that are

normally the responsibility of counterintelligence personnel of field army and division. This is especially apt to occur in stability operations.

c. When, because of conditions mentioned earlier, the operations of the counterintelligence section of corps are expanded, assistance by field army counterintelligence personnel may be requested by the corps G2 from the army G2.

8-8. Field Army

a. Counterintelligence operations at field army level similar to counterintelligence operations at division include responsibility for area coverage. Operations, however, are broader in scope because of the greater number of units, the larger area involved, and the requirement for longer-range planning. The territorial responsibilities of the field army result in more extensive counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security and special operations than is true at lower echelons. Field army counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security are based upon support of tactical operations as well as considerations for support of rear area security requirements.

b. The field army continually conducts counterintelligence operations within the field army and corps areas. Such activities are coordinated with the corps intelligence officer to avoid conflict and duplication of effort.

c. Normally, a counterintelligence team of the field army military intelligence company counterintelligence will provide area counterintelligence coverage for each corps area. Other teams will be so located as to maintain effective counterintelligence coverage in the remaining field army area. The counterintelligence element may be strengthened as necessary by augmentation personnel from theater counterintelligence resources.

8-9. Army Group

Army group has no territorial responsibilities and conducts only such counterintelligence operations as are necessary to maintain the security of the army group headquarters. Counterintelligence plans of army group are usually general in nature and take the form of policy guidance to coordinate counterintelligence operations of subordinate units. Major emphasis is placed upon security of military operations. This involves considering enemy activities which threaten military security and the necessary civil and military security countermeasures. Counterintelligence operations in support of the army group cover those of subordinate units.

8-10. Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM)

a. The TASCOM commander has the responsibility for rear area security throughout the communications zone down to the field army rear boundary. The TASCOM commander normally delegates this responsibility to the commander of the Area Support Command (ASCOM). To assist in the performance of the rear area security, a military intelligence group, counterintelligence, is assigned to ASCOM. This group provides counterintelligence support for all installations and activities in the communications zone, to include the headquarters of theater army and TASCOM.

b. Denying the enemy information of the supplies, service installations, nuclear weapon systems, and transportation and communication means, and their protection against sabotage, are vital to the accomplishment of the TASCOM mission. Thus, TASCOM requires extensive counterintelligence operations of all types. Although the scope and emphasis may vary, counterintelligence procedures and techniques are similar to those at field army level.

c. The subordinate military intelligence companies of the military intelligence group, counterintelligence, normally are attached to the area support groups to provide area coverage throughout the communications zone. Strengths may be shifted to cope with varying workloads and levels of activity. Companies are responsive to the staff intelligence or security officers of the area support groups although operations are centrally coordinated at the group headquarters under the staff supervision of the staff intelligence and security officer of the ASCOM. The following functions constitute most of the workload of the military intelligence group, counterintelligence:

(1) Personnel security investigations and complaint type investigations.

(2) Counterintelligence surveys and inspections.

(3) Counterintelligence support for Army nuclear weapons systems and facilities.

(4) Counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion operations.

(5) Interrogation of suspected guerrillas and prisoners of war captured in the TASCOM area who are of counterintelligence interest.

(6) Operation of a central records facility (CRF) on information of intelligence interest within the theater.

(7) Assistance in the security education program for TASCOM personnel.

8-11. Theater Army

a. Except for missions not suitable for assignment to subordinate commands, theater army counterintelligence activities are usually confined to the coordination of operations of subordinate commands and the administrative control of counterintelligence personnel assigned to the theater echelons. Essentially, theater army coordinates and supervises counterintelligence operations by—

(1) Publishing policy statements and directives.

(2) Planning and supervising the assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas by TASCOM when the field army moves forward. Coordination usually takes place between the armies and TASCOM or the ASCOM.

(3) Coordinating the activities of subordinate commands to insure complete counterintelligence coverage.

(4) Planning the procurement of counterintelligence specialists.

b. The theater army commander exercises operational control over a military intelligence group assigned to his command. This group provides specialized support, such as theater-wide special operations and technical intelligence analysis, which requires centralized control and direction. In the event of hostilities, this military intelligence group may be transferred to a combined or joint command if theater army headquarters is removed from the chain of operational control and becomes a planning-type headquarters.

8-12. Theater Army Civil Affairs Command

Theater army civil affairs command is concerned with internal security of the command headquarters and with providing policies, guidance, and supervision. Counterintelligence operations within the theater army civil affairs command are concerned primarily with civil security and civil aspects of port, frontier, and travel security. These operations are usually carried out by theater army subordinate civil affairs units (FM 41-10).

8-13. Theater Army Air Defense Command

Theater army air defense command headquarters is concerned with internal security of the command headquarters and with providing policies, guidance, and supervision for subordinate units. Counterintelligence operations within the theater army air defense command are concerned primarily with military security, with emphasis upon protection of weapons and target acquisition means.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND ORDERS

8-14. General

a. Counterintelligence planning is based on enemy capabilities to obtain and react to essential elements of friendly information, conduct sabotage and subversive activities against friendly forces. Counterintelligence planning develops appropriate intelligence countermeasures which are designed to prevent the enemy from learning of those friendly dispositions and activities which disclose the intentions of the command or which, if disrupted, would imperil the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Planning the counterintelligence measures in support of any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan and continues until the operation is completed. The procedures used in counterintelligence planning generally are similar to the planning of the collection effort described in an earlier chapter.

8-15. Counterintelligence Estimate

a. The counterintelligence estimate is an evaluation of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage and subversive capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capabilities. It includes the effects of these capabilities on friendly courses of action, how effectively existing friendly countermeasures can negate enemy capabilities, and the need for additional countermeasures or increased emphasis on current countermeasures.

b. The estimate is based on knowledge of the order of battle of enemy units and agencies which

collect intelligence data and conduct sabotage and subversive activities—of special interest are organization, training, equipment, doctrine, techniques, and deployment.

c. The counterintelligence estimate is applicable to all echelons of command. However, a written estimate will not normally be prepared below division or equivalent level. The counterintelligence estimate is normally prepared for the intelligence officer by the Chief of the Counterintelligence Branch, G2 Section. In preparing such an estimate the Counterintelligence Branch Chief must consider the entire range of enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities. He, therefore, must obtain detailed information from all available sources such as ASA, other branches within the G2 Section, other staff sections, air defense units, engineer elements, civil affairs and PSYOP units, MI elements, Air Force, etc. The counterintelligence estimate may be prepared in support of a single tactical operation or in support of a long-range, broad mission assigned to a unit. The format of a counterintelligence estimate may be found in appendix M.

8–16. Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet

Based upon the conclusions reached in the counterintelligence estimate, the counterintelligence measures worksheet is prepared or revised. This worksheet (fig. 8–1) is an essential aid in counterintelligence planning and is the basis for preparing counterintelligence plans, orders, and requests. It is designed to assist the intelligence staff officer in developing a comprehensive and detailed listing of defensive and offensive intelligence countermeasures required for a specific operation. It also includes the identification of units/agencies which are recommended for executing the countermeasures as well as appropriate staff coordination required.

8–17. Counterintelligence Plan

a. One of the problems of modern warfare is to deny knowledge of impending operations to the enemy. This problem is a result of varied and sophisticated intelligence collection means and battlefield surveillance capabilities available to the

UNIT:

Period covered: From _____   To; _____

(1) Phases or periods of operation	(2) SOP counter measures requiring emphasis	(3) Additional counter measures to be adopted	(4) Units/agencies responsible for execution of countermeasures										(5) Instructions, notes for future action, and staff coordination measures.

Figure 8–1. Counterintelligence measures worksheet.

enemy. The commander must, therefore, insure that all elements of his command contribute to the implementation of operational security measures which are designed to preserve the element of maximum surprise in the conduct and planning of tactical operations. Such measures are both defensive and offensive in nature and may range from the implementation of a simple security procedure to an entire cover and deception operation.

b. The intelligence officer's contribution to the commander's operational security principally consists of the formulation of the counterintelligence plan. It is a systematic listing of all intelligence countermeasures to be carried out by a command, indicating the units/agencies responsible for the execution of each task. It is prepared from the counterintelligence measures worksheet, and, when completed, becomes an appendix to the intelligence annex to the operation order or is included in paragraph 6 of the intelligence annex. The G2/S2 must continuously coordinate with G3/S3 on proposed intelligence countermeasures.

CHAPTER 9

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE

Section I. GENERAL

9-1. Purpose

This chapter provides the company commander with additional guidance in determining his intelligence requirements and in formulating means and methods for the collection of information and the dissemination of information and intelligence.

9-2. General

a. The scope of intelligence activities at the company level is much reduced from that at higher echelons. An urgent need does exist for the collection of information and the application of intelligence to the tactical plan or mission of the company.

b. The company commander must make the greatest possible use of the time and means available to him in order that collection of information and the use of resulting intelligence will fulfill the maximum number of his requirements. The company commander has a realistic and urgent responsibility to supply the information needed by the battalion S2. It is largely through the efforts of the individual companies that the battalion S2 is able to produce the intelligence necessary for the commander and the subordinate elements of the command.

c. The company commander, like the S2, is often unable to satisfy all of his requirements for information. This means that he must establish a working priority for his requirements after considering the mission of the company and the enemy situation as known at the time.

Section II. COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

9-3. General

The type and amount of intelligence required will vary with each situation, the knowledge previously acquired, and the terrain in the area of operation. It is a maxim that the company commander will never have all of the information of the enemy that he desires. It is also true that requirements as to type and detail of intelligence will vary with different missions. In every case, however, the company commander will rely upon the battalion S2 to furnish him with much of the intelligence necessary for planning his assigned mission.

9-4. Requirements for the Attack

a. In order to execute his attack order successfully, the company commander requires timely and accurate intelligence concerning the enemy's defense capability. In general, the commander will always require information on the enemy, weather, and terrain which will enable him to in-

fluence the outcome of the action through proper decisions relative to—

(1) Positioning of the reserve.

(2) Employment of weapons.

(a) Location.

(b) Type of fire.

(c) Priorities for fire support.

(3) Location of the company commander.

(4) Commitment of the reserve.

(5) Requests for support from higher headquarters.

(a) Fire support.

(b) Troop support.

b. During stability operations the company commander will require intelligence data concerning not only the traditional aspects of enemy, weather, and terrain, but also intelligence data oriented towards the sociological, political, and economic aspects of the population.

c. Intelligence is important to the company commander in the attack because knowledge of the manner in which the enemy is conducting his defense allows the commander to take a positive approach in influencing the action, enables him to maintain the initiative and exploit his own successes as well as enemy weaknesses, and it permits him to apply the force available at the most advantageous moment.

9-5. Requirements for the Defense

a. As in the attack, intelligence requirements for the conduct of a successful defense will vary. Generally, the following requirements will be given priority during the period prior to the enemy attack which can be anticipated in a defense situation:

(1) Locations of avenues of approach into the friendly position.

(2) Locations of obstacles.

(3) Locations and strengths of opposing enemy forces, including his reserves.

(4) Locations of enemy automatic weapons.

(5) Locations of likely enemy assembly areas.

(6) Weather forecasts and information.

b. As in the attack information or intelligence concerned with these items will enable the company commander to take a positive approach to influence the action and will enable him to exploit fully his own capabilities and the enemy weaknesses. (See chapter 4 for additional guidance.)

9-6. Intelligence Requirements for Other Actions

a. Withdrawal. A withdrawal, conducted during daylight or at night, poses definite intelligence requirements. One of the most important means of fulfilling these requirements is reconnaissance. The company commander must select routes to assigned or designated assembly areas; these routes should provide security from enemy observation and fire. Terrain and weather will play an important part in selection of routes. Security for a withdrawal begins with the inception of planning and continues until the movement is completed. Security must include both security for the force and security measures designed to deny the enemy knowledge of the withdrawal be-

fore, during, and frequently after the action is completed.

b. Company as a Security Force. Frequently the company will be designated as a security force for the next higher echelon or as a part of a larger security force for the division. Security forces are used to provide security, deception, and flexibility, and to add depth to the defense of a larger unit. Security forces should have greater mobility than the enemy, but a similar result may be achieved by use of deception, movement in darkness, and retention of the initiative in movement. The company commander continues to have the responsibility for rapidly passing back to the echelon controlling the security force all items of information/intelligence. Requirements will be focused on terrain, reconnaissance, and the effects of the weather as forecast.

c. Company as a Reserve Force.

(1) When a company is designated as the reserve or as part of a larger reserve unit, planning for employment in at least one, but usually several roles is necessitated. The company commander must use reconnaissance to ascertain the best utilization of terrain for each role in which his unit may be employed. Weather information and its effect on terrain must be weighed and studied. Enemy capabilities as they affect each role must be determined. Since the company is in reserve, the opportunity for using organic means to acquire information is limited or nonexistent. Requests must be made of the battalion S2 for the intelligence necessary to plan for the various missions anticipated.

(2) In reserve, the company commander will frequently be charged with an area security responsibility. As a general rule when increased dispersion is necessitated by the enemy's capability to employ nuclear weapons, the area security mission will require utilization of most, if not all, of the company's personnel. The security mission will necessitate the employment of some of the counterintelligence and security measures mentioned in chapter 8.

d. Other Actions. Regardless of mission or role, the company commander is responsible for the security of his unit. Insuring the security of a company while it is in movement presents many problems. All security measures which do not interfere with the accomplishment of the mission should be implemented. Security measures must be developed for each situation on an individual basis.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE MEANS AVAILABLE

9-7. General

The company commander must accomplish the S2 functions since he has no personnel whose primary duty is intelligence. With the urgent need for intelligence at this level, the company commander must organize his unit to provide for the handling of collected information and the dissemination of intelligence.

9-8. Organic Collecting Agencies

All subordinate elements of the company must be trained and prepared to function as collecting agencies. Available to the commander are his tactical elements (platoons), his organic supporting weapons observers, reconnaissance elements, personnel manning the company observation post, and finally, every individual of the company who can observe enemy activity or its effect. The main problem in transmitting the information available to the company commander, and through him to the battalion S2, is one of command emphasis on the training and conduct of personnel to insure that items of significant information are recognized and reported expeditiously to the commander.

9-9. Attached or Supporting Collection Agencies

The company commander should insure that personnel of attached or supporting units, such as forward observers of supporting artillery and personnel manning outposts in the company area of responsibility, report information of possible interest or significance to him for his consideration. In addition personnel of other supporting arms and reconnaissance elements from the next higher echelon which are attached or operating in the company area will provide significant intelligence data to the company commander.

9-10. The Company Commander's Intelligence Role

a. It is often incorrectly stated that the company does not produce intelligence. This statement is usually based on the function of the higher echelon S2 and his role in the production of intelligence for his commander, the staff, and subordinate elements. The company commander can and does analyze, collate, evaluate, and produce intelligence on a limited scale for the use of his company and its subordinate elements. This process is largely mental and instinctive, but it does encompass the elements associated with the production of intelligence. A requirement exists for designation of personnel and means of communication for receiving the information from the collection agencies. There must also be some means of recording information in the absence of the company commander. Once the company commander has established his "intelligence section" and insured the receipt of information from his collection agencies, his role then parallels that of the S2, i.e., analyzing items in the light of his mission and the known enemy capabilities. The company commander also has the responsibility, of insuring the uninterrupted flow of these items of information to the next higher echelon.

b. The company has no organic personnel designated for intelligence duties. It is necessary, therefore, that the company commander utilize personnel with other primary duties for intelligence purposes. An inspection of personnel assigned to company headquarters will result in the selection of several who will be available to function in an intelligence capacity on a part-time basis. Among such personnel are the executive officer, the first sergeant, communications sergeant, messenger, or radio operator. The main point is to insure that capable personnel are available to perform intelligence functions on an around-the-clock basis.

9-11. Dissemination

Equally as important as the receipt of information and production of intelligence is timely dissemination to personnel and units concerned with the use of these items. This requirement alone justifies the procedure of insuring that certain personnel are assigned intelligence duties. In addition to reporting (disseminating) information to the battalion S2, the company commander must keep his organic, subordinate, attached, and supporting elements informed.

Section IV. INTELLIGENCE AT LOWER LEVELS

9-12. General

At the level of units below company, intelligence is again reduced in scope, but it is equally important and will pose many of the same requirements that are present at the company level. A large portion of the intelligence used here is produced at company and higher levels and then disseminated to the platoon and squad. This results from the relatively small area of operations and the limited number of personnel involved. In the strictest sense of the word, at lower levels "information" is collected while "intelligence" emanates from higher levels.

9-13. Platoon Intelligence Requirements

As a major subordinate element of the company, the platoon comprises the main tactical echelon of the company. Needs will vary with the different types of platoons within the company, based on the mission, assignment, and capabilities of each. Platoon leaders will develop some intelligence information at their level for use of the platoon and squad. Care must be taken, however, that the company provides the broadest coverage and that information developed at platoon and squad level is viewed in its proper perspective. Platoon leaders must transmit expeditiously to company that information acquired. It must be recognized that the effective production of intelligence requires the participation of all elements of the command.

9-14. Squad Intelligence

As the lowest tactical entity of the company, the squad intelligence needs are commensurate with the mission assigned to the squad. Because of the small size of squads and the limitation of the area of knowledge, most of the squad's information requirements will be met by the higher level. Items produced at squad level are limited and also subject to distortion unless correlated with intelligence developed at company and higher level. It is the squad leader's responsibility to insure the receipt of intelligence from above and to disseminate it to each of the members of his squad. Equally important is the squad leader's responsibility for training the members of his squad in intelligence matters, particularly in the need for immediate and accurate reporting of all items of information (FM 21-75).

9-15. Company Patrols

In addition to patrols directed by the S2 at battalion level, the company commander will dispatch patrols to obtain needed information, to provide contact with adjacent units, and to serve as a screening or counterreconnaissance force. These patrols will report to the S2 for coordination purposes and since patrols are considered as an operation, coordination between the S3 and S2 must be effected. The S2 will include in his daily patrol plan those patrols which must be coordinated with higher and adjacent units. Company-directed patrols for the most part will consist of those patrols that the commander feels necessary to maintain contact between elements of the company, and between the company and adjacent units; those patrols necessary to provide warning and security to the company from enemy activity; and those patrols utilized for reconnaissance of importance to elements of the company, rather than to the company itself. Constant, aggressive, and thorough patrolling is a strong deterrent to enemy intelligence efforts.

CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, OR SPECIAL TYPE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

10-1. Introduction

a. The intelligence operations described in previous chapters are generally applicable to any military operation. However, certain aspects of intelligence operations receive increased emphasis depending upon the limitations and requirements of unusual characteristics in the operational environment.

b. Unusual characteristics in the operational environment are of two general types. One is concerned with special environmental conditions such as extremes of weather or terrain. The other pertains to the conduct of special type operations such as airborne, amphibious, airmobile, cover and deception, and psychological operations.

c. This chapter discusses intelligence aspects of

these unusual characteristics and provides references for more detailed coverage.

10-2. Use of Strategic Intelligence in Special Operations

Strategic intelligence is used extensively in planning for special operations, particularly those to be conducted in a distant area. Strategic intelligence used for this purpose is confirmed and supplemented by combat intelligence as soon as practicable. Strategic intelligence will be particularly helpful to combat units entering a theater or area for the first time. Strategic area studies prepared in advance, showing the locations and types of critical local installations, can be very helpful to tactical intelligence officers.

Section II. EXTREMES OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

10-3. General

a. Information concerning extreme characteristics of weather and terrain is a prerequisite to the initiation of an operation. In addition, the effects of these on both friendly and enemy courses must be considered.

b. Operations in extremes of weather and terrain affect intelligence operations by creating unique intelligence requirements and by generally impeding collection and dissemination of information and intelligence. Specific intelligence requirements and problems posed by extremes of weather and terrain are discussed in certain field manuals of the 31-series. Paragraphs 10-4 and 10-5 emphasize significant intelligence considerations.

10-4. Extremes in Weather

a. Provisions must be made for frequent weather forecasting and for rapid dissemination

of forecasts to the lowest echelons. Forecasts must include special items of particular significance to the military operation. Wind speed in northern operations is extremely important because of its use in determining the windchill factor. In mountain operations, storms of all types are a critical factor in the conduct of operations. Weather forecasts and forecasting capabilities must be responsive to these special conditions. Additional equipment or units may be required to meet the need.

b. Extremes in weather affect intelligence requirements concerning enemy capabilities. Specific information of the enemy's capabilities for moving cross-country and for living and fighting for prolonged periods in extreme weather is an essential intelligence requirement.

c. Preplanning is necessary to minimize the effects of weather extremes on intelligence collection efforts. Extremes of cold or heat affect the

operation of sensory devices; prolonged periods of reduced visibility limit the effectiveness of reconnaissance/surveillance and the effectiveness of visual and photographic capabilities; and sudden storms place limitations on all battlefield surveillance operations.

10-5. Extremes in Terrain

a. Extreme terrain features increase the magnitude of the effort required to collect needed information. Because of the extreme terrain variations, more detailed information is required for planning purposes. Jungle areas require close examination in order to penetrate the jungle cover;

mountainous regions limit observation, especially when the high ground cannot be occupied; and northern regions or deserts are conspicuous by their lack of easily identified and located terrain objects.

b. Generally, areas of extreme terrain lack accurate geodetic and map coverage. This creates a requirement for greater detail in the collection of terrain information.

c. Early examination and evaluation of the collection efforts required and prior planning and preparation will minimize collection problems during the conduct of the military operation.

Section III. SPECIAL TYPE OPERATIONS

10-6. Joint Airborne Operations

a. The production and dissemination of intelligence are influenced by the following characteristics of joint airborne operations:

(1) Planning is concurrent.

(2) Higher headquarters provide most of the information and intelligence for airborne units during the planning phase.

(3) Terrain analyses are more detailed. Special emphasis is placed upon the location of suitable drop zones and assault aircraft landing zones. These locations are developed by means of a point landing area study.

(4) Weather information must be broader in scope and more detailed; weather forecasts must be more frequent than for ground-based operations.

(5) Counterintelligence measures are stringent and rigidly enforced. However, intelligence disseminated to subordinate units is as extensive and detailed as practicable.

b. Certain enemy capabilities receive special emphasis. Examples of his capability to employ nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents, and airstrikes against the airborne force in the departure area, en route, and in the objective area; his armor capability; and his air defense capability (FM 57-1).

10-7. Airmobile Operations

a. *Initial Entry Into an Area of Operations.*

(1) Normal combat intelligence collecting, processing, and disseminating procedures suffice;

however, increased requirements exist for maps, weather forecasts, and up to date intelligence on enemy antiaircraft capabilities, with dissemination down to company level. Continuous 24-hour air reconnaissance is required. Airmobile operations are normally based on continuous offense with extensive requirements for rear area security, population controls, and heavy logistical support requirements. Therefore airmobile operations require simultaneous consideration of strategic and tactical information for defensive and offensive operations at all times by all echelons.

(2) Battalion and brigade commanders are forced in many instances to make their own intelligence estimates as described in chapter 9. This is due primarily to the rapid pace of decisionmaking in airmobile operations. The battalion and brigade S2 must develop a much broader concept of intelligence and prepare more detailed and comprehensive briefings for their commanders.

b. *Stable Base Area of Operations.*

(1) Intelligence requirements include terrain analyses of landing areas, detailed and frequent weather forecasts and accurate locations of enemy air defense installations.

(2) The determination of aerial avenues of approach and landing zones are major requirements. Normally, these requirements cannot be fully accomplished by ground reconnaissance. For areas immediately in front of the FEBA, information can be obtained from the units in contact. Visual (VR), SLAR, and aerial reconnaissance are employed in the objective area and in other areas beyond the capability of the units in contact (FM 57-35).

10-8. Amphibious Operations

a. Special considerations that affect intelligence requirements for amphibious operations include the following:

(1) Length of time elapsing between the initiation of planning and execution of the operaation.

(2) Dependence upon higher echelons for information and intelligence.

(3) Lack of opportunity for supplemental ground reconnaissance prior to initiation of landing.

(4) Difficulty in dissemination of intelligence during the initial stages of the landing.

b. Intelligence requirements that receive special emphasis include information about beaches and the terrain inland to the beachhead line, including obstacles and demolitions on beaches and under water; weather conditions; and current information of the enemy situation just prior to and during the assault landing (FM 31-12).

10-9. Unconventional Warfare

Intelligence requirements at all command levels concerned with the conduct of unconventional warfare operation encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence. Unconventional warfare includes the three related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion, conducted within hostile areas by predominately indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. The planning and conduct of unconventional warfare encompasses the entire spectrum of intelligence and counterintelligence activities at all command levels concerned with this type of warfare.

a. *Guerrilla Warfare.*

(1) Planning and conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence activities to support guerrilla forces are normally centralized in the J2 and J3 staff sections of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) of the unified or specified command. Once Unconventional Warfare Operational Areas (UWOA) have been designated by the theater commander (where guerrilla assets are known to be available), Army Special Forces operational detachments are infiltrated into these areas. To provide a focal point for planning and conducting unconventional warfare operations in these areas, Special Forces is given the primary task of organizing an area

command headquarters for integrating Special Forces operational detachments and the resistance forces. (See FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A for details.)

(2) Guerrilla forces conducting overt offensive operations in UWOA will be primarily interested in acquiring combat intelligence for use in their own operations. To this end, guerrillas normally will employ conventional information gathering techniques such as patrols, observation posts, and area and target site reconnaissance, supported in varying degrees by information from their auxiliary and underground forces. Correspondingly, the guerrilla forces must have a well-developed counterintelligence capability to prevent enemy security forces from penetrating the main guerrilla force organization by infiltrating informants or agents.

(3) Intelligence requirements in support of military objectives are dictated by the nature and scope of unconventional warfare operations to be conducted in the designated UWOA. They are primarily directed toward information which—

(a) Provides a thorough background knowledge of the UWOA area to include an intimate understanding of the population within the UWOA area and an evaluation of their resistance potential.

(b) Aids in determining political trends.

(c) Aids in determining enemy activities and capabilities.

(d) Supports guerrilla psychological operations.

(e) Supports the expansion of guerrilla operations.

(f) Provides weather data.

(4) The employment of guerrilla forces as intelligence collection agencies for commanders of theater and component forces is restricted by communication limitations and the nature of their collection effort to support their own operations. The security of guerrilla forces dictates restrictions on radio traffic and, consequently, the amount of intelligence that can be provided. This limitation notwithstanding, guerrilla forces are ideally suited to contribute to the theater intelligence effort—chiefly target acquisition, damage assessment, and enemy order of battle (FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A).

b. *Evasion and Escape.*

(1) Information and intelligence of the area of operations and enemy procedures and tech-

niques are required for an effective evasion and escape program.

(2) Information on the area of operations is collected using normal collection methods. Specific requirements include information on usable routes for escapees and evaders, cover and concealment, sources of water and subsistence, areas to be avoided, areas safe for use as removal areas, borders, and the attitude of the local population according to social, ethnic, religious, political, and economic groups, if possible.

(3) Requirements concerning enemy procedures and techniques in countering the evasion and escape operation are collected primarily by interrogation of knowledgeable prisoners of war, refugees, escapees, and evaders.

(4) Details on evasion and escape are discussed in FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A.

c. *Subversion.*

(1) Subversion consists of those actions designed to reduce the military, moral, political, economic, or psychological strength of any enemy. One of the objectives of indigenous underground resistance groups, in coordination with its guerrilla forces, is to attempt to undermine or overthrow a government or occupying power.

(2) The success or failure of the underground resistance movement to operate effectively in a hostile environment hinges largely on the effectiveness of its intelligence networks to provide the intelligence needed for planning and conducting subversion against the enemy government or occupying power. These intelligence networks must be sufficiently broad in scope to cover every facet of the society and government, including enemy military forces. Correspondingly, it must have a well-developed counterintelligence capability to prevent opposition security forces from penetrating vital operational elements of the underground.

(3) In view of the sensitive nature of such operations, military intelligence requirements levied on the resistance underground organization may be greatly circumscribed, in view of the need to communicate with underground leaders in utmost secrecy. Normally, this will be accomplished through the area command headquarters in the UWOA. However, channels of communication may be used. Notwithstanding these inherent limitations, an effective underground organization may be in a position to materially contribute to the theater intelligence effort by providing both strategic and tactical intelligence to further military objectives (FM 31-21A).

10-10. Tactical Cover and Deception

a. Tactical cover and deception plans (a G3 responsibility) are based on knowledge of the enemy's psychology and intelligence capabilities. To prepare a deception plan, information and intelligence on the following are necessary: enemy means of collecting information and the capabilities of these means; how the enemy processes information to include what he considers to be indications; at what enemy command level action is taken on the deception plan; and the personalities of the enemy intelligence officers and commanders who can be expected to act on the deception plan. This information and intelligence is derived in part from studies of enemy procedures and order of battle on enemy units that collect and process information.

b. To execute tactical cover and deception operations, it is essential to have intelligence on the progress of the operations and early warning of enemy suspicions that a deception operation is being used against him also is required. Such intelligence is produced by the use of normal collection means and special use of communications intelligence.

c. Part of any tactical cover and deception plan is the denial of certain information to the enemy. Security of cover and deception plans and operations are supported by the counterintelligence plan (para 8-17) which contains all required intelligence countermeasures. Information on every phase of tactical cover and deception plans and operations is disseminated on a need-to-know basis. To safeguard this information, special procedures such as restricted areas, security checks, special passes, and special handling of documents and equipment are established.

d. Communication-electronic cover and deception is of paramount importance to the success of tactical cover and deception operations. (FM 31-40 and FM 32-20). The EW/Cryptologic staff officer and the communications-electronics staff officer are capable of furnishing advice and assistance relative to communication-electronics aspects of all cover and deception operations.

e. Continued success of tactical cover and deception operations depends in part upon convincing the enemy that his failure was due to faulty evaluation of information. To accomplish this, the normal pattern of intelligence activities is

continued during and after tactical cover and deception operations. See FM 31–40 for further details.

10–11. Chemical and Biological Operations

a. The enemy's chemical and biological capabilities and the effects of chemical or biological agents on the area of operations are considered in analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and collection plans. The surprise with which chemical and biological agents can be used and the difficulties involved in the immediate detection of their use—but particularly verification of a biological attack—make indications of the use of these agents an important element in intelligence collection planning.

b. The unit counterintelligence plan includes measures to prevent the enemy from learning of our intentions regarding the use of chemical agents or other countermeasures.

c. Effective use of chemical munitions or agents requires information and intelligence on targets and target areas for attack by friendly forces. Predictions are required as to the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on the use of chemical munitions or agents. Specifically, information is required on the surface wind speed and direction, temperature, temperature gradient, relative humidity, and precipitation. In addition, data on the type of soil, surface contour, and vegetation and civilian population are needed (FM 3–10-series and TM 3–240).

10–12. Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations are conducted against enemy troops and hostile civilians in order to cause disaffection. They are directed toward friendly or neutral civilians in order to win their support or, as a minimum, to influence their behavior so as to preclude interference with U.S. tactical operations. In stability operations the bulk of the psychological operations effort is directed toward winning the support of the civilian populace.

b. Intelligence is required concerning the enemy and hostile and friendly civilians to identify susceptible groups and their potential vulnerabilities toward which psychological operations can be directed in order to cause surrender or disaffection.

c. Intelligence is required concerning personnel whose loyalties are unknown to help identify key individuals or groups and those social, ethnic, religious, political, or economic attitudes towards which we can direct our psychological operations in order to win their support.

d. For detailed psychological operations intelligence requirements see FM 33–1 and FM 33–5.

Section IV. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

10–13. Vulnerabilities of Intelligence Operations

a. The unimpeded performance of communications-electronic (COMMEL) systems is essential to the effective acquisition, processing, integration, and dissemination of information and intelligence. Degradation of COMMEL systems will seriously impair the command and control of a unit, and will have an adverse effect on the capability of the intelligence system to support tactical operations.

b. All radiations, intentional and unintentional, emanating from COMMEL equipment such as radios, radar, and electro-optical devices are susceptible to interception, direction-finding and analysis. The intelligence officer must be acutely aware of the threat posed by hostile collection and exploitation activities which seek to disrupt, deceive, harass, or otherwise interfere with the friendly command and control capability and its supporting intelligence activities. Any time electromagnetic energy is radiated, detection, interception, and subsequent exploitation can occur. The enemy's exploitation may be oriented toward SIGINT support of his fire and maneuver elements as well as intelligence operations. Or, it may be in the form of electronic warfare support measures, that is, providing supportive data for the conduct of electronic warfare operations. This vulnerability of COMMEL systems must be accepted as an inherent limitation and a necessary risk, since immunity from hostile interception is difficult to attain. Nonetheless, the consequences of such interception and exploitation can be reduced through the adoption and enforcement of the strictest signal security practices to minimize enemy exploitation and through the adoption of procedures to counter the effects of enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM) (FM 32–20 and FM 32–20A).

c. All frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum are conducive to electronic warfare (EW) operations. Thus any equipment in the chain of intelligence activities using radio, radar, and electro-optical technology can be affected by EW. The overall military use of this technology occurs in communication, target acquisition and tracking, battlefield surveillance, missile guidance, weapons fuzing and control systems as well as in navigational aids. It should be noted that despite its passive state, an infrared device—e.g., the airborne infrared sensor—can be subjected to countermeasures such as jamming by high-intensity light sources or deception through the deliberate placement of heat-dispersing objects.

10-14. Intelligence Officer's Role in EW

There are essentially two dimensions to the intelligence officer's responsibilities in the area of EW. First, he must plan for and consider the intelligence support of friendly EW operations. Second, as a user of the electromagnetic spectrum, he must be cognizant of the EW implications on those communication-electronic devices and systems which directly support his intelligence mission.

a. EW Implications. The intelligence officer must consider the potential vulnerability to hostile electronic countermeasures (ECM) of the communication-electronic means which provide the command with an integrated intelligence capability. He must insure the unimpeded interface of collection assets, communications media, and data processing resources. Their degradation through electronic jamming or deception will have an adverse effect on the accuracy, completeness and timeliness.

(1) In the case of jamming, the enemy seeks to deny the effective use of communication and sensor equipment by interfering with a single frequency or a range of frequencies. The specific effects on the victim equipment depend on the enemy's selection of jamming modes, their modulation by interference signals, and the kinds of communication-electronic equipment, both friendly and enemy. For additional detail refer to FM 24-18 and FM 32-20.

(2) Hostile electronic deception can have grave consequences on the integrity of the intelligence system. Imitative deception, which is the intrusion into our COMMEL system with signals which are purported to be our own, is directed at friendly COMMEL operators and their superiors who could ultimately fall prey to the deception. For example, the enemy, through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of electromagnetic energy can cause false target presentations on friendly sensors which distort the actual enemy situation. The likely result is a miscalculation of enemy capabilities. Similarly, hostile impostor traffic passed over radio nets carrying intelligence information could cause the production of faulty intelligence. Manipulation of the enemy's own electromagnetic radiations is a deceptive tool which is principally directed against friendly SIGINT, surveillance, and target acquisition resources. Such enemy electromagnetic deception includes the alteration or simulation of hostile emissions which friendly analysts could construe as bona fide intelligence. Since the enemy is ostensibly superimposing this type of deception over his own COMMEL system, he would ordinarily resort to it only if he has adequate intelligence regarding friendly SIGINT and other electronic surveillance capabilities. For details refer to FM 31-40 and FM 32-20.

(3) Since ECM impacts on the communication facilities and sensors employed by the intelligence officer, he has a vital stake in protecting these resources against the detrimental effects of such hostile actions. Specifically, he must coordinate with the G3/S3, the COMMEL Staff Officer, and the EW/Cryptologic Staff Officer to insure that personnel engaged in such COMMEL activities receive adequate training and supervision in SIGSEC procedures and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) techniques.

b. Intelligence Support of EW.

(1) The vulnerability of enemy communication-electronic systems to EW can be exploited by friendly forces to further the attainment of tactical objectives. In order to plan and conduct EW operations, intelligence data concerning the enemy force and the area of operations, if immediately or potentially significant to ECM, must be obtained from all available sources. Moreover, the enemy's jamming and deception potential must be ascertained for the development of effective ECCM circuitry and operational procedures. Tactical commanders also use this information for evaluating the effectiveness of friendly and enemy EW operations.

(2) The production of electronic warfare intelligence entails the interface between SIGINT, electronic warfare support measures (ESM), technical intelligence, and intelligence derived from all other sources. The intelligence officer

must coordinate the tasking of collection agencies (chap 4) for the following information requirements:

(a) Electronic order of battle.

(b) Type and purpose of COMMEL equipment.

(c) Type and purpose of EW equipment.

(d) Technical parameters of COMMEL and EW equipment (e.g., operating frequencies, power output, modulation type).

(e) Overall ECM capability.

(f) Communication procedures (notably for imitative deception).

(g) SIGINT capability (notably for manipulative deception).

(3) The overall implications of electronic countermeasures must be carefully considered by the intelligence officer in planning the command's EW operations. A significant responsibility of the intelligence officer in planning assistance is his coordination with the G3/S3, the EW/Cryptologic Staff Officer, and the EW/SIGINT operations officer of the EWE relative to the intelligence aspects of current and planned operations. For example, the possible tactical advantage that can be gained from jamming hostile radio transmissions must be weighed against the possible loss of COMINT. For further details regarding electronic warfare, see FM 32-20 and FM 32-20A.

CHAPTER 11

STABILITY OPERATIONS

11–1. General

a. Within the overall internal defense and internal development program of the United States, the U.S. Army conducts stability operations. These operations consist of providing training advice and assistance to the host country military and paramilitary ground forces, and are coordinated with other U.S. military services and government agencies.

b. A significant variation in the broad mission of stability operations intelligence is the fact that intelligence must, in addition to the three traditional considerations of the enemy (insurgent), weather, and terrain, concern itself with a fourth major consideration: the population. The population is both the primary target of the insurgent and a principal source of his intelligence, cover, personnel, and logistical support. Therefore, the civilian population as well as the insurgent military forces represent major intelligence targets.

c. Because of the board scope of stability operations, intelligence data base requirements differ greatly from those needed for conventional military operations. Stability operations require elaborately detailed intelligence concerning sociological, political, geographic, and economic information which may have significant impact on tactical operations. Commanders and intelligence staffs must give these requirements the same consideration given to the usual tactical requirements concerning the enemy military forces. Furthermore, collection of such data is vitally needed for the support of U.S. Army psychological and civil affairs operations which play a prominent role in stability operations.

d. The task of obtaining timely information in a stability operations environment is made more difficult by the nature of insurgent activities. The insurgent has the capability of changing units or organizations, blending with the populace, using border areas as sanctuaries, infiltrating host country forces, and living to a degree off the land, with little logistic support, particularly in the early phases of an insurgency. Although conventional intelligence techniques remain valid for stability operations, there must be some modifications made both in operational techniques and in the organization of intelligence units to fully exploit the peculiarities of the insurgent, the locale in which the insurgency is taking place, and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of friendly operations to that point. In stability operations, it is imperative that there be close and continuous liaison between all elements which directly or indirectly contribute to, or receive intelligence data necessary for, operational efficiency. During all phases of an insurgency, U.S. advisory and operational elements will work closely with host country intelligence resources to assure continuity of effort and management of intelligence assets commensurate with the mission. When possible, combined intelligence operations with the host country will be used to efficiently establish joint interrogation, document and material exploitation, and imagery interpretation centers. For detailed discussion of stability operations see FM 30–31, FM 30–31A, and FM 31–23.

11–2. Intelligence Collection

Intelligence collection during stability operations will differ somewhat from conventional collection since, due to the nature of the insurgent environment, intelligence requirements will be satisfied only by reporting information in minute detail and analyzing and scrutinizing all data reported in order to accurately and rapidly assess the insurgent capabilities and possible courses of action. Information must also be compiled on the local populace to determine if support or aid is being provided the insurgent and to properly assess the overall strength of the insurgent movement. The intelligence needs for stability operations, therefore, are based upon broader considerations of the insurgent situation and the operational environment. Based on all available information, an intelligence estimate for stability operations is developed based not only on traditional informa-

tion on the enemy, weather, and terrain, but also on the population, including nontactical data such as psychological, political, economic, and sociological factors relating to the insurgency. Groups or individuals which may be able to furnish information to friendly collection agencies include the following:

a. Leaders of dissident groups within the country.

b. Captured insurgents.

c. Defectors from the insurgent ranks.

d. Insurgents who have been recruited or who volunteered to work for friendly forces.

e. Businessmen, to include merchants, wholesalers, etc.

f. Medical personnel (doctors, nurses, pharmacists).

g. Bar owners.

h. Prostitutes.

i. Religious leaders of all groups within the country.

j. Political leaders of opposition parties.

k. Labor leaders.

11—3. Intelligence Activities

Intelligence activities conducted during stability operations are characterized by extensive coordination with host country intelligence agencies and participation in intelligence activities to include the following:

a. Penetration of the insurgent infrastructure.

b. Extensive interrogation of suspected insurgent elements.

c. Compilation and maintenance of extensive dossiers of individuals of intelligence interest.

d. Surveillance of individuals of intelligence interest.

e. Censorship activities appropriate to the degree of insurgent activity.

f. Complete documentation of civilians for easy identification.

g. Exploitation of captured documents and material.

h. Extensive counterintelligence, countersubversion, and countersabotage activity directed to-

ward elimination or neutralization of the insurgent threat.

i. Establishment of intelligence files.

11—4. Insurgent Intelligence System

Since the insurgent intelligence system utilizes overt, covert, and clandestine collection activities, the identification of these activities will require extensive data on the insurgent elements, to include mission, organization, strength, and where possible, location. Counterintelligence operations are complicated by the degree of reliance which must be placed on local organizations and individuals, the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population, and political considerations which will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence operations. Normally there will be a requirement for a larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in all phases of an insurgency than required in normal combat operations due to the many and varied intelligence requirements in the insurgency (FM 30–31).

11—5. Combat Intelligence

a. The role of the individual soldier is much broader in stability operations since the need for locating the insurgent and reporting information of intelligence value becomes of prime importance. Detailed collection plans are prepared at all echelons, and requirements for information entail requests for data of both tactical and nontactical significance. Patrolling becomes of paramount importance during insurgent operations since patrols provide a basis for reporting both positive and negative information on insurgent activities. Effective ground surveillance and reconnaissance become particularly difficult in an insurgency since friendly units seldom fight in the traditional manner, with flank support, and are more apt to be employed in relative isolation. Airborne Infantry Ranger Company elements will be of particular value in an insurgent environment in providing detailed information on remote portions of the area of interest. Special forces units, located astride lines of communication (LOC) or near suspected insurgent base areas, will also be constant sources of current information of intelligence value.

b. In addition to providing intelligence data of a conventional nature, friendly forces must also be alert for indirect evidence(s) of insurgent

activity within the area of operations. These include:

(1) Built-up areas not recorded on maps.

(2) Abandonment of villages, food producing areas, or equipment.

(3) Civilian activity in isolated areas of the country.

(4) Areas being cleared of foliage for no apparent reason.

(5) Unexplained movement of people from one area to another.

(6) Abnormal traffic on roads, paths, or waterways.

(7) Roads or paths constructed in relatively remote areas of the country.

(8) Unidentified activity detected by sensor devices, particularly during the hours of darkness.

c. During stability operations, tactical operations are oriented on locating insurgent elements rather than the seizure of terrain. Once the insurgent element has been located and neutralized, friendly elements can extend their control into the area. Precautions, therefore, must be taken to avoid early detection of friendly forces by either the insurgent element itself or by sympathizers who may signal the approach of friendly forces. Adequate safeguards must be taken to insure that personnel in the area of operations, to include women or children, are provided with no indication of the friendly courses of action.

d. Prisoners should be taken whenever possible, and every opportunity should be given the insurgent to surrender or defect. Psychological operations should include themes which encourage surrender or defection. The success of such a plan depends on the treatment provided insurgents who join the government side. Reasonable treatment normally will generate additional defections —particularly when immediate exploitation is made by the capturing unit.

e. Interrogation of returnees, prisoners of war, and other persons detained play an important role in the determination of the capabilities, organizations, outside support, and locations of insurgent elements. The basic principles for handling prisoners of war and techniques used in the interrogation are valid for stability operations except that in the case of an insurgency, the interrogator will be faced with the problem of interrogating not only captured military personnel but also friendly, hostile, or suspect civilians located within the area of operations. Interrogations taking place during stability operations also dictate that the interrogator have a detailed familiarity with the military and political organization of the insurgent elements and a complete and detailed knowledge of the area of operations. Handling of prisoners of war is governed by the guidelines outlined in the Geneva Conventions (FM 27-10). All prisoners, whether they be military insurgents, returnees, political cadre, suspects, or deserters, should be treated in a firm but fair manner to insure maximum exploitation.

f. Another valuable source of information is the person who has travelled through or has worked in an area known or suspected to be a hiding place for insurgent elements. Woodcutters, farmers, nomads, or other individuals who have been conscripted and have been forced to work for the insurgents, may provide invaluable information on order of battle, terrain, capabilities, caches, base camp locations, or other intelligence information.

g. Funds should be made available to reward informants and other persons providing valuable intelligence information. The use of such funds, however, must be controlled because, although it encourages reporting, it may also encourage the reporting of false or fabricated information by persons motivated solely by the prospect of either material gain or to misinform. One method of preventing this is to provide additional rewards to persons providing information which results in tactical success and to withhold payment from persons proved to have reported fabricated or deliberately falsified information.

h. Information on known insurgents should be distributed as widely as possible consistent with security requirements. Suitable rewards can also be established for information leading to their capture or death.

i. Maximum use should be made of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance throughout all phases of an insurgency. Aerial imagery can provide tactical commanders and patrol leaders with updated imagery on specific areas. Aerial surveillance can provide a continuous day-night capability and can often assist in locating insurgent base camps, gun positions, etc., and direct forces or fire to destroy them. Visual surveillance also achieves confirmation of certain terrain information and when integrated with other imagery. The effectiveness of visual observation gener-

ally increases as pilot and observer perform repetitive search of a specific area. By observing the same topography, the same manmade objects contained there, and the same activities which take place day after day, observer personnel will more readily detect changes which may indicate insurgent activity.

j. Intelligence collection operations involving human sources are highly sensitive and demand that they be conducted by specially trained intelligence personnel. Such operations are usually highly centralized with tight control exercised to protect both the operations and sources involved. Information of a tactical nature is normally passed to the area tactical commander whose intelligence staff must evaluate it not only in the light of other information available but also based on the source reliability rating given to the original source reporting the information. The tactical commander is responsible for providing the reporting unit with an evaluation of the report and furnish data regarding the results of combat response taken based on the information furnished. This will greatly assist the reporting unit's assessment of the source and its conduct of future intelligence collection operations involving this source. For additional information see FM 30-31A.

11-6. Counterintelligence

a. Since stability operations are basically aimed at the restoration of internal security in the area of operations, they demand a vigorous and coordinated counterintelligence effort. All intelligence collection efforts are usually complicated by a highly effective insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence effort. Liaison and exchange of information between both military and civilian counterintelligence agencies and related agencies, such as police, are essential to the success of the counterintelligence effort (FM 30-17, FM 30-31, and FM 30-31A).

b. Many counterintelligence efforts are defensive in nature and are aimed at the protection of installations, personnel, and information from espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence measures which may be employed are the following:

(1) Maintenance of files on organizations,

location, and individuals of counterintelligence interest, to include the enemy infrastructure.

(2) Background investigations and records checks on persons in sensitive positions and those whose loyalty is questionable.

(3) Indoctrination of personnel in all fields of security.

(4) Inspection of the internal security of installations and units.

(5) Movement control measures to include identification systems used to minimize the possibility of insurgents gaining access to areas in the proximity of, or within installations; curfews; travel restrictions; and coordination of search procedures in the installation with military police elements.

(6) Raids on suspected insurgent meeting and hiding places to include cordon operations.

(7) Coordination of censorship activities with those staff elements or units given this primary responsibility.

(8) Debriefing of selected personnel, friendly and hostile, to include combat patrols or other elements which may unwittingly possess information of counterintelligence interest.

(9) Coordination with military police elements concerning control of black marketable material which could aid insurgent forces, such as maps, batteries, communication wire, medical supplies, food, etc.

(10) Investigations of terrorist or sabotage incidents in conjunction with EOD, Military Police, and technical intelligence personnel in an attempt to identify the terrorists and saboteurs.

c. Counterintelligence operations must place great emphasis on offensive operations against the insurgent infrastructure so that it can be identified, neutralized and its effectiveness destroyed. One of the significant variations to the overall collection program and the selection of collection agencies in stability operations is the heavy reliance on police, security, and counterintelligence units and agencies. As a result of the subversive nature of an insurgency, these agencies which are normally charged with the conduct of countersubversion operations, have the best capability to satisfy a wide range of high-priority intelligence requirements.

CHAPTER 12

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Section I. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

12-1. General

Intelligence training, including counterintelligence training, is given to all personnel. Personnel whose primary duties are concerned with intelligence are given additional training appropriate to their assignments.

12-2. Conduct of Intelligence Training

a. Intelligence training is integrated with other training (app P) except for specialized subjects and orientation. It is not conducted as a separate activity distinct from all other training.

b. Intelligence training emphasizes speed of collection and processing of information and the extension of collection activities to the depth of the unit's area of interest. It should constantly stress proper security practices. When appropriate, this training should be supplemented by additional hours of specialized instruction in stability operations. Army Subject Schedule 30-9 provides uniform guidance in the conduct of combat intelligence training in all components of the Army.

c. In training exercises, units should be provided with the intelligence means normally required during combat operations. Realistic training situations requiring the use of these means should be provided.

12-3. Responsibilities

a. All commanders are responsible for the intelligence training of their units. The operations officer has primary responsibility for matters pertaining to overall training of the command. All staff officers are responsible for the intelligence training of their staff sections.

b. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the operations officer, exercises staff supervision over intelligence training within the command.

He prepares the intelligence training program, conducts intelligence schools, supervises intelligence training, conducts tests, and assists lower units in obtaining training aids and qualified instructors. He informs the operations officers of the time needed for intelligence training and requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors. Close coordination between the intelligence officer and other members of the staff helps insure the integration of intelligence training with other training.

c. Unit training in reconnaissance and the collection of information is planned and supervised by the intelligence officer. Orders directing unit intelligence training are issued by the operations officer in the name of the commander.

12-4. Specialized Intelligence Instructional Methods

a. The methods of instruction prescribed by FM 21-6 are applicable to specialized intelligence training. In most cases, specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralizing instruction.

b. A system of intelligence schools within the command helps establish standard practices throughout the command:

(1) A theater-level intelligence school should be established for instruction of all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Instruction should be area oriented and should interpret the effects of conditions peculiar to the command and the area of operations on intelligence functions and procedures.

(2) Division-level schools should be established for instruction of all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Subordinate units conduct intelligence schools to train their regularly assigned intelli-

gence personnel and those of their subordinate units. These schools are conducted by unit intelligence officers, with the assistance and under the supervision of the intelligence officer of the division or comparable unit. Preferably, instructors should have attended the school established at the next higher level.

c. Training is not concluded with the completion of the division-level an subordinate intelligence schools; rather it is conducted on a continuous basis and is perfected by the integration with on-the-job and other training.

12–5. Intelligence Training and Maneuvers

a. Intelligence play in maneuvers should be designed to furnish realistic training in every aspect of combat intelligence. The use of Aggressor as a maneuver enemy improves realism and helps make commanders, staffs, and troops conscious of the enemy as a real opposing force.

b. Intelligence measures used in maneuvers include aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, ground reconnaissance, use of sensor devices, interrogation of PW and other detainees, debriefing of refugees, acquisition and exploitation of enemy documents and material, safeguarding military information, use of camouflage and camouflage discipline, restrictions on the use of communications, identification of aircraft, radiological monitoring, reporting of nuclear bursts, detecting and reporting chemical and biological attacks, preparation and distribution of photographs as supplements to maps, and the requisition and distribution of maps.

c. Intelligence training should include training individuals to understand weather elements and to effectively use weather information. The effects of weather upon tactical operations, personnel, weapons, equipment, terrain, and movement should be emphasized. Particular emphasis should be given to training the individual soldier in the timely, accurate, and factual reporting of information.

d. Additionally, training should emphasize intelligence operations during all phases of stability operations to include coordination and liaison with host country intelligence resources and the collection and interpretation of political, economic, and sociological data.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

12–6. Section SOP

The intelligence officer prepares the SOP for the routine activities of the intelligence section. The format and content of the SOP will depend upon the level of command, the nature of the operations, and the desires of the intelligence officer (FM 101–5).

12–7. Command SOP

The intelligence officer usually prepares that portion of the command SOP that pertains to intelligence activities. A form for a command SOP is contained in FM 101–5. An example of a division SOP is contained in FM 61–100. Intelligence entries therein can be used as a guide in the preparation of the intelligence portion of a command SOP. In order to insure uniformity throughout the command, the intelligence portion of the command SOP should standardize methods for directing the collection effort, and prescribe dissemination and reporting format and procedures. The intelligence officer may select the SOP of one subordinate intelligence section as a model SOP for all subordinate units at the same echelon. For example, the division G2 may select the SOP of one brigade and direct that this SOP be adopted by all other brigades of the division.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A-1. Field Manuals (FM)

1-15	Divisional Aviation Battalion and Group.
1-100	Army Aviation Utilization.
3-10	Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
(C) FM 3-10B	Employment of Chemical Agents (U).
3-12	Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
5-20	Camouflage.
5-30	Engineer Intelligence.
6-15	Artillery Meteorology.
6-20-1	Field Artillery Tactics.
6-121	Field Artillery Target Acquisition.
8-10	Medical Service, Theater of Operations.
11-40	Signal Corps Pictorial Operations.
17-30	The Armored Brigade.
17-36	Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units.
17-37	The Air Cavalry Squadron.
19-1	Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.
19-4	Military Police Support, Theater of Operations.
19-30	Physical Security.
19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
20-60	Battlefield Illumination.
21-5	Military Training Management.
21-6	Techniques of Military Instruction.
21-26	Map Reading.
21-30	Military Symbols.
21-31	Topographic Symbols.
21-40	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense.
21-75	Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.
21-76	Survival, Evasion and Escape.
(S) 21-77A	Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U).
30-9	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
30-10	Terrain Intelligence.
(C) 30-10A	Special Applications of Terrain Intelligence (U).
30-15	Intelligence Interrogation.
30-16	Technical Intelligence.
30-17	Counterintelligence Operations.
(C) 30-17A	Counterintelligence Special Operations (U).
30-20	Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army.
30-28	Armed Forces Censorship.
30-31	Stability Operations-Intelligence.
(S) 30-31A	Stability Operations-Intelligence Collection (U).
30-102	Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.
30-103	Aggressor Order of Battle Book.
30-104	Handbook on Aggressor Insurgent War.

31–2 (TEST)	Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation—(STANO) Doctrinal Guidance.
31–10	Denial Operations and Barriers.
31–11	Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.
31–12	Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force).
31–16	Counterguerrilla Operations.
31–18	Long-Range Reconnaissance Ranger Company.
31–20	Special Forces Operational Techniques.
(C) 31–20A	Special Forces Operational Techniques (U).
31–21	Special Forces Operations.
(S) 31–21A	Special Forces Operations (U).
31–22	U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces.
(C) 31–22A	U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (U).
31–23	Stability Operations U.S. Army Doctrine.
31–35	Jungle Operations.
(C) 31–40	Tactical Cover and Deception (U).
(C) 32–5	Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
(S) 32–10	United States Army Security Agency in Support of Tactical Operations (U).
(C) 32–20	Electronic Warfare (Ground Based) (U).
(S) 32–20A	Electronic Warfare (Ground Based) (U).
33–1	Psychological Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine.
33–5	Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
41–10	Civil Affairs Operations.
44–1	U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment.
45–20	Civil Censorship.
45–25	Field Press Censorship.
55–8	Transportation Intelligence.
57–1	U.S. Army/U.S. Air Force Doctrine for Airborne Operations.
57–35	Airmobile Operations.
61–100	The Division.
100–5	Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
100–10	Combat Service Support.
100–15	Larger Units Theater Army—Corps.
(C) 100–20	Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) (U).
101–5	SOFM, Staff Organization and Procedures.
101–10–series	SOFM, Organization, Technical and Logistical Data.
101–31–series	SOFM, Nuclear Weapons Employment.
105–5	Maneuver Control.

A–2. Technical Manuals (TM)

3–210	Fallout Prediction.
3–215	Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents.
3–216	Military Biology and Biological Agents.
3–220	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination.
3–240	Field Behavior of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents.
5–248	Foreign Maps.
5–545	Geology
30–245	Image Interpretation Handbook.
30–246	Tactical Interpretation of Air Photos.

A–3. Army Regulations (AR)

(C) 10–122	United States Army Security Agency (U).
95–1	Army Aviation—General Provisions.

190–25	Captured, Missing or Detained U.S. Army Personnel Administration, Return, and Processing.
310–25	Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title AD).
310–50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
340–1	Records Management—Programs, Policies and Procedures.
350–30	Code of Conduct.
350–225	Survival, Evasion, and Escape Training.
360–65	Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship in Combat Areas.
380–5	Safeguarding Defense Information.
380–83	Civil Censorship.
380–200	Armed Forces Censorship.
380–235	Enemy PW and Civilian Internee Communications Censorship.
(C) 381–101	Employment, Utilization, and Special Administration of Counterintelligence and Area Intelligence Personnel (U).
381–115	Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.
604–5	Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material.
604–10	Military Personnel Security Clearance.

A–4. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

108–1	Index of Army Motion Pictures and Releateed Audio-Visual Aids.
310-series	Military Publications Indexes.

A–5. Miscellaneous Publications

JCS Pub 1	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
JCS Pub 2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
JCS Pub 12	Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations.
ASubjSchd 30–9	Combat Intelligence.
ASubjSchd 30–40	Order of Battle Personnel.
STANAG 2008 SEASTAG 2008 SOLOG 5R2	Bombing, Shelling and Mortaring Reports.
STANAG 2014 SEASTAG 2014 SOLOG 17R	Operation Orders, and Administrative/Logistic Orders.
STANAG 2020 SEASTAG 2020 SOLOG 16R	Operational Situation Reports.
STANAG 2022 SEASTAG 2022 SOLOG 2R2	Intelligence Reports.
STANAG 2029 SEASTAG 2029 SOLOG 34R	Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas and Boundaries.
STANAG 2033 SOLOG 69	Interrogation of Prisoners of War.
STANAG 2073	NATO Intelligence Subject Code.
STANAG 2077 SOLOG 109	Enemy Order of Battle Records for Combat Intelligence.
STANAG 2084 SEASTAG 2084 SOLOG 94	Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment.
STANAG 2097 SOLOG 90	Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment. Intelligence Annex to Operations Orders.

STANAG 2103	Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radioactive Fallout and Biological and
SOLOG 123	Chemical Attacks.
STANAG 2118	Intelligence Estimate.
SEASTAG 2118	
STANAG 2134	Offensive Air Support Operations.
STANAG 3377	Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms.
SEASTAG 3377	

APPENDIX B

THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

B–1. General

An analysis of the area of operations is a study to determine the effects of the area of operations on the general courses of action that the enemy and friendly forces may adopt. It includes consideration of climatic or weather conditions, relief and drainage systems, vegetation, surface materials, manmade features, military aspects of the area, observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, air avenues of approach, and other effects of the area on combat service support.

B–2. Sources of Information

a. Analyses of the area of operations from other headquarters and studies prepared by higher headquarters are valuable source materials in the preparation of a current analysis of the area of operations. The conclusion of analyses prepared by higher headquarters is usually not directly applicable to a subordinate unit. Considerations that are important to the higher commander's mission are not necessarily applicable at the subordinate headquarters.

b. Technical reports, maps and imagery, and reports of ground and aerial reconnaissance are valuable as sources of information in the preparation of an analysis of the area of operations.

c. Other staff officers assist in the preparation of the analysis by furnishing specialized information.

(1) At all echelons of command, the engineer produces and distributes terrain studies, including soil analyses and technical interpretation of terrain characteristics of military significance; included are obstacles, routes, avenues of approach, cover and concealment, and trafficability.

(2) At field army and at comparable and higher headquarters, the preparation of intelligence studies of manmade features of the area of operations is the responsibility of the engineer staff officer for other than communications facilities.

(3) Weather information of both a general and a special nature is provided by the staff weather officer.

(4) Information and analyses of political, economic, sociological, and psychological aspects of the civil community are obtained from the civil-military operations officer (CMO).

B–3. Contents of the Analysis

a. An annotated example of a written analysis of the area of operations is contained in FM 101–5.

b. Additional guidance is provided in subsequent paragraphs, the titles of which correspond to selected paragraphs and subparagraphs of the example.

B–4. Climatic or Weather Conditions

a. The paragraph of the analysis concerning climatic or weather conditions lists the items of weather information that have military significance. Throughout the remainder of the analysis, the weather information is interpreted as to its operational effects. For example, winds at low temperatures are interpreted in terms of the windchill factor and the resulting effects on operations, such as an attack or defense which must face the prevailing winds, or the use of open or closed storage facilities.

b. Light data always are given as they are necessary for the selection of courses of action and the conduct of military activities.

(1) The beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of enough light for limited visibility. The beginning of morning civil twilight (BMCT) and the end of evening civil twilight (EECT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of adequate light for large-scale operations.

(2) Moon phases and other phenomena such as atmospheric conditions and star brilliance, in-

fluence night operations. During full moonlight, conditions of visibility sometimes approach those of daylight. Such conditions are anticipated as they influence friendly and enemy courses of action such as attacks, patrolling, and changes in dispositions at night.

B-5. Relief and Drainage System

Drainage and ridge lines are the basic elements in studying terrain as they clearly indicate the general shape of the ground. A complete study of the relief and drainage includes detailed information about slope, configuration, elevation of ground forms, and depth, width, tide data, and conditions of banks and bottoms of streams and rivers. These items can be portrayed graphically on maps by various methods.

B-6. Vegetation

Vegetation studies are best presented in the form of tinted, or otherwise marked, overlays. Considerations include locations of trees, diameters of trunks, density, ground cover or canopy, undergrowth, and types of natural and cultivated vegetation of nonwooded areas.

B-7. Surface Materials

These data, if extensive, are best presented in colored or marked overlays. In preparing these data, soil maps made by the agricultural services of various countries are particularly valuable. The information contained in soil maps can frequently be translated into a trafficability map and a map of areas susceptible to high radiation intensities of induced radioactivity. A trafficability map, based on weather forecasts, and colored or marked to indicate degrees of trafficability, effectively shows areas suitable for cross-country movement.

B-8. Manmade Features

Militarily manmade features include roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, mines, towns, industrial areas, and fortifications. These features, if extensive, are best presented on a map or marked overlays.

B-9. Additional Characteristics

Only those characteristics (e.g., sociology, politics, economics, transportation, manpower, etc.) which influence the choice of a course of action by either force are included. Lengthy data are presented in annexes, preferably in tabular form.

B-10. Military Aspects of the Area

This paragraph analyzes the facts listed in the "General Description of the Area" paragraph and determines their influence on the tactical and combat service support factors that are considered in the selection of a course of action by either force. In the analysis of these factors, the effects of and on nuclear fires, chemical and biological agents, and important devices and equipment used in implementing courses of action are integrated as appropriate. The tactical aspects of observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, avenues of approach, and the combat service aspects are discussed in the following paragraphs.

B-11. Observation and Fire

a. Observation depends on conditions of weather and terrain which permit a force to locate the enemy either visually or through the use of surveillance devices. The highest terrain in an area usually provides the best observation. The increased use of equipment with line-of-sight characteristics requires the availability of suitable terrain features for sighting purposes. The capability of employing organic aerial platforms reduces the requirement to use such terrain. Smoke clouds from materials (vegetation and buildings) set on fire by thermal effects of nuclear weapons obstruct visual and some types of electronic observation. Dust clouds caused by nuclear blast reduce both visual and electronic observation. Other factors that limit or deny observation include smoke, fog, precipitation, darkness, and tall vegetation (to include woods and jungle canopy).

b. Fire, as used in the analysis of the area of operations, includes the field of fire of the weapon and characteristics of weapons delivery systems affected by weather and terrain. For example, gusty surface winds affect the use of free rockets. High, irregular terrain features or the absence of overhead mass clearance, may limit the field of fire weapons. A field of fire is an area that weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best observation does not always guarantee the best field of fire. An ideal field of fire for flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can be seen and on which he has no protection from the fire of such weapons.

B–12. Concealment and Cover

a. Concealment is protection from observation and may be provided by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, darkness, smoke, dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling snow.

b. Cover is protection from the effects of direct and indirect fires and is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, riverbanks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Defiladed areas which provide protection against nonnuclear weapons do not necessarily protect against effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a terrain mass are very steep, blast will affect personnel and materiel on the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all but the most rugged terrain. When a nuclear weapon is fired over a deep valley, or the valley axis points toward ground zero, the blast effects may be channelized and increase damage. Irregular terrain provides some cover from thermal radiation of nuclear fires. Few buildings are sufficiently strong to withstand all effects of blast and, if not damaged or destroyed by blast, may be damaged by thermal radiation. Foxholes, bunkers, and tunnel type shelters offer the simplest forms of effective cover.

c. Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attack and the defense. If troops can move forward under the concealment of woods, fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater. If troops can move protected from the enemy's fire by ditches, embankments, or walls, the attack will be more effective. In a defensive situation friendly forces seek to defend in an area which offers both cover and concealment but does not provide covered approaches for the enemy.

d. The mobility of the command is considered in determining available cover and concealment. Cover and concealment are desirable during troop movements by any means. Routes which afford good cover and concealment reduce the vulnerability of a moving force to detection and to destruction by fire.

B–13. Obstacles

a. An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Natural obstacles include rivers, streams, canals lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes, dense woods, jungles, deserts, mountains, cities, and certain types of unstable soil. Artificial obstacles are works of construction and destruction executed to stop or impede military movement. They include minefields, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatis, roadblocks, deliberately flooded areas, areas contaminated with chemical and biological agents, extensive rubble, forest fires, tree blowdown, and areas contaminated with residual nuclear radiation.

b. Obstacles to be fully effective must be covered by observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may channelize an attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and are suitable for nuclear attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy, forcing him into concentrations that tend to occur while crossing obstacles, and holding the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense. Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance may give the attacker flank protection. However, parallel obstacles may interfere with lateral movement and coordination.

c. Consideration of obstacles is influenced by the mission of the command. In the defense the intelligence officer identifies as obstacles those features of the terrain which stop, impede, or divert military movement into, out of, or within the area encompassed by the FEBA, lateral boundaries and the rear boundary (prescribed or assumed). In the attack he considers the obstacles from the line of departure to the objective (both inclusive), bounded laterally by the assigned or assumed operational zone.

B–14. Key Terrain

a. A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to either opposing force. Key terrain features are selected to indicate areas and localities whose seizure or control must be considered in formulating and selecting courses of action. The selection is based on the mission of the command. Key terrain is selected which if in our control would give us a marked advantage in the accomplishment of our mission, or which if seized or controlled by the enemy would hinder materially the accomplishment of our mission. For example, a bridge over an unfordable river may give access to the opposite shore without requiring an assault crossing. Control of a road or rail center may reduce the enemy's ability to resist our advance. A

level clearing in rough terrain may be the only accessible landing field for airmobile operations. Key terrain varies with the level of command. For example, to an army commander, a large city may afford marked advantages as a communications center, but to a division commander, the high ground which dominates the city may be more important, and the city itself may be an obstacle. Obstacles are rarely key terrain features. The high ground dominating a river, rather than the river itself, is usually the key terrain feature for the lower unit commander. An exception is an obstacle, such as a built-up area, which is assigned as an objective to a force; the obstacle then becomes key terrain to the force ordered to capture it.

b. Key terrain, in addition to influencing the mission accomplishment, is also highly significant in applying combat power. Control is not insured only by seizure and occupation. Seizure and physical occupancy of key terrain features, by relatively large forces may not be desirable. Destructive fires delivered by long-range means can destroy forces physically occupying key terrain. The commander then controls key terrain to avoid destruction of his force while keeping the enemy from gaining control. Control includes maneuver, surveillance, security, and use of fires. Terrain which permits or denies maneuver may be key terrain. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the capability for applying combat power and at the same time forcing the enemy into areas which result in reduction of his ability to apply his combat power. Terrain which permits this also may be key terrain. The effect of terrain on maneuver, application of combat power, and preservation of force integrity are considerations in selecting key terrain, its control, and tactical use.

c. In the offense, key terrain are usually forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. However, terrain features in adjacent sectors may be key terrain if their control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the accomplishment of the mission. If the mission is to destroy enemy forces, terrain may be selected whose seizure helps insure the required destruction. Terrain which gives the enemy effective observation along an axis of advance to be used by the friendly forces may be key terrain if the enemy must be denied its possession or control. Key terrain may be within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For ex-

ample, if the enemy can attack before our attack, the control of this terrain is essential because it affords us a marked advantage. Thus, it is a key terrain feature.

d. In the defense, key terrain are usually within the assigned sector and within or behind the selected defensive area. Some examples of key terrain are—

(1) Terrain which gives good observation over avenues of approach to and into the defensive position.

(2) Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.

(3) Important communication centers which affect command communications, and the use of reserves.

e. Key terrain also may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. For example, a terrain feature forward of the edge of the battle area or in an adjacent sector which gives the enemy good observation over defended localities, communication routes, or enemy avenues of approach, is key terrain when active measures must be taken to reduce the enemy advantage. The defender may move his position forward to include the feature or take action to minimize the enemy advantage by the use of fire, chemicals, smoke, concealment, and cover.

B-15. Avenues of Approach

a. An avenue of approach is a route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide some ease of movement and enough width for dispersion of a force of a sufficient size to affect significantly the outcome of the operation. The division G2 usually considers avenues of approach adequate for at least the type brigade of the particular division. The corps and higher G2 usually consider avenues of approach adequate for at least a division. In determining the width of dispersion, consideration is given to the deployment patterns, mobility means, and the area required for maneuver to prevent presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.

b. A valley approach gives the advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment from enemy observation. A valley approach includes the floor of the valley, the slopes of the ridges, and the military crests. Control of the military crests on each side of the valley is

essential. In a valley approach, the best avenue of approach is that which offers the best observation, cross-country trafficability, road net, fields of fire, concealment and cover, and dispersion. In evaluating the use of a deep valley approach, the possible intensification of nuclear effects and resulting greater casualties on the valley floor are considered. At times, the best avenue may be along the slopes of a ridge below the military crests, rather than along the valley floor.

c. The use of a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the ridge, the size and deployment of the units involved, and the distance to the elevation of adjacent ridges. A ridge approach usually has the advantage of good observation. However, there may be little protection from enemy fire on the ridge. The best avenue of approach in a ridge approach is often slightly below the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it.

B-16. Air Avenues of Approach

a. An air avenue of approach is a route which provides a suitable flight path for a particular number of aircraft to reach a drop or landing zone. In selecting air avenues of approach the major considerations are adequate airspace for rapid movement of the aircraft to landing or drop zones, ground observation, easily recognized terrain features, terrain corridors, and length of the flight path.

b. In selecting avenues of approach for tactical helicopter operations, the major concern is concealment. Routes selected should be in defilade and be easy to follow which will assist in navigation at low altitudes. Ridge lines are crossed as infrequently as possible to reduce exposure time to radar detection. Steep defiles or canyons are avoided, especially when there is an appreciable amount of surface wind which can cause momentary loss of aircraft control due to downdrafts. Heavily forested and swampy areas provide good routes as ground troops have little opportunity to see, or to take under fire, the helicopters passing overhead at tree-top level. Low altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic wave from aircraft and decrease the distance at which the sound can be detected. It also hampers determination of the direction of the noise source by ground observers. Aviation officers assist in evaluating the effect of air density, altitude, and visibility on selected avenues of approach.

B-17. Combat Service Support Aspects

a. The analyses of the facts and subconclusions developed in the preceding parts of the analysis are used as a basis for further studies of effects of combat service support activities on friendly and enemy units. In this paragraph the effects of the characteristics of the area on combat service support that influence the selection of a course of action by either force are determined.

b. In studying the influence of the area, consideration is given to effects on matters such as availability of adequate routes for lines of communication, facilities for maintenance and storage, construction resources, public health situation, required shelter for administrative facilities, availability of labor, maintenance of discipline, law and order, and control of refugees.

B-18. Effects of Characteristics of the Area

This paragraph contains the conclusions reached on the basis of the facts and subconclusions previously developed. The effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on each significant course of action of which the enemy is physically capable of adopting and which, if adopted, could adversely affect the accomplishment of our mission are discussed. Usually, the discussion includes, as a minimum, effects on the enemy's ability to defend and on his ability to attack. It also includes, as appropriate, the effects on the enemy's ability to delay, use his reserves, amphibious or airborne forces, nuclear fires, guerrilla forces, chemical and biological agents, cover and deception, sensor devices, or to conduct special operations and support his forces administratively. The discussion of the effects on our courses of action is limited to those required for the accomplishment of the mission.

APPENDIX C

AVAILABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

C–1. Division, Corps, and Field Army

The agencies usually available at a division, corps, and field army are shown in figures C–1, C–2, and C–3.

C–2. Army Group

The agencies normally available at the army group are:

a. Subordinate forces.

b. Army group special staff.

c. Adjacent army groups.

d. Tactical air force.

e. Theater task force.

f. Theater army support command (TASCOM), theater army civil affairs command, (TACAC) if established, theater army air defense command (TAADC), and theater army signal command (TASC), and theater army psychological operations group.

Figure C–1. Intelligence collection agencies available to division.

Figure C-2. Intelligence collection agencies available to corps.

LEGEND ============ Assigned or attached.

- - - - - Support available by request. May be employed as a
Corps Support Command with assignment to Corps
Headquarters.

Figure C-3. Intelligence collection agencies available to field army.

LEGEND ──────────── Assigned or attached.
            ─ ─ ─ ─   Support available by request.

Theater Army	Theater Navy		Military Airlift Command	State Department and Other Government Agencies
Theater Army Signal Command	Theater Air Force		Military Sea Transportation Service	Local US Consulates, etc.
Theater Army Civil Affairs Command	Theater Air Defense Command		Merchant Marine	Allied Line of Communication Agencies
Theater Army Air Defense Command	Joint UW Task Force		Commercial Air Lines	Local Civilian Authorities
PSYOP Group	Army Security Agency Units			
Army Group	Military Intelligence Units			
Field Armies				

THEATER ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND (TASCOM)

- TASCOM Special Staff Sections
- Subordinate Commands
  - Military Intelligence, Counterintelligence
  - Subordinate Units
  - Technical Intelligence

LEGEND ——— Assigned or attached
— — — Support available by request, if established.

Figure C-4. Intelligence collection agencies available to Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM).

US State Department		Theater Air Force		Theater Army
Other US Governmental Agencies		Theater Navy		Theater Army Signal Command
Non-US Governmental Agencies		Theater Air Defense Command		Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM)
		Allied Headquarters		Theater Army Air Defense Command
				Army Groups
				Field Armies

THEATER ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND (TACAC)

Subordinate Civil Affairs Units

Military Intelligence

Local Civil Authorities

LEGEND ———————— Assigned or attached.
— — — — — Support available by request, if established.

Figure C-5. Intelligence collection agencies available to Theater Army Civil Affairs Command.

```
┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│ Theater Air  │                    │   Theater    │
│   Defense    │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │     Army     │
│   Command    │                    │              │
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│   Theater    │                    │   Theater    │
│  Air Force   │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │     Army     │
│              │                    │ Signal Command│
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│              │                    │ Theater Army │
│   Theater    │                    │   Support    │
│    Navy      │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │   Command    │
│              │                    │  (TASCOM)    │
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│              │                    │ Theater Army │
│   Allied     │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ Civil Affairs│
│    HQ        │                    │   Command    │
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│   PSYOP      │                    │    Army      │
│   Group      │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │   Groups     │
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│  Joint UW    │                    │  Field Army  │
│ Task Force   │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ Air Defense  │
│              │                    │    Units     │
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│  Military    │                    │              │
│ Intelligence │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┼ ─ ─ ─ ─ │   USASA      │
│   Units      │                    │    Units     │
└──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

              ┌──────────────────┐
              │  THEATER ARMY    │
              │   AIR DEFENSE    │
              │    COMMAND       │
              │    (TAADC)       │
              └──────────────────┘

              ┌──────────────────┐
              │  Subordinate     │
              │  Air Defense     │
              │ Artillery Units  │
              └──────────────────┘
```

LEGEND ━━━━━━━━━ Assigned or attached.
       ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ Support available by request, if established.

Figure C–6. Intelligence collection agencies available to Theater Army Air Defense Command.

g. Theater army, theater navy, and theater air force.

h. Military intelligence units.

C–3. Communications Zone

Agencies available to major army commands located within the communications zone are shown in figures C–4, C–5, and C–6.

C–4. Theater Army

The agencies available at theater army vary with the organization of the theater and generally include:

a. Subordinate army commands.

b. Theater army special staff sections.

c. Army Security Agency elements.

d. Army Special Forces elements.

e. Military intelligence units.

f. Agencies organized primarily for production of strategic intelligence, but which also develop combat intelligence and information. Such agencies may include interrogation centers, document exploitation centers, and materiel exploitation centers.

g. Comparable headquarters of other services, allied forces, and joint commands subordinate to theater headquarters.

h. Higher headquarters.

i. Psychological operations units and theater army civil affairs command.

APPENDIX D

FORMAT FOR PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT (PERINTREP)

(Classification)

Copy No_____
Unit
Location
Date-time group
Message reference number

PERINTREP No_____
Period covered: (date and time to date and time).
References: Maps or charts.
Disposal instructions: (if any).

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

This paragraph contains a brief summary of enemy operations during the period. Amplifying details are furnished in the paragraphs that follow and in appropriate annexes, or both. This paragraph provides a quick briefing on the highlights of the enemy situation and the significance of the enemy's major activities, to include marked changes in morale, strengths, dispositions, tactics, combat effectiveness, and equipment. Data that are lengthy or can conveniently be shown graphically are presented in annexes.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

This paragraph, in conjunction with those following, provides the details of the situation summarized in paragraph 1. Detailed intelligence provided in this paragraph covers all operational activities. Information may be presented graphically by overlays, printed maps, sketch maps, and annexes. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligence is not available or is adequately covered by other portions of this report.
(Short title identification)

a. Ground. (Primarily includes activities of combat arms, reserves, and reinforcements; includes enemy defenses, minefields, fortifications, barriers, obstacles, and other defensive works.)

b. Air. (Includes Air Force activities, such as bombing, close air support, and tactical aerial reconnaissance; air surveillance, and air-supported operations.)

c. Airborne.

d. Irregular.

e. Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Operations.

f. Electronic Warfare.

g. Other. (Normally includes other than combat arms; includes appropriate comments not covered in other paragraphs on reserves, reinforcements, new tactics, weapons and equipment, administrative installations,

(Classification)

(Classification)

and combat service support. Also includes appropriate technical intelligence.)

3. ORDER OF BATTLE

Frequently, this paragraph will consist only of references to the enemy situation map (or overlay) and to the order of battle annex, which is developed using the format shown below. When desired by the commander, particularly significant order of battle changes may be summarized in this paragraph in addition to being discussed in detail in the order of battle annex. (See app L, Order of Battle Annex to PERINTREP).

   a. Composition and Disposition.
   b. Strength. (Personnel and major weapons and items of equipment.)
      (1) Losses.
      (2) Current strength.
(Short title identification)
   c. Tactics.
   d. Training.
   e. Combat Service Support.
   f. Combat Effectiveness.
   g. Miscellaneous Data.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

This paragraph, or parts thereof, should be issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.

   a. General. (A short summary of the counterintelligence situation during the period.)
   b. Espionage.
   c. Sabotage.
   d. Subversion.
   e. Communications and Noncommunications Security.
   f. Miscellaneous.

5. WEATHER

This paragraph gives a summary of the effect of weather on operations during the period.

6. TERRAIN

Use an annex, special maps, and overlays when possible. Include impact on future operations, if appropriate.

7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This paragraph lists and discusses briefly enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The conclusions present the commander's assessment of the most probable courses of action available to the enemy in order of probability of adoption and vulnerabilities that are exploitable by own, higher, or lower echelons.

   a. Enemy Capabilities.
   b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
   c. Conclusions.
Acknowledge.

                             Signature

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Short title identification)

Annexes: (Any intelligence document may be distributed as an annex to a PERINTREP. Although annexes are a means of distributing detailed intelligence and information, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk and duplication.)

Distribution:

Authentication:

Note: In joint service operations, the PERINTREP is replaced by the periodic intelligence summary (PERINTSUM). The correct format for the PERINTSUM is contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12.

APPENDIX E

EXAMPLE OF A PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION PLAN

APPENDIX E
EXAMPLE OF A PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION PLAN

UNIT: 20th Inf Div

PERIOD COVERED: From 131530 Jul   To; Capture of high ground at 1055-1357

(1) Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items	(2) Indications (analysis of items in column 1)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests	(4) List all available agencies	(5) Place and time at which information is to be reported	(6) Remarks and notes for future actions
EEI 1. What are the enemy dispositions? Special attention to organization of the ground, troops occupying strongpoints, and locations and activities of reserves	a. Location and strengths of: (1) Units in contact (2) Reserves (3) Artillery (4) Others	1) Report location, strength and activities of troops on JANINA CELINA Ridge		(1) As obtained. Negative reports every 2 hours starting 131800 July	Assign to 3d when committed ✔
		2) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Hill 408 (1651) and Hill 282 (1251)		(2) Same as (1)	✔
		3) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Plateau BELLE-RIVE		(3) Same as (1)	+
		4) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity BRAZOS Woods		(4) Same as (1)	✔
		5) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 2050		(5) Same as (1)	✔
		6) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 1849		(6) Same as (1)	If positive, notify 1st Corps without delay and make maximum effort to get details for target analysis +
		7) Report location and strength of troops in LARUNA River Valley vicinity LEON (1647)		(7) Same as (1)	If positive, notify 22d Inf Div and 1st Corps +
		8) Report location and strength of troops vicinity Hill 326 (1153)		(8) Same as (1)	Cancel after damage assessment reports received ✔
		9) Report location of all artillery and mortar positions in zone to include those unoccupied and number of pieces		(9) As obtained	Check corps and army PERINTREPT's ✔
	b. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles and minefields	10) Report location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles and minefields to front, flanks and forward of present position		(10) As obtained	SOP +
	c. Entrenching and erecting bands of wire	11) Report hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact		(11) As obtained	Cancel at 140430 ✔
		12) Report hostile entrenching and bands of wire on JANINA CELINA Ridge		(12) As obtained	✔
	d. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment, fortifying buildings	13) Report evidences of fortification of buildings in zone, particularly WACO (1451) and ST GEORGE (1554)		(13) As obtained	If no information by 132300, try 1st Corps ✔
	e. Location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations	14) Report location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations in division zone north of road LA PALOMA WACO, special attention to vicinity CR 1356		(14) As obtained	+
OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 2. Will the enemy attack prior to 140430 July? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis LEON (1647) OSTRO (2046) Hill 406 (1849) Hill 418 (1848)	a. Movement of hostile units forward	15) Report volume and type of traffic across TAKASAN Canal and on roads leading south from CELINA JANINA, CR 1356 and CR 1255		(15) Same as (1)	Assign to 1st Bde, 2d Bde when railroad through LAY is reached ✔
	b. Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas	16) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1550		(16) As obtained	Cancel at 140430 ✔
		17) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1851		(17) As obtained	Cancel at 140430 ✔
	c. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within own position	18) Report clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in zone		(18) As obtained	Cancel at 140430 +
	d. Increased patrolling	19) Report the number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in zone		(19) As obtained	✔
	e. Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen	20) Report activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along line of contact		(20) As obtained	Cancel at 140430 ✔
	f. Extensive artillery preparations	21) Report any marked change in artillery fire to include time, location, direction of fire, number of rounds, rate and caliber received in zone or area		(21) As obtained	SOP +
	g. Increased aerial reconnaissance	22) Report amount and type of air activity in zone or area		(23) As obtained	SOP +
	h. Forces in contact being replaced or reinforced by new units	23) Report new identifications		(22) As obtained	SOP +

FOOTNOTES: ⊗ COLLECTION AGENCIES LEVIED REQUIREMENT   X AVAILABLE COLLECTION AGENCIES   ✔ NEGATIVE REPORTS RECEIVED   + POSITIVE REPORTS RECEIVED

APPENDIX F

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM) (STANAG 2022; SEASTAG 2022; SOLOG 2R2)

1. Format of an Intelligence Summary.

   Note. Omit items not applicable unless otherwise indicated.
   1. Issuing unit (always included).
   2. Time and date of issue (always included).
   3. Summary of enemy activity for period.
      a. Ground activity.
      b. Trace of forward elements.
      c. Potential targets for nuclear weapons.
      d. Nuclear activity.
      e. CBR activity.
      f. Air activity.
      g. Other (new tactics, counterintelligence, etc.).
   4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses.
      a. Personnel (KIA).
      b. Prisoner of war.
      c. Equipment destroyed or captured.
   5. New obstacles and barriers.
   6. Administrative activities.
   7. New identifications.
      a. Units.
      b. Personalities.
   8. Enemy movements.
   9. Estimates number and types of vehicles.
   10. Weather and terrain conditions.
   11. Brief discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities (always included).

IMMEDIATE
TO CG 2D CORPS
INTSUM NUMBER 144 ENDING Ø4Ø6ØØ PARA 3 ALFA AGGRESSOR CONTINUED DEFENSE IN ZONE EXCEPT FOR LOCAL ATTACK AT Ø415 VICINITY R376759 WITH ESTIMATED 9Ø MEN CMM 3 MEDIUM TANKS CMM AND LIGHT ARTILLERY SUPPORT PD ATTACK REPULSED PD PARA 3 DELTA ATTACK PRECEDED AT Ø41Ø BY VERY HIGH AIR BURST NUCLEAR WEAPON CMM GROUND ZERO R374761 CMM DELIVERY MEANS UNDETERMINED CMM YIELD ESTIMATED AT Ø PD 5 KT PD PARA 3 FOXTROT ATTACK SUPPORTED BY 2 JET ATTACK AIRPLANES BOMBING AND STRAFING VICINITY R396756 FOR 5 MINUTES STARTING AT Ø425 PD PARA 4 ALFA CONFIRMED 2Ø KIA CMM ESTIMATED 5 KIA CMM ESTIMATED 30 WIA PD PARA 4 BRAVO 1Ø INCLUDING 2 WIA PD PARA 4 CHARLIE 2 MEDIUM TANKS DESTROYED CMM 1 DAMAGED CMM 1 JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN PD PARA 6 PRISONER STATES AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN FORWARD UNITS RUNNING LOW PAREN CHARLIE DASH 3 PAREN PD PARA 7 ALFA PATROL REPORTS BATTERY 152 MM HOWITZERS AT R3Ø3292 PD PRISONERS CONFIRM LOCATION 2D BATTALION CMM 17F MECH REGIMENT VICINITY R375758 PAREN BRAVO DASH 1 PAREN PARA 8 AIRBORNE RADAR RECONNAISSANCE DETECTED 1Ø TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH ON ROAD AT R33Ø28Ø AT

12. Conclusions (always included).

2. Examples of a Division INTSUM (full distribution not indicated) FM CG 52D INF DIV (MECH)

Ø345 PD PARA 9 PROBABLY ROUTINE SUPPLY VEHICLES PD PARA 1Ø SNOW STARTED AT Ø4Ø545 AND CONTINUING PD GROUND FROZEN HARD AND SUPPORTS ALL TYPES OF VEHICLES PD PARA 11 LOCAL ATTACK REPORTED PROBABLY WAS TO SEIZE HILL 4Ø5 PD ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONTINUING DEFENSE IN PRESENT POSITION CMM MAKING LOCAL ATTACKS TO IMPROVE HIS DEFENSIVE POSITION CMM DELAYING TO STRONGER POSITION ALONG LAURIEX RIVER PD PARA 12 CONTINUED DEFENSE IN PRESENT POSITION MOST PROBABLE.

Note. In joint service operations, the format in JCS Publication 12 will be followed.

(Classification)

APPENDIX G

(STANAG 2008)

FORMAT FOR BOMBING, SHELLING AND MORTARING REPORTS
BOMREP, SHELREP, OR MORTREP
(indicate which)

A. UNIT OF ORIGIN. (Use current call sign, address group or code name.)

B. POSITION OF OBSERVER. (Grid reference preferred—encode if this discloses the location of a headquarters or important observation post, or if sub-paragraph F.2., below is used to give information on location.)

C. DIRECTION measured clockwise from GRID NORTH in degrees or mils (state which) of the direction of the FLASH, SOUND, OR GROOVE OF SHELL (state which). (Omit for aircraft.)

D. TIME FROM.

E. TIME TO.

F. AREA BOMBED, SHELLED, ROCKETED, OR MORTARED. May be sent either as:

    1. Grid reference (Clear reference is to be used).

<div align="center">OR</div>

    2. Direction measures clockwise from grid north to impact points (Degrees or mils—state which) and distance in yards or meters (state which) from observer. This information must be encoded. (When this method is used, maximum accuracy possible is essential.)

G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER METHODS OF DELIVERY.

H. NATURE OF FIRE. (Registration, bombardment, harassing, etc.) (May be omitted for aircraft.)

I. NUMBER, TYPE AND CALIBRE. (State whether measured or assumed) of SHELLS, ROCKETS (OR MISSILES) BOMBS, ETC.

J. TIME FROM FLASH TO BANG. (Omit for aircraft.)

K. DAMAGE. (Encode if required.)

(Classification)

APPENDIX H

REPORT FORMATS FOR REPORTING ENEMY NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACKS

(STANAG 2103)

NBC 1

Purpose: Observers' Initial Report, giving basic data.

LET-TER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL	EXAMPLE BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence (See Note 1) Date-Time Security Classification. From. To. Type of Report.	NBC 1 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 1 (CHEMICAL)	NBC 1 (BIOLOGICAL)
A.	Strike serial number (if known).			
B.	Position of observer (UTM or place).	B. NB 062634	B. MARVILLE	
C.	Direction measured clockwise from grid or magnetic north (state which) of the attack from observer (degrees or mils— state which).	C. Grid 2500 mils	C. Magnetic 060 degrees	
D.	Date-time of detonation or date-time attack started.	D. 201405Z	D. 201405Z	D. 201405Z
E.	Illumination time (secs) or time attack ended.		E. 201412Z	
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) or area attacked (actual or estimated— state which).			F. LB 2030 Actual

NBC 1 (Continued)

Purpose: Observers' Initial Report, giving basic data.

LET-TER MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL	EXAMPLE BIOLOGICAL
G. Means of delivery, if known.	-----------	G. Aerial spray	
H. Type of burst (air, surface, or unknown—state which) including height if known, or type of agent if known, or type of attack.	H. Surface	H. Nerve	H. Biological
I. Type and number of munitions or aircraft (state which.			
J. Flash-to-bang time (secs).	J. 60		
K. Crater present or absent and diameter, if known (meters).			
L. Nuclear burst angular cloud width measured at 5 minutes after the detonation (degrees or mils—state which).	L. 280 mils		
M. Stabilized cloud-top angle and/or cloud-bottom angle (state which) or cloud-top height and/or cloud-bottom height (state which) measured at H + 10 minutes (degrees, mils, meters or feet—state which).			
S. Date-time of reading or date-time contamination initially detected.	-----------	S. 201500Z	S. 201500Z

NOTES:
(1) As appropriate or as per unit SOP.
(2) NBC 1 follows the same format as the SHELREPS, MORTREPS and BOM-REPS which are included in STANAG 2008 dealing with conventional enemy attacks.

(3) The item "Type of Report" and letter items D, H, and either B and C or F must always be reported; other items are optional.

(4) Users of NBC 1 are not confined solely to the use of letter items shown in the examples; other letter items listed on pages C(DofA)–2 and –3 may be added at the users' discretion.

NBC 2

Purpose: Report used for passing evaluated data.

LET-TER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence. Date-Time. Security Classification. From. To. Type of Report.	NBC 2 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 2 (CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL)
A.	Strike serial number.	A. 24	A. 1
D.	Date-time of detonation or date-time attack started.	D. 201405Z	D. 200945Z
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) or area attacked (actual or estimated—state which).	F. LB 187486 Actual	F. LB 126456 Actual
G.	Means of delivery, if known.		
H.	Type of burst (air, surface, or unknown—state which) including height if known, or type of agent if known, or type of attack.	H. Surface	H. Nerve
N.	Estimated yield (KT)	N. 50	

NOTES:

(1) This report is normally based on two or more NBC Forms 1. It includes an attack location and, in the case of nuclear detonations, and evaluated yield.

(2) When adjacent agencies (e.g., Naval and National NBC Defense Organizations) use a different fallout prediction system, this form may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computations.

(3) Letter items A, D, F, H and N may be repeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report.

(4) Users of NBC 2 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items listed on pages C(DofA)–2 and –3 may be added at the users' discretion.

NBC 3

Purpose: To issue immediate warning of expected contamination.

LET-TER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence Date-Time. Security Classification. From. To.		(a telephone or radio message)
	Type of Report.	NBC 3 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 3 (CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL)
D.	Date-time of detonation or date-time attack started.	D. 201405Z	D. 201415Z
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) or area attacked (actual or estimated—state which).	F. LB 187486 Actual	F. LB 206300 Actual
P.	Area of expected contamination (UTM).		P. LB 208320 LB 210320 LB 206310 LB 204310
Y.	Direction measured clockwise from grid north to the left and then to the right radial lines (degrees or mils—state which), 4 digits each.	Y. 0272–0312 degrees	Y. Not Mandatory
Z.	Effective wind speed (km/h), 3 digits; downwind distance of Zone I (km), 3 digits; cloud radius (km), 2 digits.	Z. 019–025–05	

NOTES:
   (1) When adjacent agencies (e.g., Naval and National NBC Defense Organizations) use a different fallout prediction system, NBC 2 may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computations.
   (2) Users of NBC 3 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items listed on pages C(DofA)–2 and –3 may be added at the users' discretion.
   (3) If effective wind speed is less than 8 km/h, the NBC 3 report will consist of the letter items D, F and Z. Z will contain three digits only, i.e., the radius of Zone I.

NBC 4

Purpose: To report radiation dose rate measurements.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE
	Precedence.	
	Date-Time.	
	Security Classification.	
	From.	
	To.	
	Type of Report.	NBC 4
Q.	Location of reading.	Q. LB 123987
R.	Dose rate (rad per hour). The words 'Initial', Increasing', 'Peak' or 'Decreasing may be added. When decay rate is reported, the words 'Decay Normal', Decay Fast', or 'Decay Slow' or the actual value of decay constant may be inserted.	R. 35
S.	Date-Time of reading (this is NOT normalized to H + 1 hour)	S. 201735 Z Q. LB 129965 R. 60 S. 201650 Z Q. LB 146808 R. 27 Increasing S. 201710Z

NOTES:

(1) Letter items Q, R and S may be repeated as often as necessary.

(2) Radiation dose rates are measured in the open, one metre above ground. Other conditions must be specified in the message.

(3) Users of NBC 4 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples, other letter items listed on pages C(DofA)-2 and -3 may be added at the users' discretion.

NBC 5

Purpose: To report areas of contamination.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence.		
	Date-Time.		
	Security Classiffication.		
	From.		
	To.		
	Type of Report.	NBC 5 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 5 (CHEMICAL/ BIOLOGICAL)
A.	Strike serial number(s) causing contamination (if known).	A. 24	A. 1
O.	Reference date-time for estimated contours when not H + 1 hour. (See Note 2).		

NBC 5 (Continued)

Purpose: To report areas of contamination.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
S.	Date-time or reading or date-time contamination initially detected.		S. 201000Z
T.	H + 1 date-time or date-time of latest survey of contamination in the area.	T. 201505Z	T. 201045Z
U.	100 rad/hr contour line coordinates.		
V.	300 rad/hr contour line coordinates.	V. ND 651455 ND 810510 ND 821459 ND 651455	
W.	100 rad/hr contour line coordinates.	W. ND 604718 ND 991686 ND 114420 ND 595007	
X.	30 rad/hr contour line coordinates, or area of measured contamination (UTM) (yellow).		X. ND 206991 ND 201575 ND 200787 ND 206991

NOTES:

(1) The form is best sent by means of a trace or overlay if time and distance permit.

(2) When the contamination arises from a single enemy or unidentified burst, the dose rate always refers to H + 1 hour, and the letter item T is used. But when there have been several detonations at different times or on different days and no single H + 1 hour is possible, then the dose rates are reported as at a specified time using letter item O. Letter items O and T are therefore alternative and cannot both be used in the same report.

(3) It is not necessary or even desirable to report all four of the contours of different dose rates. Four are given to provide flexibility. (In the example only two are reported.)

(4) When a contour closes to form a complete ring, the first coordinate is repeated at the end (see example for 300 rad/hr).

(5) Colors when used in plotting, and when sending the report by means of a trace, are as follows:
Red for 1000 rad per hour.
Green for 300 rad per hour.
Blue for 100 rad per hour.
Black for 30 rad per hour.
Yellow for Chemical and Biological contamination.

(6) Contour lines are to be annotated with the dose rates.

(7) When requested, decay rates are to be transmitted in accordance with letter item R.

(8) Users of NBC 5 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items listed on pages C(DofA) –2 and –3 may be added at the users' discretion.

APPENDIX I

EXAMPLE OF CLIMATIC SUMMARY

CLIMATIC SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF JULY
3d CORPS AREA

I-1. General Circulation

Generally air flows from the west and northwest. Occasionally warm, dry continental air from Russia causes a relatively intense, dry heat with temperatures of 90°or more.

I-2. Temperatures

Afternoon temperatures generally are in the 70s and morning temperatures are in the 50s. There are occasional periods of hot, dry spells that last more than a week with temperatures in the 90s.

The highest temperature ever recorded was 101° F.

I-3. Thunderstorms

Thunderstorms occur frequently. They usually develop during the day and reach maximum intensity in the late afternoon and evening.

I-4. Surface Winds

The average wind speed is 5.8 knots. The most predominant direction is northeast, with a mean speed of 8.4 knots. The strongest mean wind is from the east-northeast 10.0 knots. Calms are frequent occurring 25.2 percent of the time, and usually in the early morning. Calms or near calms often last the whole day.

Percentage frequency of surface winds by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
2.1	2.0	8.6	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.2	2.1	19.5	10.9	12.2	2.7	9.6	1.0

Average surface wind speed by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
5.6	9.4	8.8	7.6	6.8	8.3	3.2	0.0	5.0	6.3	8.4	10.0	7.1	6.6	6.0	4.0

I-5. Cloudiness

Mornings frequently are clear. Clouds develop by noon and cloud cover reaches a maximum in the late afternoon, decreasing to nil just before sunset.

I-6. Visibility

Normal visibilities are from 7 to 13 kilometers and occasionally farther. Occasional haze may reduce visibility to about 3 kilometers.

I–7. Precipitation

Thunderstorms are the usual cause of precipitation. Occasionally a south-westerly wind will cause continued drizzle and low, overcast skies for 1 to 3 days. This is the only time low visibilities occur.

	Jun	Jul	Aug	Annual	Years recorded
Mean precipitation (inches)	2.56	2.48	2.36	26.97	40
Mean number of days with thunderstorm	4	4	3	18	11
Temperature (°F)					
Aboslute max	95	101	97	----	10
Absolute min	50	43	43	----	10
Mean daily max	71	74	73	----	40
Mean daily min	51	55	53	----	40
Mean number of days with fog	2	2	4	57	11

APPENDIX J

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

(STANAG 2118, SEASTAG 2118)

Section I. THE MISSION

A restatement of the assigned or assumed mission of the command.

Section II. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

J–1. General

a. Weather and terrain always are included in the characteristics of the area of operations discussed in paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate. Other characteristics are included if they are important in selecting courses of action by either force to carry out their mission, assigned or assumed. Characteristics, other than weather and terrain, are of greater importance in areas of operations which have large civilian populations and to commands with extensive territorial or combat service support responsibilities.

b. The effects of each characteristic on nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents are discussed when either combatant has the capability to use them. The discussion includes consideration of both the weapons effects and the effects on the delivery means.

c. The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area of operations on possible enemy courses of action normally includes consideration of ability to attack and to defend. It also includes, as applicable, consideration of effects on other possible enemy courses of action, such as delay, and on the enemy's possible use of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces.

d. The extent of consideration of the effects of each characteristic on broad friendly courses of action is limited by the mission. When the mission is offensive, the discussion does not include consideration of defensive courses of action. It does, however, include considerations of security.

J–2. Weather

The estimate usually includes a current weather forecast. When operations cover a long period, or are programmed for a future operation, climatic information may replace weather date forecasts. Light data, in tabular form, include the beginning or morning nautical and civil twilights, the ending of evening nautical and civil twilights, moonrise, moonset, phase of the moon, and other information, as required.

J–3. Terrain

The existing terrain situation usually is described in terms of the tactical aspects of the area, observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach. The discussion of each of these aspects is oriented on its influence on the selection of broad courses of action by either force. For example, for a combat service support unit, the discussion of cover and concealment is oriented on their influence on those courses of action, including installation locations, required to accomplish the combat service support mission and on enemy forces which can interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. In combat service support unit intelligence estimates, discussion of key terrain features is omitted unless the enemy has the capability to seize or control terrain features which will materially affect the accomplishment of the mission.

J–4. Other Characteristics

The following additional subparagraphs, of the intelligence estimate are considered, as pertinent: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science, materiel, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. They are analyzed under the same headings as weather and terrain.

Section III. ENEMY SITUATION

J–5. Dispositions

Reference may be made to overlays or enemy situation maps or previously published documents.

J–6. Composition

a. This subparagraph lists the data used for later determination of the strength the enemy may use to prevent the accomplishment of the mission. It lists all the units, including insurgent and guerrilla-type forces, with identifications and subordination as known, that can affect the accomplishment of the mission. Included are such supporting units as air, nuclear delivery, and electronic warfare units that also can affect the accomplishment of the mission. In determining which enemy units can affect the accomplishment of the mission, time and space factors are considered.

b. This subparagraph also lists the guerrilla and paramilitary forces that are operating in the area. These are important considerations for combat service support units and in cold war and in limited war. Other forces, including long-range weapons delivery units, that may be used in support of the enemy ground elements in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission also are listed. Enemy units believed to be under control of the opposing comparable command but which are committed outside the zone of the friendly unit also are listed by tactical units. Elements of the opposing enemy force deployed in areas where time and space factors do not permit their use in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission are indicated specifically.

J–7. Strength

a. This subparagraph lists all the opposing enemy forces which can be logically employed against the command in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The total forces listed cannot exceed, but can equal or be less than, the total forces listed in the "composition" subparagraph.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. Air, nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare units are omitted, as appropriate, when the enemy lacks such capabilities to interfere with the accomplishment of the mission.

J–8. Committed Forces

a. Committed forces are those enemy ground units in contact deployed along the FEBA, their immediate reserves, and supporting ground fire units, whose area of employment is not expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate, and the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared. If there is doubt whether an enemy unit is a committed force, it is considered as a reinforcement (para J–9). This reduces the risk of the friendly command being surprised.

b. Usually a G2 accounts for committed enemy forces by the size of the enemy unit which is opposing the friendly elements. This information is used as a basis for planning and conducting tactical operations. For example, against an Aggressor organization, as given in FM 30–102, a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of battalions; a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher headquarters, in terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army a statement of the number of armies and army groups the enemy has committed also is included. For example, "The committed forces facing this army group consist of one army group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 mechanized rifle divisions and three tank divisions) * * *." When the committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have a known organization, the strength is stated in total numbers.

c. Illustrative Example:

(1) Situation (fig. J–1). The 20th Inf Div, an interior division, is advancing to the south. The advance of the division has been stopped by elements of two mechanized regiments (8th and 12th) of the Aggressor 16th Mech Div. Each of these mechanized regiments has two mechanized battalions in contact and 1 mechanized battalion in regimental reserve. The third mechanized regiment (96th) of this division is in contact with the 72d Inf Div on the flank of the 20th Inf Div. About 25 miles in rear of the 16th Mech Div, and in the area of the 20th Inf Div objective, two mechanized regiments (43d and 75th) of the Aggressor 12th Mech Div are preparing field fortifications.

Figure J–1. Schematic sketch.

(2) Discussion. Only the four committed battalions (those in contact) of the two mechanized regiments (8th and 12th) in contact with the 20th Inf Div are considered as committed forces by the division G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div to continue the advance, the area of employment of these four battalions in contact will not change appreciably, even if they shift subordinate elements within their areas. The reserve battalions of the 8th and 12th Regiments are not considered committed since they are not in contact and can be employed in different areas. The 96th Regiment would be mentioned in the "composition" subparagraph, but only its reserve battalion is listed as a reinforcement by the 20th Division. The other two battalions are committed against the 72d Division and are not available as reinforcements against the 20th Division. The 43rd and 75th Regiments of the 12th Mech Division are not considered as committed against the 20th Division because their area of commitment will depend on particular time and space considerations. The regiment of the 16th Mech Div in contact with the 72d Inf Div is mentioned in the "composition" subparagraph. Only the reserve battalion is mentioned in the reinforcement portion of the strength subparagraph because the other two battalions are committed outside the zone of the 20th Inf Div.

d. Illustrative Example:

(1) Situation. The 20th Inf Div is attacking to the east (fig. J–2).

(2) Discussion. The committed forces are the 3d Bn, 3d Mech Regt, three battalions of the 5th Mech Regt and the 1st Bn, 7th Regt. The 1st Bn, 3d Mech Rifle Regt and the 2d Bn, 7th Mech Regt are not in contact and are, from their locations, regimental reserves whose area of employment is subject to change. The 2d Bn, 3d Mech Regt and 3d Bn, 7th Mech Regt are committed against units on the 20th Div flanks. The regiments to the east are not committed since their area of employment can vary depending on friendly courses of action or changing enemy plans.

Figure J–2. Schematic situation sketch.

e. The brigade S2 considers as committed forces—

(1) Enemy mechanized, rifle, tank or reconnaissance companies in contact with the brigade, plus

(2) Their reserves at the next higher echelon; i.e., normally the reserve company of the enemy mechanized battalion in contact.

(3) Although the enemy company is the basic sized unit used by the brigade S2 in accounting for committed forces, he will also account for smaller units which have been located as separately employed; e.g., tank platoons.

f. The battalion S2 considers as committed forces—

(1) Enemy mechanized rifle, tank or reconnaissance platoons in contact with the battalion, plus

(2) Their reserves at the next higher echelon; i.e., normally the reserve platoon of the enemy rifle/mechanized company in contact.

(3) Although the enemy platoon is the basic unit used by the battalion S2 in accounting for committed forces, frequently available intelli-

gence does not enable the individual platoons composing an enemy company to be located. Therefore, the battalion S2 will consider that a located enemy company normally consists of three platoons; a company minus consists of two platoons.

g. The designation of enemy units as committed forces depends primarily on their disposition and location at the time the estimate is made. Enemy unit identification may facilitate determining if a particular unit is the reserve of elements in contact with the brigade or battalion.

h. When an enemy unit of the size used in accounting for committed forces is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is considered to be committed by the G2/S2 of both friendly units. For example, if an enemy battalion is in contact with elements of two adjacent U.S. divisions, both division G2s consider the entire battalion as committed against their respective divisions. This points up the need for correct identification and accurate strength computation at each echelon.

i. All ground fire support weapons organic to the enemy mechanized battalion or regiment are

referred to as "normal regimental artillery" and are always considered as in support of committed forces. That is, each committed unit is assumed to have available to it, its normal proportion of the available supporting weapons organic to the regiment. These weapons therefore need not be enumerated. Fire support weapons not organic to the enemy mechanized battalion or regiment which can be identified as within supporting range are enumerated as in support of committed forces. In the event that the forces committed against the brigade or battalion have no known TOE: i.e., "volunteer" or irregular type units, all fire support weapons which can be identified are enumerated.

j. When enumerating enemy forces, enemy security elements forward of the combat outpost line are normally considered reinforcements of the main defensive position until contact with these security elements is made. The intelligence officer must correctly identify the enemy's main defensive positions and must not be deceived by security forces. The security forces will normally become reinforcements for the main defense after completing their security mission.

k. In addition to determining the enemy's ground combat unit strength in terms of committed forces and reinforcements, the G2/S2 also considers the enemy's air and nuclear weapons strength. However, as estimates of enemy air, nuclear, chemical and biological warfare strength are usually prepared only at field army level and higher, the G2/S2 simply restates these capabilities in his estimate.

l. Illustrative Example (fig. J-3):

(1) SITUATION: 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, with 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry forward, are defending positions as indicated on figure J-3. Reports from 21st Inf Div indicate that Aggressor has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons available.

(2) S2, 1st Bde determines Aggressor strength now opposing the brigade as follows:

(*a*) Committed Forces: 1st Bde is opposed by three mechanized companies, one reconnaissance platoon and one medium tank company (10 tanks), supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.

(*b*) Reinforcements: Aggressor reinforce-

ment available for commitment in the sector of 1st Bde is: unidentified mechanized battalion located vicinity HILL 250.

(*c*) Discussion: The three mechanized platoons northwest of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are disposed so as to logically constitute one mechanized rifle company in contact with, and therefore committed against 1st Bde. The reconnaissance platoon southwest of HILL 200 and the mechanized company northeast of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are in contact with, and therefore committed against both 1st Bde and its respective adjacent brigades. The mechanized company immediately south of CHIGGER Woods is located so as to logically be the reserve company of an enemy battalion in contact with 1st Bde and is therefore committed. The mechanized companies of the 25th and 23d regiments, located to the east and west of the sector of the 1st Bde are totally committed against adjacent brigades and are therefore neither committed nor available as reinforcements against 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div. Nine medium tanks are located in the vicinity of the mechanized rifle companies committed against 1st Bde and are therefore also committed. S2, 1st Bde would be equally correct to account for these committed medium tanks as "three medium tank platoons" or "nine medium tanks." (The three amphibious tanks organic to the reconnaissance platoon, although not specifically located at this time, are accounted for as normal components of one reconnaissance platoon.) The ripsnorter 85mm SP gun (ATAP) and 120mm mortars located north of the MUDDY River are part of the "normal regimental artillery" in support of committed forces.

1. The 160mm mortars, 100mm AT (SP) and 122mm howitzers are organic to the Aggressor regiment or battalion and are therefore *not* part of the "normal regimental artillery." However, they are within supporting range and are therefore *enumerated* as in support of committed forces. The enemy also has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons which can be employed in support of committed forces.

2. Using the data in FM 30-102, it can be determined that a mechanized battalion could move from HILL 250 to the bridge across the MUDDY River, on carriers, in daylight, cross country, in approximately 30 minutes after commencing the move. Therefore, the uncommitted mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250, could logically be employed against 1st Bde in time to affect the accomplishment of the brigade

Figure J-3. Schematic sketch.

mission and is therefore considered as a reinforcement.

(3) S2, 1-69 Inf determines Aggressor strength now opposing the battalion as follows:

(a) Committed Forces: 1-69 Inf is opposed by two mechanized platoons, one reconnaissance platoon and one medium tank platoon, supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.

(b) Reinforcements: Aggressor reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1-69 Inf are: Unidentified mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250 and unidentified mechanized company and medium tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods.

(c) Discussion: One mechanized platoon is in contact with and therefore committed against 1-69 Inf. The mechanized platoon north of boundary 1-69 Inf—1-70 Inf is located so as to logically be the reserve platoon of a company in contact and is therefore committed against both 1-69 Inf and 1-70 Inf. The medium tank platoon in the same vicinity is in contact with and therefore committed against both 1-69 Inf and 1-70 Inf. S2, 1-69 Inf considers all of the recon platoon in contact because this is the size force the battalion S2 uses for computation of enemy strength. None of the tanks organic to this platoon have been specifically located at this time; however, they are accounted for as a normal component of the reconnaissance platoon. The mechanized rifle company and tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods which are considered as committed by S2, 1st Bde could logically be employed against 1-69 Inf in time to affect the accomplishment of the battalion mission and are therefore considered as reinforcements. The discussion above (para *l*(2) (*c*)), concerning the battalion vic HILL 250, the "normal regimental artillery" and nonorganic weapons in support of committed forces applies also to the determination by S2, 1-69 Inf.

(4) S2, 1-70 Inf determines Aggressor strength now opposing the battalion as follows:

(a) Committed Forces: 1-70 Inf is opposed by four mechanized platoons and two medium tank platoons supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.

(b) Reinforcements: Aggressor reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of

1-70 Inf are: Unidentified mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250 and unidentified mechanized company and medium tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods.

(c) Discussion: S2, 1-70 Inf considers the individually located mechanized platoons vic boundary 1-69 Inf—1-70 Inf in the same manner as does S2, 1-69 Inf. Two platoons of the mechanized company northeast of Hwy 82 Bridge are considered committed against 1-70 Inf (Platoons are not shown on the sketch). S2, 4-80 Mech could also consider two platoons of this company committed against his battalion. The discussion ((2) (*c*) and (3) (*c*) above) concerning reinforcements and supporting fires applies also in the determination by S2, 1-70 Inf.

J-9. Reinforcements

a. Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of a specific course of action and enemy plans. Reinforcements include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but which can reasonably be considered capable of closing with the friendly force in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they can be committed in time to affect the accomplishment of its mission.

b. Illustrative example:

(1) Situation. Same as described in paragraph J-8*c*(1). See figure J-1.

(2) Discussion. The two regiments of the Aggressor 12th Mech Div and the three mechanized battalions apparently in regimental reserve are considered as reinforcements. These units are not committed against the friendly force and can be committed in time to affect the mission of the 20th Inf Div. Although the two regiments of the 12th Mech Div are digging field fortifications in the vicinity of the division objective, the enemy commander can employ them against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The enemy also can employ these units against the divisions adjacent to the 20th Inf Div.

c. Illustrative example:

(1) Situation. See figure J-2.

(2) Discussion. The two Aggressor mechanized regiments in the assembly area astride the

20th Inf Div north boundary, the Aggressor mechanized regiment south of the south boundary and the two uncommitted battalions forward, are reinforcements. None of these units is committed. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent that they are the reserves of the two Aggressor divisions and the reserves of the regiments committed against the 20th Inf Div. Depending on the course of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div and the enemy plans, all or part of these Aggressor elements can be employed against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places, in time to affect the accomplishment of the division mission.

d. Reinforcements are stated in convenient and meaningful terms. For example, if the opposing division has a mechanized regiment in reserve, this reinforcement is referred to as a "mechanized regiment," rather than "three mechanized battalions." When enemy units, either committed forces or reinforcements are very much understrength, the estimated remaining strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usually more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat support probably available. A half strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective as a full strength battalion.

J-10. Air

The enemy air capability is based upon numbers of enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, expected attrition, the ground tactical situation, and other factors. The supporting tactical air force furnishes intelligence on the number of sorties, by type, which the enemy can be expected to make within the field army or comparable areas. The estimate usually is not prorated below the field army level. Usually no attempt is made to calculate the number of sorties the enemy can or may make against a subordinate command of the field army or communications zone section. Corps, division, and communications zone command intelligence officers usually quote the estimate furnished by the higher headquarters in stating enemy air capabilities. For example, a corps or division G2 might state, "30th Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter, 100 attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily. By massing all aircraft within operational radius, the enemy can make a

maximum of 250 fighter, 300 attack, and 250 bomber sorties daily."

J-11. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

a. Estimates of NBC enemy capabilities usually are prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to gather the information to make such estimates. They use the estimates of the higher headquarters and modify them with available information.

b. The determination of enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical operations capabilities is based primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience, and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground troops. As with the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to estimate what portion of the available enemy NBC effort may be used against a division or corps within a field army or a command in the communications zone. It is also rarely feasible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a period as short as one day. The period selected is a month or other period depending on the available information and past experience.

c. The statement of the enemy capabilities to use chemical and biological agents includes, if known, the amount, type, and delivery means of available chemical and biological agents.

J-12. Recent and Present Significant Activities

This paragraph summarizes recent and current enemy activities which may point to future enemy actions. Significant enemy failures to take actions also are listed. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending behind a river obstacle but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the omission is listed as a significant activity. Any basis for belief that the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions also is listed. For example, mention is made of capture by the enemy of an operation order or compromise of current signal operation instructions of cover and deception operations.

J-13. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

a. This paragraph lists peculiarities and weaknesses and briefly discusses each, indicating the

extent to which it is a vulnerability and how the selection of broad friendly courses of action are affected. For example, if the enemy has an open flank, the fact is stated in the "operations" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which the open flank constitutes an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. If enemy reserves are small and are poorly positioned to extend the flank, the vulnerability may be great. If the enemy reserves are large and in position to extend the flank or to counterattack an enveloping force, the vulnerability is probably insignificant. The G2 might state it as, "The enemy north flank is open. Available reserves are adequate to extend this flank a distance of only about 3,000 meters. Positions to extend the flank have not been prepared. The enemy is vulnerable to a flank attack." Conversely, it might be stated as, "The enemy north flank is open. However, available reserves are adequate either to extend this flank beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions suitable to block an attempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on the enemy situation map." In the first case, the enemy's vulnerability to a flank attack is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph of the intelligence estimate. In the second case, the open flank apparently is not a vulnerability, and is not carried any further. Another example, if the guerrilla forces are poorly equipped with anti-tank means of all types, the fact is stated in the "logistics" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which this is an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. The intelligence officer might state, "The guerrilla forces in our area are poorly equipped with antitank means. They cannot effectively defend against armored vehicles." The inability to defend against armored vehicles is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph as a vulnerability.

b. Typical peculiarities and weaknesses include—

(1) *Personnel.*

Replacement situation (shortages or overages, particularly in specialists).

Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high. Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.

High rate of sickness.

Percentage of authorized strength, if less than 80 percent.

(2) *Intelligence.*

Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy information collecting agencies.

Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.

Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.

(3) *Operations.*

Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or unconventional patterns of operations.

Faulty organization of the terrain.

Faulty disposition of reserves.

Susceptibility to electronic countermeasures.

Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against nuclear weapons or chemical and biological agents.

Lack of adequate mobility.

Inadequate air or artillery support, or nuclear weapon delivery systems.

Pronounced failure to disperse and dig in.

Habitual failure to attack certain types of targets.

(4) *Combat Service Support.*

Shortages or inadequacies of particular supplies and materiel, including nuclear weapons.

Status of equipment, if less than 80 percent.

Large concentrations of supplies.

Location of vulnerable points and bottle-necks in the logistics system or lines of communication.

Inability to resupply during action.

Failure to equip troops with protective masks or protection clothing.

(5) *Civil-Military Operations.*

Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil populace toward the enemy.

Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include movement of civilians.

(6) *Personalities.*

Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major subordinate commanders, or principal staff officers, as disclosed by or deduced from their past performance, education, politics, experience, or other basis.

J-14. Enumeration

This paragraph lists the enemy capabilities. Enemy capabilities are courses of action which the enemy can adopt and which will influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission, either favorably or unfavorably. A properly stated enemy capability indicates what the enemy can do, when he can do it, where he can do it, and in what strength he can do it. For example, "Attack (what) now (when) along our front (where) with five mechanized battalions supported by all available nuclear weapons, artillery and air (strength)." Another example, "Conduct harassing operations (what) at any time (when) in our area (where) with about 200 guerrillas equipped only with small arms (strength)." For determination of enemy capabilities see paragraphs J-19 through J-25.

J-15. Analysis and Discussion

a. The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities includes characteristics of the area of operation and positive or negative evidence of enemy activity. A major obstacle across part of the friendly area is evidence that attack elsewhere is more likely. Low ceilings and low visibility are evidence that the enemy may not use all his available aircraft. Open, flat areas without any appreciable cover are evidence that the enemy may not use guerrilla or infiltration forces.

b. In analyzing and discussing each enemy capability, or appropriate combination, the intelligence officer judges from the enemy point of view the advantage or disadvantage in adopting the capability. In making this judgement, the G2 also considers the enemy doctrine and practices and the ultimate results of adoption or rejection of the particular capability. For example, "The enemy employment of the unidentified tank division at TNOMYEH will deprive him of the reserves to counterattack a penetration by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Commitment of this tank division too early will result in the later defeat of the enemy."

c. If there is not evidence of the enemy's possible adoption of a particular capability, and the capability does not represent a major threat to the accomplishment of the mission, the intelligence officer does not judge it. For example, the enemy usually can withdraw beyond our objective. Ordinarily, such withdrawal is not a threat to the accomplishment of the mission. If there is no evidence that the enemy may withdraw, a statement of conclusions is omitted. The intelligence officer merely states, "There is no indication of withdrawal."

Section V. CONCLUSIONS

J-16. Effects of the Area on Our Courses of Action

For a defensive mission, conclusions identify the best defense area(s) and the best avenues of approach into the defense sector. For an offensive mission, the conclusion describes the best avenues of approach to the objective(s).

J-17. Probable Courses of Action

a. The determination of probable enemy courses of action is fully justified by the previous analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. In this determination, consideration also is given to how the enemy views his own vulnerabilities as indicated by his doctrine, past experiences, and personality of the enemy commander. Consideration also is given to previous enemy selection of courses of action under similar circumstances. The determination is objective and not a guess at what the enemy will do. It is the conclusion, based on the available evidence, what he is most likely to do.

b. In determining the relative probability of adoption of enemy courses of action, the intelligence officer avoids conclusions based on our doctrines and practices. The available evidence considered in the determination includes the enemy doctrine and practices as well as positive or negative enemy activity. If the available evidence of enemy activity is not definitive enough alone to justify selection of an enemy course of action most probable of adoption, the intelligence officer selects one based on the characteristics of the area of operations, enemy doctrine, enemy practices, and the available evidence. Conclusions reached on this basis are so indicated to the commander.

c. In the statement of course of action most likely of adoption by the enemy, several capabili-

ties may be combined for brevity and clarity. All the enemy capabilities combined in one statement must be capable of being implemented at the same time. For example, the most probable enemy course of action may be, "Attack to envelop our north flank reinforced by his corps reserve and using all available nuclear weapons, artillery, and air support and conduct harassing operations in our rear areas with guerrillas and infiltrating forces."

d. If more than one enemy course of action is stated, they are listed in the order of their relative probability of action.

J-18. Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. In this paragraph, only those enemy weaknesses which may be exploited are considered. In studying the enemy peculiarities and weaknesses to determine such vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the area of operations, all aspects of the enemy situation, and the enemy's doctrine and practices are considered. Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. An open north flank which the enemy cannot, with available forces, extend or refuse, is a vulnerability. If, however, the enemy has re-serves which can readily extend the flank to an impassable obstacle, or counterattack to pin enveloping troops against that obstacle, the open flank is mentioned as a possible vulnerability subject to destruction of the enemy reserves.

b. Each exploitable enemy vulnerability is listed as a brief statement of the effect of the vulnerability rather than a repetition of the peculiarity or weakness. For example, "Shortage of antitank means" is not stated. Instead, the effect of that weakness is given by stating, "Limited capability to oppose armored vehicles." The vulnerability discussed in *a* above, could be stated as, "Enemy north flank open to envelopment subject to destruction of enemy reserves at * * *." The order of listing vulnerabilities does not matter.

c. In determining the enemy vulnerabilities to list, the G2 considers the feasibility of their exploitation by his own, higher, and subordinate commanders. However, recommendation to the commander of courses of action to be adopted is the responsibility of the G3. The listing of enemy vulnerabilities does not mean that they can all be exploited at the same time. Frequently, the exploitation of one vulnerability precludes the exploitation of another vulnerability. For example, the enemy may be vulnerable to both a night penetration and a daytime flank envelopment.

Section VI. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

J-19. General

a. Commanders base plans and actions upon estimates of enemy capabilities and the probability of their adoption. Enemy capabilities can be estimated objectively because they are based upon knowledge of the area of operations, enemy situation, enemy doctrine, and time and space factors. The enemy commander may change his mind or his higher commanders may change his orders. The enemy may practice cover and deception to indicate actions different from those which he actually intends.

b. In considering enemy capabilities, actions which are grossly disadvantageous to the enemy, or unreasonable, are not included. For example, the enemy may be physically capable of disengaging troops committed outside our zone in order to employ them against us. However, in most circumstances the G2 does not consider this to be a capability because it is unreasonable.

J-20. The "What" of an Enemy Capability

a. Four general types of tactical courses of action are usually possible. The enemy can attack, defend, reinforce, or execute a retrograde movement. These operations are usually divisible into a variety of specific courses of action. For example, an attack may be a penetration, an envelopment, a turning movement, or a pursuit. A defense may be in one position or in successive positions, and may be either static or mobile. A retrograde movement may be classified as a withdrawal, retirement, or delaying action.

b. The specific actions which the enemy can physically adopt depend upon the available means and conditions under which those means can be used. Consequently, the "what" of each of the enemy's capabilities is determined by considering the characteristics of the area of operations, the order of battle of the opposing forces, and time and space factors. Study of the characteristics of

the area of operations, friendly situation, and the means available to the enemy, usually indicates that the enemy is physically capable of certain actions, but that others are impracticable. For example, the enemy can envelop only when we have an assailable flank, and can conduct airborne operations only when he has the necessary troops and aircraft.

J-21. The "When" of an Enemy Capability

a. The earliest time at which the enemy can put into effect any of his capabilities depends upon the dispositions of his forces and equipment. Committed forces can be employed without significant delay, and can attack or defend now. Forces disposed at some distance behind the edge of the battle area cannot be committed immediately; they must first be moved to the place of employment. Complicated weapons systems, such as long-range missiles, may require time to set up after reaching launching sites before missiles can be fired.

b. An enemy capability involving displacement of forces cannot be put into effect until some time after the force has started to move. Reserves cannot reinforce an attack or defense until they have been moved to appropriate locations such as attack positions or forward assembly areas. Consequently, time and space factors are computed in determining the "when" of a capability involving the displacement of forces or equipment. These computations are discussed in paragraph J-25.

c. References to "when" usually are omitted from a statement of the enemy air, nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and other capabilities if "at any time" is intended. References to "when" usually are omitted from statements of enemy capabilities pertaining to withdrawal and delay in successive positions as "at any time" is implied. Such actions can be started at any time. In withdrawal capabilities, reference may be made to the time of the start of the withdrawal. For example, "The enemy can withdraw beyond our objective at any time before our attack."

J-22. The "Where" of an Enemy Capability

a. The "where" of an enemy capability depends upon the weather, terrain, and disposition of his forces. Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may provide ave-

nues of approach into our position from the front, flanks, or rear. Conversely, it may prevent the enemy's use of armored, mechanized, or airborne forces in certain areas. Cross compartments may provide the enemy with suitable defense or delaying positions. The existence of suitable objectives, drop or landing zones, indicates where airborne forces may be employed. The presence of suitable beaches suggests where enemy amphibious forces may land. The locations of adequate assembly areas and attack positions indicate where enemy missile launchers may be located. Accordingly, the intelligence officer determines the "where" of each enemy capability through analysis and integration of the characteristics of the area of operations with the situations of the opposing forces. If the enemy is physically capable of launching an attack, the G2 asks himself in effect, "Where can he do it?" If the enemy defends, he asks, "Where are suitable defense positions and to what places must reinforcements be moved before they can be committed?" If the enemy delays in successive positions, he asks, "Where are the favorable delaying positions?"

b. Examples.

(1) If the enemy can attack, and the situation and the area of operations indicate that the attack may strike anywhere along the friendly front, the partially stated enemy capability becomes: "Attack along our front * * *." In other circumstances, enemy capabilities, stated in part, may include: "Attack to envelop our north flank * * *," or "Attack in the direction BEIRUT ACRE," or "Land (amphibious or airborne) forces in the vicinity of * * *."

(2) Partial statements of an enemy defense capability may include: "Defend in his present position * * *." or "Defend the line of the OB River * * *."

(3) Delay capabilities may include: "Delay in present and successive positions to the line of the HAN River * * *." or "Delay along the general lines PAULU-JOANA, PENNYAWILL-THIR, * * *."

(4) Partial statements of the enemy's reinforcement capability may include: "Reinforce an envelopment of our north flank * * *." or "Reinforce his defense of the line * * *."

J-23. The "In What Strength" of an Enemy Capability

a. The strength the enemy can use in any par-

ticular capability depends primarily upon the composition, disposition, and strength of his available forces. Order of battle intelligence furnishes necessary data.

b. Forces which the enemy has committed against friendly units can be employed in almost any capability the enemy chooses to adopt. If six mechanized battalions are committed against a division, the enemy can attack with six mechanized battalions, supported by all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons. He also can defend in his present position with the same six battalions and the same support. In addition to the forces committed, the enemy also can use the reserves available at any echelon. If the enemy has six battalions committed and a regiment in reserve, he usually can reinforce either his attack or his defense with the reserve regiment. A partial statement of this capability could be, "Attack now to envelop our north flank with six mechanized battalions supported by all available artillery, and nuclear weapons, air, reinforced by one mechanized regiment at the following times and places * * *."

c. The statement of strength is usually confined to close combat units such as infantry, armor, guerrilla, and mechanized (including reconnaissance) units and their combat support means such as artillery, air, nuclear weapons, and chemical agents. The usual unit of enemy strength is the battalion or a larger unit. Guerrilla strength is expressed in total numbers, if more appropriate. Units smaller than the battalion may be used, if appropriate. The number and details of artillery, air, and similar units, available to support the enemy's operations, are specified in the "strength" subparagraph of the intelligence estimate and are usually not repeated in the statement of a capability involving support of close combat units.

d. Reference to "in what strength" usually is omitted in the statement of enemy capabilities for withdrawal and delay in successive positions, as it is implied that such actions involve all the available forces.

J-24. Capabilities in Support of Combat Forces

a. Some enemy capabilities refer specifically to the support to close combat forces rather than to the capabilities of close combat units. Such capabilities include air; nuclear, chemical, and biolog-

ical operations; cover and deception; and electronic warfare capabilities.

b. Enemy combat support capabilities, such as use of electronic warfare and cover and deception, are stated when enemy implementation of such activities will significantly affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Statements of such capabilities include, when the capability can be implemented, the area over which the capability will be effective, and the enemy resources available or the results that can be accomplished. The "where" is omitted if it is meant anywhere throughout the unit area of operations. For example, "Start cover and deception operations at any time to include imitative and manipulative transmissions and use of special units capable of depicting two divisions, either tank or mechanized rifle," or Aggressor can, under the proper conditions intercept electromagnetic radiations emanating from our transmitters, and jam our receivers.

J-25. Reinforcement Capabilities

a. The time required for an enemy to move troops from one place to another and then commit them to action is determined on the basis of factors derived from careful analysis of past similar enemy movements. The considerations described below are applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors in operations against an emeny force. See FM 30-102 for Aggressor troop movements.

b. To determine the time when the enemy can employ an uncommitted unit, the travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can be committed is calculated. To the travel time is added the closing time (pass time (PST) of a column). Except when observation of enemy units is continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to determine the earliest time at which the enemy can reinforce, it is only necessary to add the travel plus closing time to the time last seen. For example, if an enemy reinforcement was last seen at 0800 hours and it can be employed to envelop our north flank one hour after starting movement, it is assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus 1 hour). In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, travel time only is considered. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.

c. Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements of enemy reinforcing capabilities preferably include both the earliest time and the time after starting movement when the reinforcement can be accomplished. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mech Regt at 0900 hours, or one hour after starting movement." When the time since the last report is greater than the after starting movement time, only the after starting movement time is given. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mech Regt now, or one hour after starting movement." When the number of reinforcements is large, or the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are presented in tabular form. For example, the enemy can reinforce his attack or his defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated below:

Unit	Place	Motor	Foot
45th Mech Regt—	RJ 638	Now or 1 hr after starting movement.	091205 Jun or 4 hr 5 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090930 Jun or 1 hr 30 min after starting movement.	091605 Jun of 3 hr 5 min after starting movement.
37th Mech Regt—	RJ 638	091000 Jun or 2 hr after starting movement.	100740 Jun or 23 hr 40 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090920 Jun or 1 hr 20 min after starting movement.	091430 Jun or 6 hr 30 min after starting movement.

d. In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, the effects of such characteristics of the area of operations as avenues of approach and logical enemy reactions to friendly courses of action are considered. For reinforcement of an attack capability, attack positions are selected for battalions and regiments and forward assembly areas for division and larger units. For units moving to reinforce a defense, defense or counterattack positions are selected. For movements by aircraft, logical landing or drop zones from which the enemy forces can materially affect the accomplishment of the mission are selected.

e. The time required by the enemy to entruck, detruck, issue extra ammunition, make detailed reconnaissance, issue orders, deploy, or move from an attack position to a line of departure, is not considered because all may be completed before starting the operation or simultaneously with the movement.

f. The guidance below is applicable until experience factors against a particular enemy are developed.

(1) Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements. Compute motor movement time only for distances greater than 10 kilometers (six miles). If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor movement time.

(2) Consider a foot march of more than 20 miles as a forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 175 miles as a forced march for motorized units, and a movement of more than 140 miles as a forced march for tank and mechanized units.

(3) If a column begins to close prior to the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), closing time is computed at the night rate of march; if a column begins to close at or shortly after BMNT, use the day rate of march. If a column begins to close prior to the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), use the day rate of march; if a column begins to close at or shortly after EENT, use the night rate of march.

(4) To move an enemy infantry battalion, move and close the entire unit. To a move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and close two-thirds of the combat elements, that is, two battalions of an infantry regiment, two regiments of an infantry division. To move a U.S. type armored division, or other unit with a similar flexible organization, move and close two-thirds of the entire division.

APPENDIX K

ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATION

(STANAG 2077; SOLOG 93)

K-1. General

a. Enemy strength is seldom constant in combat. It undergoes continuous fluctuation through casualties and subsequent replacements. This inherent fluctuation establishes the basic premise that strength figures computed on any military force not under friendly control can only be approximations. Difficulty is encountered when attempting to compute the troop strength of insurgent or guerrilla forces, since these units often form, disband, and reform in another area of operations. An attempt must be made to provide the commander an estimate of the size of the insurgent infrastructure, regular, and irregular forces.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, and capability to employ nuclear weapons and CBR agents. Enemy strength normally is presented in terms of numerical strength and strength by type of unit. Nuclear weapons are expressed in terms of total number and size of weapons available; CBR agents are expressed in terms of weight and type of agent that can be employed in a given period.

K-2. Explanation of Terms

a. Numerical strength is the expression of a unit or force in terms of numbers of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

b. Initial strength of an enemy unit or force comprises the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment authorized by established and approved tables of organization and equipment (TOE).

c. Effective strength of an enemy unit or force consists of that part, including logistic components, of its initial strength which is currently capable of combat employment.

d. Strength by type unit is the expression of units or forces in terms of numbers of units by type, such as infantry, armor, artillery, and air.

K-3. Initial Compilation of Effective Strength

a. Prior to and at the onset of hostilities, effective strength is compiled from intelligence estimates based on the initial strength and such circumstances as:

(1) The degree to which the enemy unit is up to initial strength at the time.

(2) Whether the enemy maintained large standing forces before the outbreak of hostilities.

(3) Whether war was premeditated.

(4) Whether any warning of war was (or would be) received.

(5) Whether the enemy was (or would be) committed in other theaters.

(6) Movement facilities and lines of communication (adequacy of land, sea or air; whether interior or exterior).

b. Further estimates are based on:

(1) A consideration of the previous estimates (if any) of effective strength as well as more recent reliable intelligence.

(2) The incidence of casualties, reinforcements and replacements.

c. The calculations, which are to be expressed as percentages of the initial strength, are computed as follows (Where it is apparent that a percentage does not accurately reflect the fighting ability of a unit, it may be necessary to elaborate on this figure):

(1) A percentage attrition rate is deducted, when experience has enabled this to be established for the circumstances. (This rate is based on those men, weapons and equipment temporarily not available to a unit for reasons other than battle casualties or losses.)

(2) Subtractions (or additions) are made in the light of reliable intelligence. (Any items having only a temporary significance should have their time-lapse noted on the estimate.)

(3) The following (which should be physically counted where possible, but which, in nuclear war, is more often based on statistical estimates) is then deducted:

    (a) *Personnel.*
      1. Killed.
      2. Prisoners of war.
      3. Wounded noneffectives.

    (b) *Weapons and Equipment.*
      1. Destroyed.
      2. Captured.
      3. Damaged to extent requiring workshop repair.

(4) Personnel reinforcement and replacement of weapons and equipment is then added in accordance with the scale estimated, or the scale justified by reliable intelligence, where this is different. In the absence of other guidance, and where the enemy has secure lines of communication to the main base, it is to be assumed that:

    (a) Personnel reinforcement can be completed within 72 hours.

    (b) Small weapons and light equipment can be replaced within 72 hours: other weapons and equipment can be replaced within 6 days.

d. Resultant calculations are expressed as percentages of TOE strength where possible; however, numerical expression may be necessary to present a better understanding of the combat capability of a force and provide the commander with a basis for comparison.

e. The computation of enemy strength requires the utmost caution and alertness for intelligence that may reveal the enemy's actual strength. This is especially true at the onset of hostilities when accurate intelligence pertaining to enemy strength is lacking or inadequate, and the initial strength figure is only an approximation.

K-4. Numerical Strength Computation Formulas

a. Effective strength—TOE strength minus losses, plus replacements.

b. Percentage of
$$\text{TOE strength} = \frac{\text{Effective strength} \times 100}{\text{TOE strength}}$$

c. In time of peace, strength generally can be computed by annual induction quota times term of conscript service, plus cadre.

K-5. Computation of Strength by Type of Unit

a. Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category and type. Normally, order of-battle analysts account for enemy units down to and including two echelons below their own level of command. For example, an analyst at division level would express enemy strength in battalion sized units.

b. Expressing strength in terms of number of units by type within an enemy force is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and a readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the order of battle analyst cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy's strength compared to friendly forces. The enemy may have eight battalions of infantry in a given area, and only five friendly battalions may be located in the same area. However, because of differences in organization, the total friendly strength may exceed that of the enemy force.

c. Techniques for computing strength by type of unit are thoroughly discussed in paragraphs J-6 through J-9. Organic or supporting artillery and reconnaissance units are considered and counted as committed forces unless known otherwise. For example, organic divisional artillery within range is considered committed unless it is located outside the friendly commander's area of influence and not capable of firing support missions. Frequently, artillery units are listed as fire support units when categorizing enemy strength. Numerical tabulation of the committed forces and reinforcements, as well as their individual strengths in personnel and equipment, is maintained on a strength worksheet (fig. 7-8).

APPENDIX L

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO PERINTREP (STANAG 2014, SOLOG 17R)

1. Format of Order of Battle Annex

   Notes. 1. Omit items not applicable and renumber remaining paragraphs.
   2. All entries are followed by a comment.
   3. Evaluation of source and information, including type of source, accompanies each entry.

(Classification)

ORDER OF BATTLE

Annex ＿＿, (OB) to PERINTREP NO. ＿＿,＿＿, Corps, ＿＿

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (See appendix 1, Overlay). An overlay is usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The initial subparagraphs always consist of identification and disposition; the remaining subparagraphs contain information pertaining to organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate units from left to right, or top to bottom, as displayed on the overlay. Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.

2. STRENGTH. This paragraph contains information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength figures of individual units may be listed.

3. TACTICS. Only new tactics and deviations from prescribed tactical doctrine are reported.

4. TRAINING. New development and recent changes in training programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the initiation of hostilities are reported.

5. LOGISTICS. Enter data concerning those items which will affect current enemy operations such as supply status, supply system, and locations of supply facilities.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. This paragraph includes data on the combat effectiveness of enemy units, either of the entire force or of a major tactical unit. Items indicating morale, esprit, quality of troops and commanders are listed. The ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission is expressed.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA. Personalities, unit history, field post numbers (FPO), code numbers and names, order of battle changes, and any other item of order of battle intelligence that cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs are listed.

Acknowledge.

(SIGNATURE)

(Classification)

(Classification)

Appendixes:
Distribution:
OFFICIAL
(NAME OF G2)

2. Example of Order of Battle Annex
Annex B (OB) to PERINTREP 29, 3 Corps, 201800 August 19 _____

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, Overlay).

a. All PW captured during period are from Aggressor 2d Combined Arms Army. Unit identifications include: (C–1)

17 Mech Div	30 Mech Div	32 Mech Div
283 Mech Regt	141 Mech Regt	132d Mdm Tk Regt
290 Mech Regt	142 Mech Regt	
	130 Mdm Tk Regt	
	130 Recon Bn	

COMMENT: 32 Mech Div accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 Tk Div previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

b. Two large missile-type weapons mounted on large amphibious Armored carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vic MP 420513. (B–2)

COMMENT: Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously unlocated.

c. Captured Aggressor field order reveals plan to attach 40 Tk Div to 2d CAA effective 22 Aug. (B–1)

COMMENT: PW previously reported 40th Tk Div moving to reinforce 2d CAA. Aggressor main effort probably planned for this area.

2. STRENGTH.

En losses reported during period:

	PW	KIA	ARTY	ARMOR	AIR	VEH
16 Mech Div	37	302	2	4	1	21
30 Mech Div	16	52	8	1	--	16
32 Mech Div	8	12	--	--	--	4
Total 3 US Corps Sector	61	366	10	5	1	41

COMMENT: Personnel losses, which have shown a marked increase during the period, have been sustained mostly by Aggressor combat patrols. Aircraft loss was H1, Observation Helicopter equipped with AERO radar. Overall strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

3. TACTICS.

a. PW from 16 Mech Div and 30 Mech Div state they have been instructed in the event their units are cut off to continue fighting as guerrilla units or in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much U.S. Army property as possible before gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (C–6)

COMMENT: Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear areas can be expected if elements of these units are cut off.

b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for battalion, company and platoon commanders, written by G/D GRIBOYEDOV entitled "Tanks Out Front," (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting U.S. patrols and advancing forces to pass through Aggressor lines. A coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and

(Classification)

(Classification)

rear elements, with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining U.S. forces. (B-2)

COMMENT: Considering Aggressor doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm, the above tactic is assumed a possibility, particularly in view of reports of probable employment of 40 Tk Div (para 1).

4. TRAINING.

a. Reference paragraph 3b.

b. Indications of Aggressor concern for COMSEC is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio security and communications procedures. (B-2)

COMMENT: ASA confirms Aggressor lack of radio discipline and states that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief operations. Numerous Aggressor security violations have been noted since 17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. PW state Aggressor supply personnel have recently contacted local merchants, farmers, and fishermen for supplies of most Class I items. (C-6)

COMMENT: Aggressor either has critical shortage of Class I items or has a bottleneck in the supply system requiring local procurement of Class I items.

b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported Aggressor stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of frontline divisions. (B-2)

COMMENT: Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet undetermined. Would indicate Aggressor may be planning major offensive soon.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

a. PW from 16 Mech Div and 30 Mech Div state morale is high but senior officers are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while the 32 Mech Div and 56 Tk Div have, until recently, been assigned less hazardous missions. (F-6)

COMMENT: Analysis of unit history and recent operations of Aggressor 2d CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and the fact that 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Div has not been engaged in combat with U.S. Forces in this campaign.

b. PW reports 30 Mech Div to be redesignated 30 "Fusilier" Mech Div for superior combat record. (F-6)

COMMENT: 3 U.S. Corps rates combat effectiveness of 30 Mech Div from excellent to outstanding in comparison to other Aggressor divisions in same sector. 30 Mech Div casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

a. Personalities identified by PW: (C-1)

CG, 40th Tk Div	G/D GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P. (Ref 3b)
CO, 282 Mech Regt	Col CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.

(Classification)

(Classification)

CO, 283 Mech Regt	Col UNDSET, Bjornstjerne (Acting CO)
CO, 130 Mdm Tk Regt	Col STEENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 Mdm Tk Regt	Col MATTEZ, Mario

COMMENT: Confirms previously obtained information.

b. Unit History: Officer PW stated his unit (32 Mech Div) trained extensively during 1965 and 1966 in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F–6)

COMMENT: Special training received by 32 Mech Div should increase its overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No evidence of other units so trained.

c. Field Post Numbers: Captured document reveals Aggressor field post numbers being used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and last three digits are transposed. Field post number of 46 Mech Div will appear as 75031 instead of 31750. (B–1)

COMMENT: Aggressor has employed this system previously as a security measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different patterns during future operations.

Acknowledge.

LEE
Lt Gen

Appendixes:
1–En Disp Overlay
2–Aggressor Army Org Chart
3–Aggressor Training Pamphlet

Distribution: Same as PERINTREP 29

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GRANT
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Note. In joint service operations, the Order of Battle Annex to the PERINTREP will be replaced by the Order of Battle Annex to the PERINTSUM as contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12.

(Classification)

APPENDIX M

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FORMAT

(Classification)

> Issuing Section and Headquarters[1]
> Location
> Date and Time

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER____
Reference(s) : Maps, charts, or other documents.

1. MISSION

State the assigned or assumed unit mission.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

This paragraph discusses the influence of the area of operations on enemy intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversive efforts and on friendly countermeasures, where appropriate.

a. Weather. Discuss the effects of the weather on enemy battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Light data and weather forecasts or climatic information as appropriate should be considered. Conclude the discussion with a statement as to whether or not the weather favors enemy collection efforts and the impact of the weather on friendly countermeasures.

b. Terrain. Consider such factors as observation, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach and conclude the discussion with effects of these factors on enemy collection efforts and the impact on friendly countermeasures.

c. Other Factors. List other factors which may be considered, if pertinent, in separate subparagraphs: political, economical, sociological, psychological and transportation.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

Discuss in this paragraph enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities in terms of the current situation and recent and significant activities. Include in the discussion, where appropriate, known factors regence efforts.

a. Intelligence.

(1) Ground surveillance and reconnaissance.
(a) Visual observation.
(b) Patrols.
(c) Ground radar.
(d) Infrared surveillance.
(e) Unattended ground sensors.
(f) Other.
(2) Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance.
(a) Intrusion flights.

(Classification)

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[1] If distributed outside the headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command and the ending modified accordingly.

        (b) Stand-off flights.
        (c) Sensors.
        (d) Reconnaissance satellites.
     (3) Signal intelligence.
        (a) COMINT.
        (b) ELINT.
     (4) Guerrillas/Insurgents.
     (5) Espionage.
     (6) Other: Line crossers, refugees, PW, etc.
  b. Sabotage.
     (1) Military (key installations, lines of communications, etc.).
     (2) Economic.
  c. Subversion.
     (1) Propaganda.
     (2) Terrorism.
     (3) Political.

4. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES
  a. Enumeration of enemy capabilities.
     (1) Intelligence.
     (2) Sabotage.
     (3) Subversion.
  b. Analysis and discussion. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities to provide a basis for conclusions as to the relative probability of adoption of above enumerated enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.

5. CONCLUSIONS.
  a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive and sabotage capabilities.
  b. Effects of enemy capabilities on friendly courses of action.
  c. Effectiveness of current friendly countermeasures.
  d. Additional friendly countermeasures or emphasis needed.

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ANNEX TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Organization Name
Location
Strength (Actual and Authorized)
Leadership and Key Personalities
Liaison, Coordination and Cooperation with Other Intelligence, Subversive
and Sabotage Organizations
Capabilities
Typical Activities
Strengths and Weaknesses
Other Information as Required

APPENDIX N

EXAMPLE OF A DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ANNEX
(When issued separately from an operation order)

(STANAG 2014, 2098; SOLOG 90)

(Classification)

Copy No 4 of_____ copies
20th Inf Div
ZELLE (4671), BUTTANO
101900 September 19____
BQ 13.

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operations Order 24

Reference: Map, BUTTANO, Edition 2, 1:50,000 sheets 204 (ZELLE-PAGT.)

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

See INTSUM, this HQ, 101800 September, and Appendix 1, Situation Overlay.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

 a. Essential Elements of Information. Will Aggressor reinforce his forces along the FLOOD River before the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to the mechanized regiment and the medium tank regiment in vicinity of BURG.

 b. Other Intelligence Requirements.

 (1) Will Aggressor continue to defend in his present position? If so, how will he organize his forces on the ground, and with what troops? Special attention to locations and activities of reserves, and vulnerability to nuclear attack.

 (2) Will Aggressor attack prior to 110500 September? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis Hill 536—Hill 524—CR 981.

 (3) Will Aggressor employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yields, and what delivery means?

 (4) Will Aggressor use CB agents? If so, what agents, when, how and where?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

 a. Orders to attached and subordinate units.

 (1) 1st Bde.

 (2) 2d Bde.

 (a) Reports as obtained.

 1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

 2. Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parts.

 3. Clearing lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

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(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

4. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

5. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

6. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

7. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Activity in medium tank regiment (−) and tank battalion assembly areas in vicinity of BURG.

2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(3) 3d Bde.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of CR 987.

2. Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

3. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of FLOOD River.

4. Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

5. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

6. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols and time they were observed or contacted.

7. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

8. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

9. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Activity in medium tank regiment (−) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(4) 1/21 Cav Report as obtained.

(a) Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

(b) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

(c) Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

(d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles with Aggressor position in division zone.

(e) Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

(f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

(g) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

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(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

      (5) Div Arty.

        (a) Report as obtained.

          1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

          2. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

          3. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed or contacted.

          4. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

          5. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

        (b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of position.

      (6) 20 Avn.

        (a) Report as obtained.

          1. Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of CR 987.

          2. Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

          3. Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill 536 (north of BURG).

          4. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

          5. Location and size of ammunition sites, location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

          6. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).

          7. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

        (b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

          1. Movement on the following roads:

            a. North on Highway 25.

            b. West on Highway 2.

            c. West on Highway 4.

          2. Activity in medium tank regiment (−) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

          3. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

          4. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

      (7) 20 Engr. Report as obtained.

        (a) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

        (b) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

    b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

      (1) 1st Corps is requested to provide:

        (a) As obtained.

          1. Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill 536 (north of BURG).

          2. Number, types, direction of movement, and time of movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone, with special attention to Highway 2.

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(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

3. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

4. Evidence of field fortifications and troop concentrations along the following lines:

    a. Hill 503—CR 987.

    b. Hill 518—Hill 536—Hill 499.

5. Location and size of ammunition storage sites and locations, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

6. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

7. Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

8. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

9. Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

10. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

11. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

12. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

13. All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

14. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:

    a. North on Highway 25.

    b. West on Highway 2.

    c. West on Highway 4.

2. Activity in medium tank regiment (−) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4. Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 994.

5. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

6. Command posts, supply points, and medical facilities east of Highway 25.

(2) 18 Inf Div is requested to provide:

(a) As obtained.

1. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

2. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

3. Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

4. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

5. Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

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(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

<u>6.</u> Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

<u>7.</u> Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

<u>8.</u> Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

<u>9.</u> The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

<u>10.</u> All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

<u>11.</u> The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400 September.

<u>1.</u> Movement on the following roads:

<u>a.</u> North on Highway 25.

<u>b.</u> West on Highway 2.

<u>c.</u> West on Highway 4.

<u>2.</u> Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 994.

(3) 52 Mech Div is requested to provide as obtained:

(a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

(b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

(c) Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

(d) Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

(e) Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

(f) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

(g) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(h) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

(i) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(j) All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

(k) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(4) Supporting USASA units provide information derivable from IGINT and ESM and will respond to specific tasking as described in separate instructions.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

See Division SOP.

5. DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

a. Maps. SOP distributions of map, BUTTANO 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT.

b. Photographic. Following aerial photographs will be furnished:

(1) Basis cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximate), six copies of each brigade and Div Arty; one copy each tank battalion, mechanized

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(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

infantry battalion, 1/21 Cav, division engineer, aviation battalion or group, and division signal officer.

(2) Annotated airphotos distributed automatically, as available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Appendix 2, Counterintelligence.

b. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division tactical operations center (DTOC) to minimize number of aircraft in air over division zone prior to attack.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

Effective 110800 September units will submit INTSUM at 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400, and 0400 hours daily in lieu of times prescribed in division SOP.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

None.

Acknowledge.

POWERS
Maj Gen

Appendixes: 1—Situation Overlay
              2—Counterintelligence
Distribution: Same as OPORD_____
OFFICIAL:
/s/AUSTIN
  AUSTIN
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Note: In joint service operations where international standardization agreements do not apply, the Intelligence Annex in JCS Publication 12 will be used.

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APPENDIX O

EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE WORKBOOK FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. ENEMY OPERATIONS
   a. Units
      (1) Guerrillas
      (2) Political (to include infrastructure)
      (3) Underground
      (4) Others
   b. Modus Operandi
      (1) Tactical
      (2) Political
      (3) Propaganda
      (4) Logistics
      (5) Sabotage, Assassination etc.

2. CIVILIAN POPULACE
   a. Hostile
   b. Friendly
   c. Neutral

3. THIRD COUNTRY OPERATIONS
   a. Units
   b. Personnel
   c. Command
   d. Organizations
   e. Logistics
   f. Training Areas and Programs
   g. Other Support Operations

4. ORGANIZATIONS
   a. Political
   b. Military/Guerrilla
   c. Paramilitary
   d. Command

   e. Logistical
   f. Propaganda
   g. Subversive

5. TARGETS AND LOCATION
   a. Command and Tactical Units
   b. Paramilitary
   c. Political Cells
   d. Propaganda Cells
   e. Supply Installations and Caches
   f. Line of Communications and Supply

6. EFFECTS OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN
   a. Military Operations
   b. Political Activities
   c. Economic Factors

7. LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEMS
   a. In-Country
   b. Third Country

8. RECRUITING AND TRAINING
   a. Military/Guerrilla
      (1) In-Country
      (2) Third Country
   b. Political
      (1) In-Country
      (2) Third Country
   c. Others
      (1) In-Country
      (2) Third Country

9. MISCELLANEOUS

APPENDIX P

SAMPLE METHOD OF INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE WITH OTHER TRAINING

INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO OTHER SUBJECTS

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
CHARACTER GUIDANCE AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT.	Security.	Stress the moral obligation of all military personnel to report violations of security.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES.	The intelligence chain.	Show intelligence structure from the individual soldier to DA.
RULES OF LAND WARFARE AND GENEVA CONVENTION.	Handling of PW and other persons of intelligence interest.	Correct treatment of enemy PW means more information during interrogations.
TROOP INFORMATION.	Orientation in foreign armies. Aggressor, the maneuver enemy.	Use foreign armies as a topic, if possible. Otherwise integrate as much information as is possible considering the primary topic scheduled.
CONCEALMENT AND COVER.	Counterintelligence. Patrolling.	Good concealment and camouflage denies the enemy information about our dispositions, both troops and supplies. Discussion of noise and light discipline should be included.
FIELD SANITATION.	Counterintelligence.	Clean bivouac areas mean less information for the enemy.
FIRST AID.	Survival. Patrolling.	Troops on patrol or evading capture must often treat injuries without professional aid or medical supplies.
GUARD DUTY.	Counterintelligence. Use of Aggressor. Security.	Use challenge and password in the field as well as garrison. Maintain bivouac security guard against infiltration and guerrilla activities. Practice cover and concealment. Use Aggressor to add realism in demonstrations and practical exercises.
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST CBR ATTACK.	Reporting. Necessity for speed in reporting.	Report CBR equipment whenever observed. A person detecting the use of CBR must report: (a) location; (b) time of attack; and (c) method of release (if known).
INSPECTIONS.	Patrolling. All intelligence subjects.	Troops, especially NCO's must know the difference between a formal field inspection and the inspection of a patrol. During garrison inspection, question individuals about meaning of combat intelligence, observation, counterintelligence, etc.
EVASION AND ESCAPE.	Collecting and reporting information. Camouflage and concealment. Scouting and patrolling. Map and compass reading. Survival.	Remember and report information of intelligence value; practice cover and concealment techniques during escape and evasion training. Apply the principles of scouting patrolling as insurance for successful evasion. Weather may be used as a cover for evaders and escapers but may complicate the escape effort.
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY ECONOMY, AND COST CONSCIOUSNESS.	Counterintelligence. Security.	Do not leave equipment where the enemy can pick it up. Discarded equipment is as important a source of information to the enemy as any other data. Littered bivouac areas mean more information for the enemy. Practice security measures.

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ELEMENTARY.	Patrolling. Reporting. Security.	A patrol acts as the eyes and ears of the commander. Messages used to report information must be clear, concise, and timely. Be security conscious.
ANTIGUERRILLA AND ANTI-INFILTRATION TRAINING.	Counterintelligence. Collection of information. Handling of PW.	Guards and sentries should practice cover and concealment at all times; discover the enemy before being discovered; get the drop on the enemy and attempt to capture him for interrogation. Report guerrilla activities. Other troops must be alerted and antiguerrilla operation conducted.
DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK.	Collecting and reporting. Counterintelligence.	Good camouflage and concealment prevent detection from both air and ground. Practice light discipline. Use Aggressor to test cover effectiveness and discipline.
HASTY FORTIFICATIONS.	Observation. Counterintelligence.	Select a position that affords good observation, camouflage it well, and practice light and noise discipline.
INDIVIDUAL DAY TRAINING.	Observation. Counterintelligence. Security.	Observation must be continuous. Practice cover and concealment. Use cover at all times. The chances of avoiding capture are enhanced by following the simple rules taught in scouting and patrolling and use of cover and concealment.
INDIVIDUAL NIGHT TRAINING.	Counterintelligence. Map and compass reading. Collecting and reporting information. Evasion and escape.	Practice light and noise discipline. Use compass and the stars to determine direction. Use night observation and listening techniques to collect information.
MAP AND AERIAL IMAGERY.	Reporting information. Patrolling. Counterintelligence.	Learn how to use coordinates in reporting information. Aerial imagery is valuable both for obtaining and verifying information. Use map and aerial imagery to select patrol routes that afford maximum cover and concealment.
MARCHES AND BIVOUACS.	Maps and aerial imagery. Counterintelligence. Collecting and reporting information. Handling PW and persons of intelligence interest. Security. Handling captured documents.	Use of maps and aerial imagery for planning routes and selecting bivouac areas. Practice cover and concealment, communications security, noise and light discipline. Leave a clean bivouac area. Remove all unit signs, etc. Unit intelligence officer should check area. Use Aggressor to add realism to problem. Observe for enemy activity, report unusual activity. Attempt to capture Aggressor PW during problem. Search for documents and properly process them.
MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS.	Collecting and reporting information. Patrolling.	Importance of reporting and marking enemy mines and boobytraps/ Patrols must be proficient in detecting and skirting or passing through enemy minefields. Knowledge of the patterns used by friendly and enemy forces and methods by which mines and boobytraps may be disarmed are very important.
SQUAD AND PLATOON TACTICAL TRAINING.	Collecting and reporting information. Counterintelligence. Maps, compass, and aerial imagery. Handling enemy PW and material. Security.	Review observing, listening, reporting of information, cover and concealment, noise and light discipline. Use challenge and password, compass, map and aerial imagery. Use Aggressor to add realism and to teach handling of PW and enemy documents.

APPENDIX Q

TYPICAL INFORMATION NEEDS IN THE AREA OF INFLUENCE
OF VARIOUS UNITS

CATEGORY OF INFORMATION	SUBCATEGORY OF INFORMATION	TIMELINESS	GENERAL LOCATION (Accuracy in meters)	SPOT LOCATION (Accuracy in meters)
PERSONNEL				
COMPANY	RIFLEMEN, MORTAR OBSERVERS, ARTILLERY OBSERVERS, SQUADS, PLATOON	IMMEDIATE	10, 50	50
BATTALION	ARTILLERY OBSERVERS, PLATOONS	IMMEDIATE	10, 100	50
BRIGADE	ARTILLERY OBSERVERS, COMPANIES	IMMEDIATE	100, 500	50
DIVISION	BATTALIONS	IMMEDIATE	200	100
CORPS	REGIMENTS	IMMEDIATE	500	100
FIELD ARMY	DIVISIONS	IMMEDIATE	500	NA
VEHICLES				
COMPANY	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	10	50
BATTALION	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
BRIGADE	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
DIVISION	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	200	50
CORPS	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	500	100
FIELD ARMY	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	500	100
WEAPONS				
COMPANY	DIRECT FIRE, DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, INDIRECT FIRE, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	10, 50, 200	50
BATTALION	DIRECT FIRE, DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, INDIRECT FIRE, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100, 200	50
BRIGADE	DIRECT FIRE, DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, INDIRECT FIRE, ANTIAIRCRAFT, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100, 200	50
DIVISION	COMPANY-SIZE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, COMPANY-SIZE INDIRECT FIRE (NON NUCLEAR), NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, ANTIAIRCRAFT	IMMEDIATE	200, 100	100
CORPS	BATTALION-SIZE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, BATTALION-SIZE INDIRECT FIRE, NUCLEAR ARTILLARY, ANTIAIRCRAFT	IMMEDIATE, 3 HOURS	500, 100	100
FIELD ARMY	REGIMENT-SIZE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, NUCLEAR ARTILLARY, ANTIAIRCRAFT	IMMEDIATE, 3 HOURS	500, 100	100
STRUCTURES				
COMPANY	ALL	IMMEDIATE	25	50
BATTALION	ALL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
BRIGADE	ALL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
DIVISION	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR LANDING FACILITIES, SUPPLY FACILITIES, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, ADM	30 MINUTES	150	100
CORPS	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR LANDING FACILITIES, SUPPLY DEPOTS, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, BUILDINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE, ADM	1 HOUR	200	100
FIELD ARMY	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR LANDING FACILITIES, SUPPLY DEPOTS, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, BUILDINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE, ADM	2 HOURS	500	100
TERRAIN AND WEATHER				
COMPANY	WEATHER FORECASTS	IMMEDIATE, EACH 12 HOURS	25	25
BATTALION	WEATHER FORECASTS	IMMEDIATE, EACH 12 HOURS	25	25
BRIGADE	WEATHER FORECASTS	IMMEDIATE, EACH 24 HOURS	50	25
DIVISION	RELIEF AND DRAINAGE, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, MAN MADE FEATURES, HYDROGRAPHY, WEATHER FORECASTS	30 MINUTES, EACH 24 HOURS	50	50
CORPS	TOPOGRAPHY, VEGETATION SURFACE MATERIALS, RIVERS & STREAMS, LAKES & PONDS, SWAMPS, MINES & QUARRIES, URBAN AREAS, WEATHER FORECASTS	1 HOUR, EACH 6 & 48 HOURS	100	50
FIELD ARMY	TOPOGRAPHY, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, RIVERS & STREAMS, LAKES & PONDS, SWAMPS, MINES & QUARRIES, URBAN AREAS, WEATHER FORECASTS	2 HOURS, EACH 6 & 48 HOURS	500	100
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS				
COMPANY	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS	IMMEDIATE	10, 100	50
BATTALION	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS	IMMEDIATE	10, 100	50
BRIGADE	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS	IMMEDIATE	100, 500	50
DIVISION	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS, ANTIAIRCRAFT RADARS, RADIOS	30 MINUTES	100, 200, 500	100
CORPS	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS, ANTIAIRCRAFT RADARS, RADIOS	1 HOUR	500, 100	100
FIELD ARMY	ANTIAIRCRAFT RADARS, RADIOS	3 HOURS, 2 HOURS	100, 500	100
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS				
COMPANY	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BATTALION	FRIENDLY, ENEMY, ADM	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BRIGADE	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100	NA
DIVISION	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100, 200	NA
CORPS	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	300	NA
FIELD ARMY	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	500	NA
CONTAMINATED AREAS				
COMPANY	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BATTALION	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BRIGADE	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	200, 500	NA
DIVISION	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE, 1 HOUR	200, 500	NA
CORPS	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE, 1 HOUR	300, 500	NA
FIELD ARMY	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE, 1 HOUR	500	NA

APPENDIX R

AIRCRAFT HOSTILE FIRE REPORT

1. Unit _____.

2. Date fire was received _____. Time of Day _____.

3. Type of Aircraft _____. Serial Number _____.

4. Location/Coordinates where fire was received _____.

5. Altitude of Aircraft _____ (feet above the terrain).

6. Estimate number of rounds fired at aircraft _____. Number of hits aircraft received _____. Where on aircraft were hits taken? _____.

7. Type of mission flown (circle one) :

   a. Armed visual recon
   b. Visual recon
   c. Photo recon
   d. IR recon
   e. SLAR recon
   f. Combat assault
   g. Extraction of troops
   h. Aircraft recovery
   i. Log (resupply)

   j. Command and control
   k. Armed escort
   l. ARA
   m. Administrative
   n. Maintenance test flight
   o. Training
   p. Low level screening
   q. OTHER (explain briefly) _____
   _____

8. Where in the flight profile of the mission was the fire received?

   a. Landing at LZ
   b. Departing LZ
   c. Landing at PZ
   d. Departing PZ
   e. En route
   f. Departing secure base of opns

   g. Arriving at secure base of opns
   h. Inbound on ARA/Gun run
   i. Breaking off gun run
   j. Orbiting over_____
   k. Hovering at _____
   l. OTHER (explain briefly) _____
   _____

9. What airspeed was being flown? _____ knots.

10. What attitude was aircraft?

    a. Straight and level flight
    b. Straight descending
    c. Straight climbing flight
    d. Steep climb
    e. Steep descent

    f. Turning and climbing
    g. Turning in level flight
    h. Turning and descending
    i. Shallow descent

11. Type of enemy fire received? (small arms, automatic or both)

12. Was aircraft in formation? YES NO If yes, were other aircraft in the formation hit? YES NO If yes, what was the position of the aircraft in relation to yours? _____

13. If hit in formation, what formation was used?

14. Condition of aircraft:

    a. HLF (Hit flyable)

    b. HNF (Hit not flyable)
    c. SRR (Shot down-recovered-repairable)
    d. SRN (Shot down-recovered-not repairable)
    e. SNR (Shot down-not recovered)

15. Casualties:
    a. _____KIA   MedEvac   YES   NO
    b. _____WIA

16. Was weather a factor in altitude being flown?   YES   NO

17. Was fire received over what was considered a secure area?
    YES   NO

18. Remarks: (Returned fire, amt, assessments, etc.)

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By Order of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force:

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